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CHAPTER 1
THE PROBLEMS OF GOVERNING FRAGMENTED METROPOLITAN AREAS
Metropolitan regions have emerged in the United States as important economic
units participating in a larger international community (Feiock 2009). Many of the
metropolitan areas in the United States developed with numerous small local
governments, each providing various public services. Today the 330 metropolitan areas
in the United States are home to approximately 60 percent of this nation’s population.
The typical metropolitan area contains about 100 independent local governments with a
variety of specific individual public service functions and often overlapping jurisdictions
(Rawlings 2003). Given the large number of local jurisdictions engaging in interlocal
collaboration, there is considerable academic interest in its nature and consequences.
Further study will prove useful.
Today there is a dearth of systematic “information about particular
interjurisdictional actions that have promoted various forms of cooperation, how and why
these structures evolved, and what happened as a result of the cooperation” (Nunn and
Rosentraub 1997, p. 206). Feiock (2008) concluded that little is currently known about
the dynamics of how governance mechanisms emerge and operate in fragmented
metropolitan areas. Much can be learned by studying how jurisdictions collaborate to
address problems, knowing what works and what does not will give administrators the
knowledge needed to properly design and operate collaborative ventures.
Feiock (2009) found that much of the literature pertaining to urban politics and
public administration tends to focus on regional governments and authorities as a way of
solving collective action problems in metropolitan regions. Contrary to that literature,

2
Feiock argues “there are an array of mechanisms that vary in the extent to which selforganization is evident in their creation and use” (Feiock 2009, p. 358). This study uses
Feiock’s ICA framework to analyze how such mechanisms arise and are used to solve
service provision problems.
Some research examining how metropolitan areas work to produce and provide
services shows that a “complex, multijurisdictional, multilevel organization is a
productive arrangement” (Parks and Oakerson 1989, p. 18). Such findings however, run
counter to the metropolitan reform literature that contends these areas must consolidate
into fewer independent jurisdictions in order to achieve improvement in quality and cost
of public services.
There exists a need for a clear model of cooperation that can be used by
practitioners to plan cooperative activities to address some of the more pressing issues in
local government administration. Cooperation should be relatively easy when all parties
concerned expect to gain from the activity. What is needed at this juncture is a better
understanding of how cooperation can be accomplished when issues are more complex,
and resistance from one or more source is expected.
Frederickson (1999) has argued that metropolitan areas have become so
fragmented in their approach to service delivery that they constitute what he describes as
a “disarticulated state.”
In the high fragmentation of the American metropolis
one can find most of the features of the disarticulated
state-the declining salience of jurisdiction, the fuzziness
of borders, a growing asymmetry in the relationship
between the governed and those who govern, and an
erosion of the capacity of the local jurisdiction to
contain and, thereby, manage complex social, economic
and political issues (Frederickson 1999, p.707).
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It is becoming increasingly clear that the political boundaries of these local
governmental units often are not the same as their relevant economic or problem-solving
boundaries. Many of the problems that afflict local governments transcend local
governmental boundaries. “Fragmentation creates diseconomies of scale, positive and
negative externalities, and common property resource problems” (Feiock 2009, p. 357).
Given the interdependency typically found in metropolitan areas, some
jurisdictions such as Miami-Dade, Florida and Louisville, Kentucky, have concluded that
the consolidation of metropolitan jurisdictions is the correct method for dealing with
these problems. However, consolidation has frequently been resisted. Carr (2004) has
noted that for every community that approves the consolidation of city and county
governments, eight to ten other communities reject such a proposal. Frederickson (1999)
has argued that citizens actually prefer the fragmented nature of their metropolitan areas
and will generally resist consolidation of jurisdictions.
One of the problems this research is designed to address is the lack of a clear
understanding of the role played by factors in collaboration decisions. For example,
existing literature is somewhat conflicting in terms of the likely effect of fiscal stress on a
community when encouraging collaboration. When cost savings are likely, fiscal
pressures are noticeable and political opposition weak, Morgan, Hirlinger and England
(1988) argued that local officials are more likely to engage in interlocal arrangements.
Bartle and Swayze (1997) concluded that fiscal pressure was a frequently mentioned
reason for interlocal collaboration. Agranoff and McGuire (2003) contend that financially
stable jurisdictions are less likely to engage in collaborative activities. Krueger and
McGuire (2005) argue that fiscal stress often leads to more collaborative activity.
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Zeemering’s (2007) research indicated that fiscal pressure stimulus is consistently
mentioned as a reason for collaboration.
Morgan and Hirlinger (1991) argue to the contrary, noting that fiscal stress in a
community is not a major incentive for contracting out. Thurmaier and Wood (2004) also
concluded that cost savings and the presence of fiscal stress were not major reasons for
cities and counties in their sample to collaborate. Likewise, Carr and LeRoux (2005)
examining data gathered in a Citizens Research Council of Michigan study, concluded
that fiscal constraints do not provide a universal rationale for undertaking collaborative
efforts.
Given the significant financial strain Michigan municipalities confront at the end
of the first decade of the new millennium, a better understanding of the role played by
fiscal stress is critical. Local officials in Michigan and elsewhere are actively searching
for ways to reduce costs but maintain service levels. In some instances, local officials
conclude that they can resolve their fiscal problems more effectively by collaborating on
selective services, while remaining separate and independent in other areas of service
delivery. Recent work by Andrew (2009) illustrated that in the current fiscal
environment, local governments may find that interjurisdictional agreements for the
provision of public services are important tools for increasing efficiency and
effectiveness.
In this dissertation, the focus is on collaboration among local governments
because that is the level where most government service provision actually occurs. Local
government is the most visible and, arguably, the most important level of government to
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most Americans. There are an estimated 89,476 local governments currently in the
United States (U. S. Census Bureau 2007).

Definition of Key Terms
Before proceeding further into this study, it is useful to define a few of the key
terms that will be encountered. The term “governance” is widely used today in both
public and private sectors. This term broadly refers to the methods and practices used by
local governments to provide for the numerous goods and services demanded by citizens.
Governance has come to include local and global arrangements; it can be encountered in
formal structures and informal norms and practices. Governance may occur in a
spontaneous way as well as through intentional systems of control (Williamson 1996).
Lynn, Heinrich and Hill (1999) have defined governance as the way government is
organized and the consequences that flow from that organizational structure. The
activities of governance include the participation of many actors from the public, private
and nonprofit sectors in pursuit of public goals.
The terms collaboration and cooperation are often used interchangeably in
research to describe joint service provision. There does not seem to be a firm consensus
in the literature. Collaboration can be defined in several different ways and is seen by
some analysts as an activity apart from cooperation. Eugene Bardach (1998) defines
collaboration as activity between government agencies that results in increased value,
more than can be obtained by working separately. Cooperation, on the other hand, is
defined as an effort “to work together toward a common end or purpose” or “an
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association of persons for mutual benefit.”1 Oftentimes, cooperation occurs without
formal contracts between jurisdictions. Robert Axelrod has identified what he terms a
classical form of cooperation in which groups “pursue their own self-interest without the
aid of a central authority to force them to cooperate with one another” (Axelrod 1984, p.
6). Other scholars have described cooperation as emerging “when localities, to further
shared objectives, cooperate with regional planning councils, nonprofit corporations . . .
informal alliances . . . interlocal agreements” (Nunn and Rosentraub 1997, p. 206).
For purposes of this dissertation, the terms collaboration and cooperation will be
occasionally interchangeable. However, in some contexts there may be subtle differences.
Robert Agranoff and Michael McGuire have stated that the terms collaboration and
cooperation are slightly different when used in studying interlocal activities and should
not be confused. This distinction is subtle, but important when examining interlocal
relationships. They define collaboration as a “purposive relationship designed to solve a
problem by creating or discovering a solution within a given set of constraints such as
time, knowledge, money or competition” (Agranoff and McGuire 2003, p. 4).
Cooperation is described as an activity where actors work jointly to some end and be
helpful to one another as opposed to being hostile or working against one another.
Cooperation between governments can take many forms. These include interlocal
agreements between two or more governments. Also, coalitions or councils of
government established in order to seek federal grants and influence federal policy in a
variety of areas. Post states that “local intergovernmental cooperation, broadly defined,
includes all policy activities that require some level of policy coordination between one
or more local governments. These efforts may include formal or informal agreements
1

American Heritage College Dictionary, 4th Edition, 2002, page 314.
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among local jurisdictions and may or may not require the exchange of revenue” (Post
2002, p. 6). Cooperation can also be encouraged through regional authorities (Feiock and
Carr 2001). Special districts may be formed for purposes of collaboration between
different governments. Both competition and cooperation are present in almost all local
government systems and may be complimentary or not (Feiock 2004).

Current Understanding of how Metropolitan Areas are Governed
Communities in a metropolitan area such as the one studied here are thought to
compete in a market-like fashion to provide their residents with an optimal level of goods
and services while maintaining the lowest possible tax to service ratio. Such competition
should motivate those communities to increase services or lower taxes (Tiebout, 1956).
One of the possible ways to do that is through the creation of “slack resources made
available through the joint implementation of services with another city” (Krueger and
McGuire 2005, p. 7). Yet the work of Tiebout (1956) and Schneider (1986) might suggest
that cities close together geographically providing similar levels of goods and services,
like the five communities examined in this dissertation, compete with one another and
thus have a difficult time collaborating. For collaboration to be successful, there may be
other factors present strong enough to overcome this obstacle.
There has been a considerable amount of scholarly work on interlocal
collaboration. Nunn and Rosentraub (1997) developed a model which took into
consideration four specific dimensions of interjurisdictional cooperation with a sliding
scale of what can be expected depending on how the effort is structured. They found that
cooperation became more difficult when it changed existing patterns of access to
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resources or involved a redistribution of resources. The existing arrangement has
established winners and losers, and current winners typically resist new arrangements.
Oakerson (1999) argues that effective metropolitan governance can and often
does occur without a metropolitan-wide government being in place, even when the area
consists of a large number of small municipalities. While earlier research emphasized the
need to use coercion in order to accomplish collective activities (Olson 1965), Oakerson
and others have concluded that coercion is a very expensive tool. Governments will take
action to avoid being coerced, with the result that there will be failure to take collective
action that may be in the best interests of the region. Parks and Oakerson (1989) have
shown that to facilitate better processes of governance, it is first necessary to develop
governance structures which are based on the willing consent of the participants.

Polycentric Metropolitan Areas
The development of various governing structures in a metropolitan area occupied
by numerous, often competing local governments, has been described as a “polycentric
relationship,” one well-suited to a fragmented metropolitan region (Ostrom, Tiebout and
Warren 1961). Polycentric systems develop through the interactions of multiple
independent sources of authority in the public, private and nonprofit sectors. Polycentric
systems stand in opposition to the monocentric system usually associated with the reform
movement that stresses governmental consolidation. Oakerson (2004) argues that a
polycentric system of governance allows for a greater amount of civic space that enables
a variety of opportunities for participation by non-governmental players in the area.
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Allowing such interaction between government and citizens can lead to a much more
productive approach to problem solving and produce general benefits to the community.
Frederickson (1999) notes that in the absence of a central authority, and under
conditions of the high interdependence that is often found in metropolitan areas today,
there exist highly developed systems of cooperation that serve essentially the same
purpose as the practices of diplomacy between nation-states.

Administrative Conjunction
In order for local governmental actors to balance competing demands for local
autonomy created by fragmentation with expectations that inter-jurisdictional problems
be confronted effectively, Frederickson argues that local governments must practice
“administrative conjunction.” Frederickson’s definition of such activity is “the array and
character of horizontal formal and informal association between actors representing units
in a networked public and the administrative behavior of those actors” (Frederickson
1999, p. 708). Administrative conjunction is one way in which the costs of cooperative
action can be kept low. These costs, which include those associated with establishing and
maintaining the trust of partners, monitoring performance and enforcing agreements, are
often reduced because the actors know one another and have repeated contacts. Repeated
voluntary cooperation takes the place of a centralized authority in governing the
collective activities of a metropolitan area. Frederickson (1999) argues that the key to
understanding why much of this cooperation occurs is the interdependence of local
jurisdictions within metropolitan areas. He asserts that no jurisdiction is more
interdependent than those making up metropolitan areas. Cooperation between local
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governments is often driven by recognition of such interdependency and the natural
desire of elected public officials and administrators to reduce uncertainty. Frederickson
concludes that effective public administration practiced by local government
administrators is the key to cooperation within metropolitan areas attempting to deal with
the disarticulation of the state.

The Roles Played by Elected and Administrative Officials
This is an aspect of interlocal collaboration that is still underdeveloped. Dealing
with problems on a metropolitan-wide basis to achieve economies of scale or other
benefits is thought to be an unpopular choice for elected officials (Frederickson 1999;
Clingermayer and Feiock 2001). Prior research dealing with interlocal cooperation
examined by Zeemering (2007) concluded that elected officials play a lesser role in
facilitating collaboration. It was argued that it is efforts of a professional city manager
that are more significant. Elected officials are seen as having a more parochial outlook
and less concerned with the environment outside their community. They are relatively
unconcerned with activities that they cannot clearly take credit for at election time.
Zeemering’s own research however concludes that elected officials play a far more
important role in cooperation decisions than was previously thought.
Frederickson and Matkin (2009) surveyed elected and administrative officials in
the metropolitan Kansas City area to measure differences in the ways that local elected
and administrative officials made decisions about interlocal collaboration. The findings
of this study were that “contrary to common views that metropolitan cooperation is more
likely to be supported by the norms of administration and opposed by the norms of
elected office, we did not find a difference . . . in their willingness to participate in the
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proposed project” (Frederickson and Matkin 2009, p. 60). The findings of this study
suggest that elected officials may be more inclined to support interlocal collaboration
than was previously believed.
LeRoux and Carr (2010) examined networks of interlocal agreements in the
metropolitan Detroit area, in part, to test the Frederickson (1999) Administrative
Conjunction theory and Williams (1971) Lifestyle Model. The findings of this study
“suggest that interpersonal networks may be more important to motivating cooperative
behavior in elected officials than for public managers” (LeRoux and Carr 2010, p. 19).
This study found that relationships between elected officials increased the likelihood that
local governments would cooperate through the use of interlocal agreements, thus
indicating that elected officials may play a larger role than was previously thought.

Factors that Motivate or Inhibit Collaboration
Much of the literature on public service cooperation examines the factors that
make communities more or less likely to engage in collaborative activities. There are
many common issues faced by local governments in collaborative situations; how to
maintain sufficient control over service quality and the political costs to be paid, if any, in
relinquishing local control over services. The issues of asset specificity and service
measurability are also important subjects to examine when studying collaboration.2
A widespread presumption in the literature is that relatively homogeneous
communities are more likely to collaborate with one another (Morgan, Hirlinger and
2

Asset specificity is defined as those assets that must be specifically devoted to a particular use and cannot
be easily used elsewhere. It often becomes an important factor in fire service because of the expense of
purchasing items such as fire trucks which can cost between three hundred thousand and one million
dollars. Service measurability is the ability to easily or accurately measure the quality and quantity of
services and is central to understanding the risk to individual governments from collaboration on public
services.
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England 1988; Rawlings 2003; Feiock 2007; Feiock 2008). What is not sufficiently
understood is what specific factors in homogeneous or heterogeneous communities make
them more or less likely to engage in interlocal collaboration.
Campbell and Glynn (1990) indicated that communities with a city manager were
no more likely to enter into collaborative arrangements with other communities for the
provision of services. Contrary to that finding, Morgan and Hirlinger (1991) found that
the presence of a city manager did facilitate more intergovernmental contracting, but
usually only in the provision of public safety services which are the subject of this
research. Supportive research by Brown and Potoski (2003) found that the presence of a
city manager in the community was positively related to whether that local government
would participate in collaborative service provision. Further supporting that conclusion,
Carr and LeRoux (2005) found that the council-manager form of government is a strong
predictor of interlocal contracting. They found that the city manager function can be
viewed as a mechanism for reducing the cost of gathering information. What is still
missing in the literature is a fuller understanding of why having a city manager appears to
make interlocal collaboration more or less difficult.

Demographic Characteristics of Communities
Demographic characteristics are also thought to play a significant role in whether
or not a community will engage in collaboration and if so, what form it will take. Brown
and Potoski (2003) have shown that older industrialized communities such as the five
examined here are more likely than are the newer communities of the southwest to
produce public services through joint contracting or out-sourcing.
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Feiock (2007) argues that demographic homogeneity is important as it reduces the
transaction costs for officials negotiate collaboration agreements with other communities.
There is some statistical correlation between the demographic homogeneity of a
community and the homogeneity of preferences within and between communities (Feiock
2007). While demographic homogeneity between collaborating communities is thought to
reduce the cost of cooperating, homogeneity within each community is also an important
factor as it may reflect homogeneity in service preferences (Feiock 2008).
The percentage of persons aged sixty-five and older has been cited as an
important variable for predicting collaboration. Research has shown that the larger the
percentage of such persons in the population, the more resistant the population is to any
proposed change in the existing level of services (Morgan, Hirlinger and England, 1988).
Race can also be an important factor in analyzing the likelihood of collaboration
in the production and delivery of public services. Research by Morgan, Hirlinger and
England (1988) indicated that the percentage of blacks in the population appeared to
significantly reduce the likelihood of contracting out for health and human services
activity but not necessarily for other kinds of services.
In a comprehensive review of much of the theoretical and empirical literature on
metropolitan fragmentation and interlocal cooperation, Rawlings (2003) found that
heterogeneity, particularly racial heterogeneity, is believed to have a negative impact on
levels of cooperation. Yet contrary to the bulk of the literature, Rawlings own research
involving Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) across the nation found that racial
variation within a metropolitan area is positively linked to greater levels of interlocal
collaboration. Research by Lackey, Freshwater and Rupasingha (2002) indicated that
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local government officials and residents in rural areas were often more suspicious of
collaboration than their urban counterparts.
Housing characteristics in a city are an important factor in collaboration on fire
and Emergency Medical Services (EMS), such as those investigated in this study.
Communities with similar types, age and value of housing are thought to make better
potential partners. Krueger and McGuire (2005) found that cities that enjoy a high taxable
value and high tax revenues were among the least likely to seek additional revenues
through interlocal collaboration. Having similar taxable values, and the potential to raise
similar levels of revenue to financially support the effort are important factors if two or
more communities are going to collaborate on the provision of services.
In the case of the communities examined in this study, the continuing decline in
available revenues with which to provide public services has reportedly been a strong
incentive to search for alternative solutions. The relative openness to collaboration in
general and a more proactive approach to public policy may be factors stimulating this
effort. “Cities that have a more proactive policy agenda and viewpoint should be more
interested in collaboration” (Krueger and McGuire 2005, p. 16).

Shared Geographic Borders and Repeat Interactions between Government Actors
Shared geographic borders are another factor that can influence the decision to
collaborate. Past interactions between interlocal neighbors can have a positive or negative
effect on the decision to collaborate. “Trying to negotiate with uncooperative or
adversarial neighbors is likely to discourage further attempts at cooperation” (Nice and
Fredericksen 1995, p. 129). Foster (1997) found that the absence of natural barriers often
facilitates ties between local governments which find it easier to collaborate across
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political boundaries. There are no natural barriers separating the five cities examined in
this dissertation. They are contiguous, tightly-packed and share common geographic
borders. Post (2002) found that the geographic density of metropolitan area governments
is a significant predictor of the occurrence of interlocal agreements. Fixed geographic
borders often require repeat play among neighboring communities, which can reduce
transaction costs (Feiock 2007). Shared borders can “increase exposure to positive and
negative externalities and lock local neighbors into repeat play that provides
opportunities for mutual assurances” (Feiock 2008, p. 12).
Yet another factor that is examined in this study is the role that trust plays among
collaboration partners. Lackey, et al., (2002) found that a good and long-established
relationship among cooperating jurisdictions increases the chances of continuing success.
In such circumstances, processes often run smoothly because of accumulating levels of
trust between collaborating partners. Park and Feiock (2003) found that the longer the
partners have collaborated the more likely they are to collaborate further. When clustered
together and with repeated contacts, each community can benefit from acquiring and
preserving their reputation for cooperation and commitment. Successful collaboration in
the past could potentially create a reservoir of social and political capital that can be used
to encourage future efforts. Repeated contacts create social capital between the
participants which can often lead to better cooperation (Lackey, et al. 2002). Higher
levels of social capital have a positive effect on levels of intergovernmental cooperation
across the nation as a whole (Rawlings, 2003).
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The Research Setting and Organizing Framework of Dissertation
Many scholars argue that “collaborative management is a core activity for today’s
public manager…and that more and more governments are deeply in the game of
managing at their borders” (Agranoff & McGuire 2003, p. 15). This dissertation explores
aspects of collaboration among local governments with regard to the provision of fire and
emergency medical services in a five-city area in Metropolitan Detroit through a single
combined fire authority. These five contiguous cities are located in the “Downriver” area
of Wayne County, south of Detroit. The proposed collaboration would replace five
separate municipal fire departments with a single fire authority and establish a
mechanism for sharing the costs of the service among these cities.
This case study provides important insights into the obstacles local government
officials confront in attempting interlocal collaboration. These communities are highly
similar demographically and economically. They all employ full-time fire fighters, train
in similar ways and purchase similar fire fighting equipment. All of these communities
have a mayor-city council form of government operating under Michigan’s Home Rule
Statute. All of these communities employ a city manager or someone whose job
description embodies traditional city manager style functions.
A good explanation of the role played by transaction costs has appeared in the
work of others (Feiock 2009; Carr, LeRoux and Shrestha 2009). What is missing in their
work is a clear understanding of how individual actors react to those costs and which
costs are perceived as being most important. Therefore, a chief aim of this research is a
better understanding of the role played by the transactional characteristics of goods, the
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characteristics of communities and regions, the importance of institutional structures and
the characteristics of the services themselves.

The Institutional Collective Action (ICA) Framework
To better understand the processes and actors involved in collaborative service
delivery arrangements, it is useful to have a framework that helps to understand how
organizations and persons operate within such a system. The Institutional Collective
Action (ICA) framework developed by Feiock provides an excellent tool to organize an
examination of these factors. Much of our current understanding about these terms in
context comes from the modern effort to decentralize regional governance and encourage
self-government through the use of horizontally and vertically linked organizations. The
ICA framework builds upon the logic of individual collective action to describe a process
whereby “local governments can act collectively to create a civil society that integrates a
region across multiple jurisdictions through a web of voluntary agreements and
associations and collective choices by citizens” (Feiock 2004, p. 6).
While the ICA framework is an excellent mechanism for grouping the most
commonly studied factors into a few broad categories, it also reveals the lack of scholarly
attention to several other important factors. An advantage of the ICA framework is that it
provides a means to categorize the factors expected to directly affect the incentives for
interlocal cooperation. These factors can be grouped into four categories: (1) state level
rules defining the powers and structure of local units, (2) the service attributes or
characteristics of goods which take into consideration factors such as asset specificity,
difficulty of measurement, production costs, scale economies, capital intensiveness and
labor intensiveness, (3) the demographic and economic characteristics of communities
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and regions, and (4) the administrative and electoral institutions of the governments
themselves.
Governments are, first and foremost political institutions that are spatially bound
and legally constrained in function. What local governments can do is determined by
legislation passed by state government. Therefore, another important factor to examine is
whether state laws promote or even permit collaboration between local governments.
Carr, LeRoux and Shrestha (2009) noted that state level factors such as tax limitations,
mandated services, ways in which governments are formed and potential restrictions on
interlocal collaboration can affect service production decisions.
“State level rules” refer to externally imposed rules such as state statutes and
constitutional provisions that define the legal authority of local governing units and
determine the specific ability of the units to deal with ICA problems. Such rules shape the
strategies available to local units and the incentives that may be provided to encourage or
discourage collaboration. Thus, state tax and revenue restrictions, such as those present in
Michigan, can affect a local unit’s ability to cope.
Feiock’s second factor, the terms “service attributes” and “service characteristics”
of goods encompass matters such as “asset specificity” and “meterability,” the difficulty
of measuring the quality and quantity of output. If certain activity requires that specific
investments be made, and those assets cannot easily be redeployed elsewhere, the local
unit may be reluctant to accept a proposed collaborative effort. Carr, LeRoux and
Shrestha (2009) have argued that asset specificity can create significant costs such as
monitoring activity closely to ensure that a contractor not act opportunistically. If the
nature of the goods establishes a dependency among the local players that locks them into
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a long-term commitment, they may be reluctant to collaborate. If a particular service
requires a large capital expenditure, local governments may conclude that it is better to
contract out its production to a private for-profit entity or in some instances, a non-profit
agency. If the quantity and/or quality of the service provided is difficult to measure or
quantify, local governments may decide that it is better to keep that function in-house.
A third factor identified by Feiock highlights the importance of the economic and
demographic characteristics of communities and regions. How do shared borders and
repeated interaction among neighboring units affect how local government views any
potential collaboration? Moreover, demographic homogeneity within a jurisdiction, and
among collaborating jurisdictions, may make collective effort easier to establish and
maintain. Successful collaboration is more likely when potential partners share similar
political and economic interests (Feiock 2004).
Finally, Feiock argues that administrative and electoral institutions of the
governments themselves will impact their ability to collaborate. Whether city council
members are elected by district or at-large may affect how they view various proposals
involving collaboration. Whether or not a city manager is present may influence whether
or not a unit will collaborate with its neighbors. The presence of progressively ambitious
politicians who harbor plans for higher office and desire to take credit for collaborative
efficiencies may enhance the likelihood of collaborative activities being undertaken
(Feiock 2008).
Another aspect of the ICA framework is the concept that repeated contacts
between local government actors over time can play a significant part in determining

20
whether interlocal collaboration will occur. It is thought that the form that such repeat
play takes can also affect if and how local jurisdictions chose to collaborate.
The relationships that may or may not exist between local government actors can
also play an important role in collaboration decisions. “Local government officials may
be linked through personal relationships, professional associations, regional councils, and
other forms of networks that present opportunities for information sharing that may
increase the likelihood of interlocal service cooperation” (Carr, LeRoux and Shrestha
2009, p. 404). This dissertation will examine the relationships and networks that exist
among the participants interviewed to determine whether such factors play a significant
role in collaboration decisions.
Frederickson (1999) has argued that professional city administrators share a
common professional perspective on issues of cooperation due to their education and
membership in local professional networks and national organizations such as the
International City County Management Association (ICMA). Professional associations
may be a factor in promoting interlocal collaboration (Carr, LeRoux and Shrestha 2009).
Brown and Potoski (2003) have argued that such professional affiliations can help in
developing common understandings and practices among city managers. This dissertation
will examine whether or not such factors are relevant to the collaboration decision.
The framework developed by Zeemering (2007) is also used to obtain a better
understanding of how collaboration actually occurs at the local level. Zeemering
developed and uses this framework to measure the conjunction of policy stimuli,
perceptions of intergovernmental partners and social capital, and the actual terms of the
proposed collaboration. Zeemering argues that “decisions in favor of collaboration
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depend on the officials perceptions of an agenda for collaboration, their assessment of the
terms of collaboration, and their opinion of potential government partners” (Zeemering
2007, p. ix). Zeemering ultimately concludes that collaboration is most likely to occur
when all three causal conditions are present.
This research uses the case of five communities to describe the factors needed for
intergovernmental cooperation to occur and be successful, identify the elected and
administrative actors who usually drive this activity, and explain how they overcome the
sometimes significant transaction costs associated with inter-jurisdictional cooperation.
This research also explores the role that trust between actors play in collaborative
activity. A better understanding of the role of trust, what it means in this context, and
how it is gained or lost, is a significant contribution to the literature on municipal
collaboration activities.
Some of the broad questions asked in this research include the following; 1) what
kinds of conditions and events trigger collaboration, 2) are policy entrepreneurs important
to the collaboration process and if so, what kinds of activities do they engage in, 3) are
fire services easier to collaborate on than other types of public services, 4) is retaining
control over services important to local governments, 5) is trust important to
collaboration and if so, how is it developed, maintained or damaged, 6) how do
collaborating communities choose one another, 7) what kinds of activities can elected
officials engage in to facilitate collaboration, and 8) what kinds of activities can
administrative officials engage in to facilitate collaboration.
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Conclusion
The balance of this dissertation examines the questions raised in the introduction.
Chapter Two reviews the extant literature on this topic and examines different aspects of
interlocal cooperation. It is organized around the Institutional Collective Action
framework developed by Feiock as well as that developed by Zeemering. Chapter Three
describes the methodology used for this research and gives a fuller description of the
characteristics of the area that is the focus of this study.
Chapters Four through Eight discuss a case study of a recent effort to form the
“Downriver Fire Authority” among the Metropolitan Detroit cities of Allen Park, Lincoln
Park, Melvindale, Southgate and Wyandotte. The discussion and analysis in these
chapters is based on information about the effort obtained through in-depth interviews
with participants directly involved in the effort to create the fire authority as well as a
follow up interview done in 2009.
Chapter Four examines the factors motivating five local governments to consider
collaborating with one another in the provision of fire services. Chapter Five examines
what these local governments sought in the operating terms of the collaboration
agreement. Chapter Six examines what is important to these five local governments in
terms of their partners in the collaboration. Chapter Seven examines the differences in the
roles played by elected and administrative officials in these communities when they
attempt to engage in interlocal collaboration. Chapter Eight is drawn from a separate
follow-up interview done with the local government participants.
Chapter Nine is the Summary and Implications of Research. In theory, all of these
communities should make good collaboration partners. The existing literature would lead
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to the conclusion that these communities should be able to successfully collaborate on the
merging of their five fire departments into a single consolidated fire authority.
Requirements necessary for communities to collaborate on this kind of service provision
is the central focus of this research.
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CHAPTER 2
RESEARCH AND THEORY RELATIVE TO INTERLOCAL
PUBLIC SERVICE COLLABORATION

There are many reasons why communities may choose to collaborate with one
another. Demographic differences among communities, real and perceived, can be an
important factor. More homogeneous cities collaborate less intensively than cities in
more heterogeneous markets (Krueger and McGuire 2005). The U. S. Census of
Governments shows that nationwide, there is collaboration occurring. The Census of
Governments indicated that approximately 68 percent of the cities in the study
collaborate with each other and the average value of their efforts was one million dollars
each. The total value of interlocal collaboration was 3.9 billion dollars (U.S. Census
Bureau 1997). “That figure represented 3.4 percent of the total municipal budgets for all
cities that participated in some form of collaboration” (Krueger and McGuire 2005, p.
21).
This examination of the relevant literature will reveal what is currently known and
what is not known about how and why local governments collaborate in the provision of
public services. There is a significant amount of collaboration occurring in a variety of
settings across the nation. There is some understanding of why collaboration occurs in the
provision of certain services but why it doesn’t occur in others or is perceived as difficult
to accomplish in certain service areas is less clear.
Using the Institutional Collective Action (ICA) framework of Feiock (2004), this
chapter examines the factors that make collaboration more or less likely to occur.
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Examining state level rules reveals that the part played by interlocal agreements is not
fully understood. When examining the transaction and production cost characteristics of
public services, a better understanding of the various nuances of transaction and political
costs is needed.
The extant literature reveals conflicts or gaps in our understanding of the role
played by fiscal stress in a community on the decision to collaborate. It is unclear at this
time what collaborating communities are specifically looking for in terms of their
partners. A better understanding of the role of demographics and fiscal capacity in the
decision-making process is needed. There is a lack of consensus in the literature as to the
importance of having a professional city manager present and what specifically it is about
that presence or absence that makes collaboration more or less likely. There is also no
consensus in the literature on the importance of the roles played by elected and
administrative officials, which group drives the decision to collaborate and specifically
how is it done.
This chapter endeavors to sort out some of the conflicting theories and to identify
the gaps in our understanding that currently exist. The balance of this dissertation
analyzes research done in an effort to fill in some of those gaps and obtain a clearer
understanding of the process of interlocal collaboration.

Which is Better? Polycentric or Consolidated Regions
Much has been written about the disarticulation of the modern state and how it
makes administering governments more difficult. There is increased attention being paid
to related topics such as the difference between government and governance. No matter
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what term is used to describe it, “the hollow state” (Milward & Provan, 1993, 2000)
“third party government” (Salamon, 1981) or “the market state” (Bobbitt, 2002) there is
little doubt that government and governance have changed dramatically in the United
States over the past fifty years. Whether it is called cooperation, collaboration (Agranoff
and McGuire 2003) or administrative conjunction (H. George Frederickson 1999), the
public sector is slowly changing to accommodate America’s transformation from an
industrial to an information or knowledge-based society.
One of the ways that local governments are coping with these changes is through
collaboration in the production and provision of public goods and services. One of the
clearest findings coming out of research in this area is that “(m)etropolitan governance
does not require a metropolitan government able to provide or produce services” (Parks
and Oakerson 1989, p. 24). While there are costs and conflicts associated with
fragmented authority spread horizontally between competing local governments, “urban
metropolitan regions are where the inevitable tradeoffs required to coordinate policies
can potentially optimize the public value of collaboration by taking advantage of specific
local conditions” (Feiock 2008, p. 1).
Critics however, look at the relatively low level of collaboration as proof that
voluntary efforts are insufficient. They argue that there are too many separate local
governments but not enough governance in metropolitan areas. What is really needed is a
reduction in the number of governing units through consolidation. Some research has
indicated that the costs of fragmented local government far outweigh benefits. “Those
arguing in favor of fragmented metropolitan area governance contend that such
fragmentation generates competition and leads to more efficient local governments.
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Those calling for more consolidated metropolitan governance contend that fewer local
governments generate economies of scale, minimize externalities and lessen inequalities
between localities” (Post 2000, p. 3). There is research indicating that externalities,
asymmetries of information and the lack of economies of scale more than offset the
efficiency gains that may be generated by local government competition in a fragmented
metropolitan area. It is also argued that consolidation in metropolitan areas reduces the
service inequalities often present in such areas (Hill 1974).
A second school of thought, anchored in the seminal work of Ostrom, Tiebout and
Warren (1961), contends that the plethora of governmental units constitutes a polycentric
system of metropolitan governance that may, nonetheless, function in a coherent and
successful manner. Post (2002) argues that both proponents and opponents of the
polycentric model are, in part, correct. She contends that both groups ignore that certain
factors can and do cause local governments in a fragmented area to cooperate when it is
in their best interest to do so, but that such cooperation is neither easy not automatic.
There are local factors that must be taken into consideration when developing
informal organizations for dealing with metropolitan problems. The United States has a
strong tradition of local self-determination and local autonomy. Michigan is an excellent
example of a state with a strong home rule tradition, and such a tradition can complicate
organizational and collaborative efforts. It would seem to naturally lead to a preference
for a polycentric system of metropolitan governance. A polycentric system of governance
should be easy to adopt when cooperative ventures produce a greater return on
investment for all concerned.
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Agency costs can be yet another problem associated with collaborative activities
by governments. Principal-agent theory suggests that problems can arise when
collaborating governments have officials negotiating and operating on behalf of the entire
community. The government agents that negotiate collaboration agreements on behalf of
the local community may have different preferences than the majority of the citizens of
that community. “The conditions for successful regional governance can be found in the
types of policies, the characteristics of the community, political institutions and the
formal and informal network structures in which local actors are embedded” (Feiock
2007, p. 10).
Some scholars have argued that regionalism, dealing with problems as a part of a
larger group as opposed to operating solely as individual communities, is re-emerging as
a preferred solution for localities (Dodge 1990; Gage, 1992). Negative externalities that
can be resolved to the mutual benefit of all (Pareto criterion) must be distinguished from
those whose resolution entail costs for some localities and benefits for others. “Mutual
benefit issues will generally support interlocal or regional coordination while those with
negative externalities will frequently frustrate efforts to collaborate” (Julnes and Pindur
1994, p. 423). The latter may be candidates for more coercive “metro-wide” solutions.
Much of the literature has questioned the wisdom of the ways in which
governmental power in metropolitan area governments is organized. The “consolidation”
perspective calls for broader governance, perhaps imposed by higher level governments.
Parks and Oakerson (1989) counter that there is no one best way to organize the
metropolis but that rather “metropolitan areas require patterns of governance that are
sufficiently open to allow for diverse solutions that respond to variable conditions.” They
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argue for a local public economy approach that views the metropolitan area as
“complexly organized by a variety of both small and large provision units linked in
numerous ways to a variety of production units. Jurisdictional fragmentation is
augmented by organizational overlays that may provide and/or produce services” (Parks
and Oakerson 1989, p. 23).
Fragmentation is generally “measured as a ratio of the number of jurisdictions in a
metropolitan area to population” (Parks and Oakerson 1989, p. 20). Although a
fragmented metropolitan area is diverse and complex, this does not necessarily signal
failure. Some research has argued that more fragmentation tends to equal more
efficiency. One study found that the growth in local expenditures was slower in a
fragmented metropolitan area than it was in a more consolidated area (Schneider 1986).
Parks and Oakerson found that the metropolitan areas they studied tended to
develop multi-level and multi-scale mechanisms for dealing with the diversity of
preferences of their residents and the economies and diseconomies of scale they
encountered. Using their local public economy theory, these arrangements are seen as
rational accommodations to the diversity found in modern metropolitan areas. Rather
than seeing the metropolitan area as a group of isolated, individual communities research
found that “(l)ocal economies . . . are linked organizationally by webs of interlocal
agreements and overlaid by larger scale arrangements for specific purposes” (Parks and
Oakerson 1989, p. 23).
Richard C. Feiock points out that much of the literature assumes that
governmental fragmentation precludes a concerted response to inter-jurisdictional
problems. Rational choice theories primarily conclude that competition is the
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coordinating mechanism of local public economies. Feiock argues that most of the
literature deals with local government service networks and focuses on the consequences
of collaboration rather than on how they are born and begin to grow in the first place
(Feiock 2007).

Overcoming Obstacles to Interjurisdictional Collaboration: The Institutional
Collective Action Framework
Given that inter-jurisdictional collaboration imposed by a legally superior
government is not common, the work of Feiock provides a useful lens to examine this
topic. His work combines transaction cost and social exchange theories within the
Institutional Collective Action framework to explain how collaborative arrangements
arise, and how they evolve over time. He finds that collaboration is stimulated when it
generates “collective benefits by producing efficiencies and various economies of scale in
the provision and production of services and by internalizing spillover problems” (Feiock
2007, p. 3). Feiock contends that the more serious the underlying service problem, the
larger the aggregate gains from resolving it and the more likely a local government unit
might be to use a form of collaboration to solve its problem.
Feiock’s Institutional Collective Action (ICA) framework identifies four factors
affecting the costs and benefits of collective action by local government. As discussed in
Chapter One, the four main categories examined by the ICA framework include the state
rules that establish the institutional framework within which local government
collaboration operates, the incentives for cooperation arising from the attributes of the
public services that are the object of the cooperative efforts, the characteristics of the
cities and their regions that affect the incentives for collective action on public services
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and the institutions of local government. Variations in the powers provided to local
elected officials and to public administrators affect the incentives of these actors to
pursue and maintain collaborative service arrangements.

State Level Rules
State level rules are collective choice rules that delineate the kinds of local actions
that are permitted, forbidden or required (Ostrom 1990). Vertical intergovernmental
relations and state level rules that authorize or restrict the actions of general purpose local
governments, establish the tone and ground rules under which horizontal collaboration
may occur within the state (McCabe 2000). State level rules affect the ability of local
government actors to organize and act collectively to address the problems facing them.
Imposed upon local governments they dictate the authority available to them and the set
of strategies that they might employ. Some state statutes encourage collaboration between
local governments while others hinder it. Feiock and Carr (2001) contend that state laws
relative to incorporation and annexation can give cities important bargaining power with
neighboring communities. In Michigan, incorporation is relatively easy and annexation
relatively hard. Faced with the difficulty of annexing surrounding small jurisdictions,
local municipalities may view inter-jurisdictional collaboration as a functional equivalent
of and alternative to actual annexation.
Research by Morgan and Hirlinger (1991) found that the presence or absence of
legal constraints was often a reason governments look at alternative service provision
sources. State laws can be restrictive to a local government’s ability to collaborate across
jurisdictional lines, raise and allocate revenues, or use inter-governmental agreements.
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“Political institutions are linked to successful interlocal cooperation because they shape
the information available and the structure of incentives faced by government officials”
(Feiock 2007, p. 15).
Rawlings (2003) found that state incentives play a significant role in fostering
cooperation. “States can either frustrate or facilitate the natural desire to cooperate”
(Rawlings 2003, p. 53). Incentives might take the form of monetary grants or assistance
from one or more state agency. A state might require that local planning or service
provision occurs on a multi-jurisdictional or regional basis which might encourage and
act as an incentive to collaboration. Thus a state “might create special districts, authorize
joint action or authorize interlocal agreements to help facilitate collaboration” (Rawlings
2003, p. 131). Similarly, Morgan, Hirlinger and England (1988, p. 367) conclude “(l)ocal
communities operating under tax revolt era tax limitations are more inclined to engage in
contracting arrangements.” The Headlee Amendment to the Michigan Constitution
passed in the late 1970s is just such a tax revolt era limitation that might encourage
collaboration since it makes local revenue increases difficult.

Tax Limitation
Tax limitations imposed by state law can impact the use of contracting or other
forms of collaboration. Morgan, Hirlinger and England (1988) looked specifically at
cities operating under pre and post-1978 tax limitations. The reason for delineating that
year was to test whether the tax revolt era limitations imposed in the late 1970’s had a
different effect than other types of legal limitations. They found that the presence of tax
limitations was statistically significant to the decision to contract for service provision
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(Morgan, Hirlinger and England 1988). Such external service provision might take the
form of collaboration with a nonprofit organization, a for-profit firm or another unit of
government. Brown and Potoski (2003) examined the role of tax limitations in creating
fiscal pressures for local government units. While pointing out that any type of tax
limitation might create fiscal pressure, the results of the post-1978 tax limitations had the
express purpose of reducing the role of government in society and were consequently
highly restrictive. Such restrictions forced local governments to look for more efficient
ways to produce public services. Those factors are important to this study because
Michigan operates under just such a late 1970s era tax limitation.

Special Districts as an Alternative to Consolidation or Collaboration
While formal efforts to consolidate governments are relatively rare (Feiock and
Carr 2000), special district3 formation is a more common reaction when local
governments seek to efficiently provide services. McCabe (2004) argues that special
districts are more often used because they have lower political transaction costs
associated with them than does the consolidation of governments. When a state imposes
fiscal limits on local government, such as assessment and property tax limits, it can lead
to reductions in a local governing unit’s ability to raise revenues, spend or borrow to meet

3

Organized local entities other than county, municipal, township or school district governments. Special
districts are authorized by state law to provide only one or a limited number of designated functions, and
with sufficient administrative and fiscal autonomy to qualify as separate governments; includes a variety of
titles; such as, districts, authorities, boards, commissions, etc., as specified in the enabling state legislation
(U.S. Census Bureau website 2010, List & Structure of Governments, govs.org@census.gov).
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the demands they face for services. Such restrictions may in turn lead to the creation of
more special districts (McCabe 2000).
Increasingly, special districts are coming to provide the types and kinds of
services that were once provided by cities (McCabe 2000). McCabe also noted that state
level rules had a definite influence on the creation of special districts. Special districts
perform fire protection, water supply, housing and community development and drainage
which are often provided by general purpose local governments (McCabe 2004). When
state level rules prompt the formation of special districts or allow for the creation of an
authority, that should encourage, rather than hamper, their organization.

Interlocal Agreements as a Form of Collaboration
Frederickson (1999) describes the “disarticulation of the state” in the following
way. “As the borders and the sovereignty of jurisdictions decline in importance, there is a
corresponding decline in the capacity of jurisdictions to significantly contain some public
policy issues and, therefore, in the jurisdictions ability to manage them” (Frederickson
1999, p. 703). Because of the conditions described by Frederickson, many local
jurisdictions have turned to interlocal agreements as one way to collaborate in dealing
with various social and economic issues (Thurmaier and Wood 2004).
Interlocal agreements entered into by local governments are often created at the
administrative level. Much of the interlocal agreement activity observed appears to be the
result of actions of the local manager as opposed to elected authorities such as a city
council (Thurmaier and Wood 2004). As suggested by the work of Frederickson (1999),
local administrators more often seem to be engaged in collaboration with their
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metropolitan area counterparts than are the local elected officials. Bartle and Swayze
(1997) concluded that interlocal agreement activity is typically driven by the
administrative staff of local governments as opposed to calls for change by the media,
citizens or any interest groups.
Attempts to capture some economies of scale are often cited as the reason why
local jurisdictions enter into interlocal collaborations (ACIR 1985). The Bartle and
Swayze (1997) study indicated that fiscal pressure was a frequently cited reason for
developing interlocal agreements to collaborate. Thurmaier and Wood (2004) concluded
however, that cost saving and the presence of local fiscal stress were not major causes of
cities and counties collaborating. Instead, respondents in that study indicated that
providing a better level of service and being good neighbors was the motivation behind
interlocal agreements.
There are other reasons why local governments may enter into interlocal
agreements. “Interlocal agreements have lower political costs and have the ability to
increase effectiveness, equity, and allocative technical efficiency” (Thurmaier and Wood
2004, p. 124). Interlocal agreements have the potential to improve or equalize the
distribution of social resources across a metropolitan area. They can also be useful in
reducing duplication of services and potentially reduce the costs of those services
(Thurmaier and Wood 2004). Respondents in the Kansas City study indicate that
interlocal agreements required a level of trust between officials. Recent work examining
interlocal agreements by Andrew (2009) found that in transactions that call for high asset
specificity, local governments will generally work with only “high-status” actors. In
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transactions which have measurement of service difficulties, local governments will
generally hedge their bets by working with partners of their existing partners.

Annexation Laws
State level rules impact the prospects of interlocal collaboration in yet another
way. They dictate the possibility, and difficulty, of incorporated areas annexing
surrounding unincorporated areas. “State rules influence annexations by determining the
range of powers available to local governments and by shaping the incentives of local
actors to pursue this option” (Carr and Feiock 2001, p. 459). In states with overly
restrictive annexation rules, special districts may be established to provide services
(McCabe 2000).
The annexation of surrounding unincorporated areas in order to extend local
government boundaries may often benefit municipal residents by taking advantage of
various economies of scale. Yet surrounding areas may oppose annexation because they
would rather pay a higher price for some services than assume the burden of paying for
redistributive policies that benefit mostly central city residents (Carr and Feiock 2001).
Examining annexations in all fifty states between 1990 and 1999, Carr and Feiock
(2001), found that state level rules attempting to restrict annexation activity actually had
the opposite affect and stimulated annexations. “Ironically, where state laws attempt to
make annexing land or populations more difficult, municipal officials seeking to increase
their populations and tax base have incentives to circumvent these constraints by
engaging in more frequent, but smaller, annexations” (Carr and Feiock 2001, p. 468).
Carr and Feiock found that those advocating annexation were able to manage the “scope
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of conflict” (Schattschneider 1960) by the procedures they selected and therefore, state
level rules governing annexation play an important role in the process.
Some researchers have argued that governments in states like Michigan, with
extensive property tax limitation combined with provisions that make annexation
difficult, may be inclined to seek outside service production (Brown and Potoski 2003).
“Cities with strict limits on annexation authority are more likely to produce services
externally, through either complete or joint contracting, than cities with extensive
annexation authority are” (Brown and Potoski 2003, p. 448).
Because annexation of surrounding communities in order to capture any available
economies of scale does not appear to be a reasonably available alternative in states like
Michigan, communities may be more inclined to actively pursue the option of
collaborating across jurisdictional lines. Rather than deal with the inherent political
conflict involved in annexation, larger jurisdictions may be inclined to attempt to lead
their neighbors toward the joint provision of public services.

Transaction and Production Cost Characteristics of Public Services
Feiock’s ICA framework strongly emphasizes the role played by different types
of costs which affect collective action. The first set deals with transaction costs of
collective action. Consistent with this framework, but given less attention, is a second set,
the production costs of public services. Largely ignored by the ICA framework, is a third
set of costs facing local government officials, the political costs which create a
disincentive for local cooperative ventures.
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Production Costs and Economies of Scale
The characteristics involved in the provision of public goods must be taken into
account before attempting collaborative activities. For collaboration to occur, public
services must first be packaged so that those who do not pay for the service are excluded
from its use. Thus “pure” public goods that are both non-rivalrous and non-excludable are
poor candidates for collaborative production or provision. Private goods tend to be much
more easily packaged and differentiated than are public goods. Effective standards of
measurement must be developed so that production and provision can be adequately
monitored. Such production costs potentially make interjurisdictional collaboration more
difficult.
Some communities dealing with problems of production have achieved greater
economies of scale through collaboration. Economies of scale occur when a decline in the
average cost of production occurs as output increases. Local government officials
frequently give that as the reason for engaging in inter-local agreements. Local
governments can often capture the benefits of spillovers or positive externalities made
possible by cooperation. Positive externalities can produce strong incentives for local
government leaders to pursue joint efforts and goals (Feiock 2007).
Julnes and Pindur (1994) found that local officials in Virginia supported taking
advantage of economies of scale achieved through service provision by regional councils.
This support was primarily a result of previous council activity and the technical
assistance provided. Such support “is associated more with serious problems in the region
such as transportation and housing” (Julnes and Pindur 1994, p. 411).
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It may be easier for a small number of local governments to cooperate because the
transaction costs are relatively small when compared to situations where there are a large
number of governments. Having a smaller number of participants has been found to be
conducive to success (Lackey, Freshwater and Rupasingha 2002).

Transaction Costs
Brown and Potoski (2003) define transaction costs as “essentially the
management costs associated with either internally producing the service or buying it
through contracting . . . (t)he factors that give rise to transaction costs result from limited
information and uncertainty” (Brown and Potoski 2003, p. 443). Difficulty in monitoring
an intergovernmental agreement is one of the important transaction costs involved in
collaboration (Agranoff and McGuire 1998 and 2003). Research suggests that transaction
costs affect decisions in that “if they are lower then collaboration is easier but if they are
higher such agreements are more difficult” (Krueger and McGuire 2005, p. 8). Feiock has
made a similar argument in his discussion of the Coase Theorem (Coase 1960), which
states “if transaction costs are sufficiently low, rational parties will achieve a Paretoefficient allocation through voluntary bargaining” (Feiock 2007, p. 6). This theory states
that collaborative actions are expected when benefits are great, and transaction costs such
as negotiating, monitoring and enforcing the agreement are relatively low.
Brown and Potoski use a transactional costs framework to argue that governments
are often motivated by an aversion to risk that is associated with certain types of service
production. They build on previous transaction cost scholarship by looking at three
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specific risk factors: (1) service specific characteristics, (2) the service marketplace and
(3) goal incongruence.
Under the heading of service specific characteristics, the authors describe two
common factors appearing in much of the literature: asset specificity and service
measurability. “Asset specificity refers to whether specialized investments are required to
produce the service . . . (s)ervice measurability refers to how difficult it is for the
contracting organization to measure the outcomes of the service, to monitor the activities
required to deliver the service, or both” (Brown and Potoski 2003, p. 444). When assets
become very specific to a particular production method, governments tend to bring that
service production in-house as opposed to contracting it out. However, when such asset
specificity becomes extreme and requires a large up-front expenditure of resources,
governments may decide to employ outside resources rather than incur those costs.
The proper measurement of service production is another important issue. In the
case of some services, the outcomes, or even the activity itself, cannot be easily
identified. Thus, the outputs of social services such as housing counseling, poverty
advocacy or the national D.A.R.E. (Drug Awareness Resistance Education) program are
much more difficult to measure than are garbage removal or the sale of units of water.
When a government finds itself with a service that is difficult to measure, it may turn to a
joint production mechanism, whereby, it produces one part of the service and another
entity produces another. Through this method, the government often finds it easier to
monitor the activity and the quality/quantity of the service. Brown and Potoski speculate
that when “services become more difficult to measure, governments produce more
services through joint contracting and . . . governments internally produce services that
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are extremely difficult to measure” (Brown and Potoski 2003, p. 445). When services are
difficult to measure, governments turn to joint-contracting because that method allows
them to be more directly involved in the provision of services and able to monitor it more
closely. When services become extremely difficult to measure, governments are unable to
properly control for potential vendor opportunism and hence often decide to provide such
services internally instead. Brown and Potoski conclude that
when governments contract for highly asset-specific services,
those that tend toward monopoly provision, they choose
mechanisms that lower the risk of vendor opportunism . . .
When services are more difficult to monitor and measure,
governments increase their use of joint contracting and internal
service production . . . government’s contract less when service
marketplaces contain fewer vendors, because the risk of vendor
opportunism is enhanced (Brown and Potoski 2003, p. 442).
This finding is supported by other work. Krueger and McGuire (2005) suggest that
collaboration is a function of transaction costs that vary with different institutional
arrangements utilized in cities, as well as the degree of competition between cities. The
belief is that cities facing high transaction costs and high competition are less likely to
participate in collaboration or may participate less deeply. By participating less deeply,
Krueger and McGuire mean the degree of participation on the part of a local government,
measured in terms of the number of dollars transferred from one city to another.

Political Costs
In 1971 Oliver P. Williams proposed an alternative methodology for analyzing
urban areas which he called the “Social Access Approach”. This framework emphasizes
distinctions in the political saliency of public services and the implications of these
distinctions for the prospects of centralizing service production in urban areas.
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Williams distinguishes between two types of urban policies: “lifestyle” policies
and “system maintenance” policies. Lifestyle policies are those “which involve a direct
expression of preferred interactions” and system maintenance policies are those “which
generally facilitate the choice of interactions” (Williams 1971, p. 88). Lifestyle policies
are those dealing with education, zoning, land use and in some instances libraries and
police services. Such policies reflect the preferences and in some ways regulate the
interactions of those persons living in a particular area. System maintenance policies deal
with less value-laden issues: water, sewer, transportation, stadiums and utilities. Williams
argues that lifestyle policies are less likely to be jointly provided because they are closely
identified with the unique character or identity of a specific community and are so closely
aligned with what is perceived to make one community different from another. Williams
concluded that such decentralization is made possible by “sets of intergovernmental
collaboration arrangements for specific functional areas” (Williams 1970, p. 79).
Ultimately, he concludes that “policy areas which are perceived as neutral with respect to
controlling social access may be centralized but those which are perceived as controlling
social access will remain decentralized” (p. 93).
Another characteristic of public service provision are the political consequences
of the decisions made relative to collaboration with neighboring jurisdictions. Bickers
(2005) suggests that collaborative efforts might result from an elected officials desire to
prevent the dilution of voter group strength, groups that the elected officials may rely
upon for future electoral support. Elected officials may be forced to give up some amount
of control or authority in order to achieve collaborative benefits, yet if elected public
officials voluntarily relinquish control that may have political consequences detrimental
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to their electoral aspirations. Although collaborative activities may be highly beneficial to
the local community, some local voters may oppose them and show their disapproval at
the polls. This may be one of the reasons why research has consistently shown that city
managers are far more supportive of collaboration than locally elected mayors and city
council members (Feiock 2007).
A local politician with progressive ambition, who has regional or statewide
political aspirations or future job hopes, may be more supportive of collaboration than an
elected official simply hoping to continue serving his or her local community. Gillette
(2000) has argued that such electoral ambitions can sometimes lead local officials to
address interlocal needs even in the face of weak internal demands for such collaborative
activity.

Characteristics of Regions and Communities
The following two sections look at the effects that characteristics of regions have
on collaborative activity. The ICA framework focuses on the incentives the
characteristics have for interlocal cooperation. Regional characteristics include the
number and proximity of other local governments that are suitable collaborators. These
characteristics are expected to make collaboration more or less likely to occur.
A second set of factors that may impact collaboration is the demographic,
economic, and fiscal characteristics of individual local communities. Many studies focus
on the incentives for local public officials to collaborate because of fiscal stress,
population loss, and other factors.
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Characteristics of Regions
Regional institutional homogeneity, defined as the similarity in political
institutions across government units in a given region, can serve to facilitate collaborative
exchanges because relevant actors tend to cluster with other actors who share similar
values, norms and beliefs. Such similar attitudes toward collaborative activity should
facilitate greater amounts of such activity (Carley 1991 and Sabatier 1999). This could be
the result of greater levels of trust, but it may be just as likely that such actors view issues
in much the same way, which makes collaboration easier to arrange.
The geographic location of potential collaboration partners is another salient
factor. Fixed geographic borders often require repeated interactions among neighboring
communities. This can reduce transaction costs by creating interdependencies and
providing opportunities for key players to become familiar with, and more trusting of,
each other. Efforts at collaboration between players not as familiar with one another can
be much more costly. These players take time to get to know one another and develop the
trust necessary to successful collaborative efforts (Feiock 2007).
Richard Campbell and Patty Glynn investigated interlocal cooperation in Georgia
and tested the extent to which general purpose local governments cooperate with the state
and other local governments in the provision of local public services. They found that
counties spend more than cities to purchase services from other governmental units and
that intergovernmental cooperation is related to population size, regardless of
metropolitan status or form of government. While both metropolitan and nonmetropolitan counties engaged in interlocal service provision agreements, metropolitan
cities like the ones examined in the following chapters, were slightly more likely than
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non-metropolitan cities to do so (Campbell and Glynn 1990). Morgan and Hirlinger
(1991) found that if the community is located within a metropolitan area, it is much more
likely to find other jurisdictions to contract with, but the desire to retain local
independence of action induces local officials to steer clear of agreements with other
political entities.
Research by various scholars suggests that geographic density may trump
fragmentation. Post’s (2002) research found that the geographic concentration of local
governments can lead them to cooperate and confirmed that the geographic density of
metropolitan area governments is a significant predictor of the occurrence of
intergovernmental agreements. Likewise, geographic remoteness could lead to noncooperation because those communities had no previous interaction with close neighbors
and had no built-up levels of trust and reciprocity (Lackey, et al. 2002).
Location is another characteristic of a community which affects its’ decision to
collaborate. Central cities and suburbs react differently, and a city outside an MSA acts
differently than the other two (Agranoff and McGuire 1998 and 2003). Cities outside of
metropolitan areas are least likely to enter into service contracts with another unit of
government, which may indicate that the lack of available suppliers is a critical factor
(Morgan and Hirlinger 1991). Beverly Cigler (1999) found collaboration among rural
governments to be rare.
Another characteristic that was found to discourage cooperation was “(h)aving too
many chiefs involved in the process made it extremely difficult to satisfy everyone”
(Lackey, et al. 2002, p. 146). If everyone involved is expecting to be in charge of the
collaboration and making the important decisions, such a characteristic could make
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interjurisdictional collaboration more difficult to achieve. It is often assumed that
adjoining local jurisdictions will have a history of past interactions and that those
interactions might influence current decisions relative to cooperating. Hostile past
confrontations between regional actors were found to hinder efforts at cooperation. A
mismatch in fiscal capacity of the jurisdictions was a huge barrier to successful
collaboration. “Shortsightedness, greed and the lack of political demand for change were
also factors that inhibited cooperation” (Lackey, et al. 2002, p. 148). If one of the
jurisdictions considered itself the “big dog” that fact could hinder cooperative efforts.
Rather than simply turning to the costly and politically significant activity
involved in formal consolidation of governmental units, Post contends that “fragmented
metropolitan area governments may often be able to realize the economies of scale and
other savings usually attributed to consolidated governments by choosing instead to
collaborate” (Post 2002, pp. 3-4). Post found that repeated contacts between local
government actors led to greater levels of trust and performance experience which often
led to increased levels of cooperation between government units in a metropolitan area.
Summing up, the close geographic location of potential partners and having
adjacent geographic borders can lead to repeated interaction between local actors that in
turn leads to the building of trust and performance expectations between them. In areas
that are densely populated with local governments, the availability of potential partners is
increased and enhances collaborative opportunities. We also discover that it is important
that potential partners have similar political institutions, fiscal capacity and view one
another as relative equals.
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Incentives for Regional Action
The Regional Impulses Framework developed by Kathryn A. Foster (1997)
provides additional insight into the factors that determine whether local governments
within a metropolitan area will collaborate in the delivery of public services. Foster
describes “regional impulses” as factors that motivate local governments to engage in
cooperative activity. The absence of natural barriers often facilitates regional ties as local
governments find it easier to collaborate across jurisdictional boundaries.

Local

jurisdictions with similar macroeconomics are more likely to work cooperatively than are
jurisdictions that are dissimilar economically, politically or socially. Jurisdictions that
have had uneven growth experiences that led to increased competition might be less
inclined to cooperate. Fiscal impulses can contribute to cooperation between local
jurisdictions when there are economies of scale to be captured. Local communities are
concerned with the relative fiscal capacity of any jurisdiction they may consider
cooperating with. If a community is concerned that it is bringing more resources to the
table than a neighbor or is concerned that the neighbor may not have the fiscal integrity to
carry-out long-term projects, they are much less likely to cooperate (Foster 1997). If one
community believes that it is being fiscally exploited by another, it is unlikely to
cooperate. Collaboration may be easier when adjacent jurisdictions share political
leanings or party affiliation. Every area has its own unique combination of leaders,
interest groups, institutions, power relationships and policies that shape its’ outlook on
cooperation. (Foster 1997).
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Availability of Potential Partners
It is important that potential collaboration partners have sufficient information to
make an informed decision as to whether or not a particular joint effort will prove to be
mutually profitable. According to Feiock (2007) actors need to know who is or isn’t a
good potential collaborative partner. With imperfect information and no previous
experience working together, potential collaborators face relatively high start-up costs.
Each local collaborative partner wants joint gains from collective activities but also wants
a larger relative share of the benefits. With both communities expecting joint benefits and
perhaps a little more of the total, it would seem likely that collaborating communities
must be similar to one another and approach the bargaining situation from equally strong
positions. Such factors further limit the potential pool of collaborative partners that a
local government can choose from.
In addition, the circumstances of each community may change over time. What
seems to be a very good bargain today may not seem so in the future. Such changes may
prompt some collaborative partners to default on their initial agreement (Keohane and
Martin 1995). Feiock (2007) concludes that the higher the probability that respective
partners interests may drift apart, the less likely communities are to form a contractual
relationship. Enforcement of collaboration responsibilities can become a costly
transaction feature under such circumstances.
Finally, existing research has shown that it is important that there be competition
between service providers in order to maintain an equal bargaining field. It is also
important that local government maintain the ability to provide some public services
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internally in order not to become a “hollow state” that is no longer capable of producing
and providing certain public goods and services (Milward and Provan 2000).
It is argued that competitive markets have a tendency to make contracting more
effective and less risky because transaction costs are lowered. In the absence of a
competitive market some would argue that cost savings may never materialize because
outside providers cannot be compared, and without competition they will tend to charge
more for the goods and services and/or work to cut corners relative to their costs. Urban
areas are more likely to contract for services because of the existence of a competitive
market with a larger number of entities that can provide a given service. In those
situations, governments may be more likely to produce public services through complete
or joint contracting because competition lowers the risk of doing so.

Presence of Networks Linking Local Government Officials
The work of Robert Putnam has demonstrated that norms of reciprocity, levels of
trust and networks of civic engagement can help promote cooperation. Putnam argues
that voluntary cooperation is easier to accomplish when substantial stocks of social
capital are available (Putnam 1993). Racial and ethnic disparities can result in less
trusting societies and lessen the ability of people and groups within an area to cooperate
(Dodge 1992). A good, long-established relationship among cooperating jurisdictions
increases the chances for continuing success. Processes run smoothly because of
accumulated levels of trust among the participants (Lackey, et al. 2002).
Local government actors who are linked with other local government actors not
currently collaborating, can be particularly important in building such networks. As local
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government actors become more acquainted with one another and trust is accumulated,
network members are encouraged to undertake further activities. Such trust is particularly
important in settings where there is high potential for shirking or defection by some
members of the network. While there is always that potential, increased levels of trust
may reduce the likelihood of it occurring. Scholz, et al.; (2005) refer to this phenomenon
as the “credibility-clustering hypothesis.” Threats of shirking or free-riding impose a cost
on actors that have already invested resources in the collective effort. Such a reliable
network reduces the costs of both monitoring and enforcing compliance, two important
transaction costs.
Cooperation is more likely the longer the actors have cooperated with one
another. In a tightly clustered network with repeated contacts, each can benefit from
acquiring and preserving a reputation for cooperation and commitment (Park and Feiock
2003). A history of positive cooperation between local government actors leads to the
development of norms of behavior that build social capital, and thereby reduce
transaction costs. Declining transaction costs further encourage local government actors
to collaborate. Feiock’s recent work confirms the argument that “the attributes of local
government actors and the relationships that develop between them need to be accounted
for in explanations of how and why they collaborate” (Scholz, Feiock and Ahn 2005, p.
24).
Morgan and Hirlinger (1991) found that a lower commitment by local public
officials to retaining local control of service delivery is a factor that motivates them to
look to other units of government. However, current research indicates that local
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governmental units will generally resist giving up any authority they currently have to
other local units or to higher levels of government (Feiock 2008).
Through the development of informal social and policy networks, local
governmental actors can overcome many of the unwanted costs associated with collective
action. “Informal network structures emerge unplanned from interactions among
institutional actors. Informal networks coordinate complex decisions within the formal
structure. They preserve full local autonomy and require no formal authority” (Feiock
2008, p. 7).

Presence of Councils of Government
The research discussed in the following chapters examines the importance of an
area-wide council of government (COG) in a region. It is relevant to the discussion of
interlocal collaboration to discuss the impact on cooperation that higher levels of
government and area-wide COGs might have. Results of research conducted in the 1980s
indicated that interlocal cooperation is an ineffective substitute for federal intervention. In
the absence of sanctions or incentives from a higher authority, communities can often
cooperate well if benefits are shared and/or the costs of collaboration are hidden.
Otherwise, they do not collaborate well (Wrightson 1986, p. 261). According to Peterson
(1981), distributive policies can be implemented effectively without federal intervention
because the costs are hidden or diffused. Wrightson (1986) noted that in many cases it
was found that the presence of a COG made the process smoother and more effective.
Because COGs are voluntary associations of local elected officials of member
governments they are well-suited to cooperate.
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More recent research by LeRoux (2008) suggests that COGs may be less effective
in facilitating interlocal collaboration than previously thought, but that the smaller
nonprofit community conferences found in many metropolitan areas may be quite
effective in doing so. LeRoux analyzed the role played by the South East Michigan
Council of Governments (SEMCOG), the Downriver Community Conference and the
Conference of Western Wayne in increasing or decreasing the likelihood of interlocal
cooperation in the service areas of police, fire, roads and bridges, utilities and
environmental management. LeRoux found that “nonprofit community conferences
examined here had a positive and fairly consistent effect on the likelihood of engaging in
interlocal service delivery and the extent to which jurisdictions contract with other local
governments for additional components of a service” (LeRoux 2008, p. 170).
However, LeRoux found that membership in a COG had no effect on interlocal
service delivery. The data gathered in this research suggests that “networks are not
equally effective in producing this outcome. Belonging to a small organization made up
of similar members appears to be more important than belonging to a large organization
whose members are more likely to have diverse interests” (LeRoux 2008, p. 170).
LeRoux further suggests that it may not be the voluntary nature of COGs that leads to this
inability, but rather its large membership and diversity of interests.
Characteristics of Individual Communities
Feiock (2007) argues that specific characteristics of the community, along with
both formal and informal institutional arrangements, act to reduce transaction costs in
terms of information, coordination, negotiation, enforcement and agency costs. Agency
costs can arise when a public official, as a bargaining agent for his or her community, is
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supposed to represent the interests of that community, but fails to do so. Also, in
situations where the preferences of different constituencies within the community are
unknown, unclear, or vary a great deal, a public official may simply not know what the
community wants and what he or she should do. The public officials may instead pursue
their interests. When such problems are encountered, it is said that an agency problem
exists (Feiock 2007).
As noted earlier, shared borders can “increase exposure to positive and negative
externalities and lock neighbors into repeat play that provides opportunities for mutual
assurances . . .” (Feiock 2008, p. 12). Other important factors examined by the ICA
framework include the homogeneity of preferences within communities and across all
communities in a region. Demographic homogeneity between collaborating communities
is thought to reduce the costs of cooperating (Feiock 2008).
The fear of losing local control over service production is strong and therefore the
net gains of turning to external sources must be substantial (Ferris 1986). Some research
shows that when local officials fear the loss of local control, less intergovernmental
contracting tends to occur (Morgan & Hirlinger 1991).
In general, Morgan, Hirlinger and England reached the same basic conclusions
that Ferris did earlier in regards to the forces influencing the contracting decision. Local
officials will more likely choose external service provision over internal when: (1)
suppliers are readily available and cost savings likely, (2) fiscal pressures are prominent,
especially when created by tax limitation measures and (3) a lower percentage of the
community’s population is composed of dependent persons, those of low to low/moderate
income (Morgan, Hirlinger and England 1988).
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Research by Morgan and Hirlinger (1991) indicated that fiscal stress in a
community is not a major incentive for outsourcing. Fiscal pressure and cost savings can
be inducements to local governments in contracting out, but political opposition is still a
significant factor in the final decision. As Shulman (1982) argued, unions and municipal
employees often fight hard against it.
Several factors do, however, appear to positively influence the decision by local
officials to use non-traditional service delivery options. Among the reasons most often
given by respondents, expected cost savings appear to be most important. Availability of
alternative sources of delivery was a consideration often cited. Ineffectual political
opposition was another inducement (Morgan and Hirlinger 1991). Other research has
shown that those communities more dependent on outside funding sources are more
likely to suffer fiscal stress (Bowman 1981). Morgan and Hirlinger (1991) hypothesized
that the percentage of city revenues derived from federal and state sources would be
positively related to the decision to use outside service providers.

Fiscal Capacity of the Community
The fiscal capacity of a community and the fiscal stress it confronts are factors
that have been examined by many researchers. As noted earlier, James Ferris (1986)
argued that municipalities may not be eager to outsource services but rather would prefer
to maintain direct local control. Noticeable fiscal pressure was one of the conditions that
Ferris concluded was necessary in order to explain any incidence of outsourcing.
Contrary to her own predictions and reaching a seemingly counter-intuitive conclusion,
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Foster (1997) argues that empirical evidence shows that widespread fiscal stress appears
to hamper rather than encourage regional consolidation.
Cities are thought to compete in a market-like fashion to provide an optimal mix
of goods and services at the lowest possible overall tax rate (Tiebout 1956). One way to
accomplish this is by “creating slack resources made available through the joint
implementation of services with another city” (Krueger and McGuire 2005, p. 7).
Another potential problem in interlocal collaboration is the propensity for cities to act
opportunistically when competition is high and transaction costs are low. Cities with
more severe needs are even more motivated to generate slack resources so that they can
be used to help alleviate various problems (Krueger and McGuire 2005). Krueger and
McGuire found that cities already enjoying high taxable values and high tax revenues
among the least likely to seek additional revenues through interlocal arrangements.

Demographic/Socioeconomic Composition
Lackey, Freshwater and Rupasingha (2002) found that many rural local
government officials and residents are suspicious of collaborative efforts. The authors
investigated the effects of several independent variables on collaborative efforts. They
found that higher education levels had a strong positive correlation with trust and
cooperation.
Brown and Potoski (2003) elaborate on the differences between older industrial
cities such as those found in the northeast and Midwest United States and the newer postindustrial cities found in the southwest and western states. The authors hypothesized that
“older industrial cities are more likely to produce services externally, through either

56
complete or joint contracting, than younger postindustrial cities are” (Brown and Potoski
2003, p. 448). Those cities providing a larger proportion of public services through
intergovernmental contracting tended to have lower labor costs (Morgan and Hirlinger
1991).
Generally the literature argues that the larger the group, the harder it is to
organize. There are mixed opinions regarding the effect of a strong central city such as
Detroit in the metro area. There is disagreement regarding the effects of political culture
on governmental cooperation. Social capital can often lead to better cooperation. Higher
levels of social capital were found to have a positive effect on levels of intergovernmental
cooperation across the nation as a whole (Rawlings 2003).
The economic, social and political characteristics of a community’s population
can help shape their preferences for public goods and also help determine the potential
gains from collaboration and the transaction costs associated with it (Feiock 2007).
Communication costs will be greater in a heterogeneous community as opposed to a more
homogeneous one and hence, increase the cost of collaboration.
One of the political indicators of whether a community will contract out or
collaborate on service provision is the percentage of elderly persons in the community’s
population. Measuring the number of persons in the population that were sixty-five years
or older, Morgan, Hirlinger and England (1988) found that a larger percentage of such
persons in the population correlated with that community being more resistant to any
proposed change in the existing level of services. These researchers characterized elderly
persons as that part of the community that is more dependent on public services and
hence more resistant to any proposed changes in services.
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Examining data from a 1983 ACIR/ICMA survey combined with other data
related to social, economic and fiscal data for cities, Morgan and Hirlinger confirmed the
earlier conclusion and argued that “cities with larger proportions of elderly are less
inclined to use IG service arrangements” (Morgan and Hirlinger 1991, p. 138). The
researchers hypothesized it may be that elderly residents are more politically aware and
likely to monitor service levels more closely than other groups in the community.
Analyzing the literature on interlocal cooperation Lynette Rawlings (2003) noted
that some studies have found that “individuals in racially fragmented areas are less
willing to pool their fiscal resources to provide public goods” (Rawlings 2003, p. 5).
Rawlings noted that most of the empirical literature she reviewed had concluded that
heterogeneity, particularly racial heterogeneity, has a negative impact on cooperation.
Contrary to that literature however, she concluded that, “Metropolitan area racial
variation was found to be positively associated with interlocal cooperation” (Rawlings
2003, p. 19).
The percentage of lower income households has been found in some research to
be a negative indicator of a community’s propensity to consider external service delivery.
Using the percentage of households with annual incomes of $30,000 or less, Morgan and
Hirlinger (1988) found that “the higher the percentage of the city population in the lower
and middle income brackets . . . the less likely a municipality will enter into agreements
with external service providers” (p. 367). However, their subsequent research (Morgan
and Hirlinger 1991) found that both poorer and wealthier communities tended to favor
intergovernmental contracting. Other research has concluded that the causal link is not
clear between area economic health and levels of cooperation (Rawlings 2003).

58
Political Structures
Finally, the ICA framework highlights the role played by the institutional
structure of the local government in structuring incentives for interlocal collaboration.
“Electoral institutions shape the information available and the incentives faced by
government officials. Administrators and elected officials each participate in networks
and contractual relationships, but they differ in bargaining resources and institutional
position” (Feiock 2008, p. 13). The political structure of a community is an important
variable in understanding why some communities collaborate and others do not. It also
may explain why some collaboration efforts undertaken fail while others are more
successful. Local government sophistication in the monitoring of such arrangements is
another indicator of a city’s likelihood to participate in collaboration (Krueger and
McGuire 2005).
One of the reasons that local governments have not engaged in more collaboration
is the belief that it requires substantial incentives to overcome the inherent difficulties
involved and the loss of policy/political autonomy. Krueger and McGuire (2005)
concluded that three institutional factors seemed to matter in these situations: first, city
manager versus other forms of government; second, at-large versus single-member or
ward/district representation, and third, partisan versus non-partisan elections. Singlemember districts motivate politicians to focus on narrow interests (Kettl 2002), whereas
at-large districts curb such parochialism by creating an incentive structure which
motivates politicians to focus on services to the majority. “Political parties help reduce
the information gathering costs for voters but non-partisan elections have little impact on
the choice to collaborate or not” (Krueger and McGuire 2005, p. 5).
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The Presence of a Professional City Manager
The public administration literature maintains that professional city managers
share a common type of training, orientation and in-service experiences which can lead to
a common set of values emphasizing efficiency and professionalism. Local leaders may
also pursue collaborative activities because of political and career incentives that they
wish to pursue as a result of joint action. Such political incentives may include the desire
to run for higher office. Other research (Feiock, et al. 2004) indicates that the
professional standing and future employment opportunities of city managers can be
enhanced by their engaging in collaborative service innovations.
The empirical literature is contradictory regarding the impact of the presence of a
professional city manager on the likelihood of collaboration. Data gathered in Georgia
indicated that, “local government units with city managers were not more likely to enter
into agreements with other local governments for service provision” (Campbell and
Glynn 1990, pp. 126). Morgan and Hirlinger (1991) found that the presence of a city
manager did facilitate more intergovernmental contracting in the area of public safety.
Brown and Potoski (2003) argue that there are institutional explanations for why
governments choose one production method over another. Council-manager forms of
government often produce services externally because of the professional norm of
running government more like a business. Being a member of the ICMA or similar
professional organizations may lead to the use of industry standards when choosing
between production methods. The presence of a city manager working in a local
community can be an important source of policy innovation, particularly in the use of
intergovernmental or collaborative contracts (Morgan & Hirlinger 1991).
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Carr and LeRoux (2005) and Krueger and McGuire (2005) have reported that the
council-manager form of government is a strong predictor of interlocal contracting and
that the city manager function can be viewed as a mechanism for reducing information
costs associated with policy-making in a complex environment. It can also reduce the
transaction cost of rent-seeking that potentially exist in networks of collaborators. A
similar role played by professional administrators is described in Thurmaier and Wood’s
(2002) account of interlocal agreements among governments in the Kansas City
metropolitan area. Finally, Brown and Potoski (2003) found that the presence of a city
manager was positively related to whether the government would engage in collaborative
activities.

Organization and Election of City Councils
The literature also indicates that how a city council is organized and elected can
have an impact on the success or failure of collaborative efforts. Gerber and Gibson
(2005) note that there is a political dilemma in that collaboration requires local officials
to give up a certain amount of authority to achieve regional goals. Local officials who are
elected on a city-wide or at-large basis may share the regional viewpoint of the chief
elected officer and be more willing to relinquish authority than are local officials elected
on a district basis. Such officials may be more concerned with negative repercussions
from voters who hold them accountable for collaborative activities with which they
disagree or that go awry (Gerber and Gibson 2005). The relatively short-term focus of
local elected officials caused by frequent turnover and short election cycles of two to four
years may make cooperation more difficult (Clingermayer and Feiock 2001).

61
Differences in Elected and Administrative Officials
While much of the previous literature examined the role of administrative
officials, Zeemering (2007) argues that elected officials play a much more significant role
than was previously thought. Zeemering argues that “decisions in favor of collaboration
depend on officials perceptions of an agenda for collaboration, their assessment of the
terms of collaboration, and their opinion of potential government partners” (Zeemering
2007, p. ix).
Zeemering developed a three-part framework measuring the conjunction of policy
stimuli, perceptions of intergovernmental partners and social capital and the actual terms
of the proposed collaboration (Zeemering 2007). Zeemering conducted research in a
number of communities in western Michigan and conducted interviews with elected
officials throughout that region. Zeemering concluded that a positive stimulus or agenda
status is a necessary condition for collaboration. Additionally, he contends that positive
terms of collaboration and a positive stimulus or positive perceptions of potential
collaboration partners and a collaborative stimulus together are sufficient for
collaboration to be undertaken.
Zeemering ultimately concludes that collaboration is most likely to occur when all
three causal conditions are present. Contrary to existing theory, Zeemering argues that
such positive perceptions of potential partners can develop during the process of
negotiating a collaboration agreement as opposed to being a necessary condition
preceding collaboration (Zeemering 2007).
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Research Gaps
There is contradictory evidence in the literature concerning what motivates local
jurisdictions to collaboration on public services. As this review of the extant literature
concludes, there are far more questions than answers. The characteristics of individual
communities and regions have an influence on whether or not they collaborate.
Communities subject to state level rules can be encouraged or inhibited relative to
collaboration. Transaction costs associated with collaborating can also influence
communities to engage in or forego collaborative activity. Finally, the political structures
present in an area will frequently influence whether or not collaboration is attempted.
This review of prior research reveals research gaps and limitations in understanding. The
balance of this dissertation will address the following research gaps:

•

A clear understanding of the role played by fiscal stress in the decision of
whether or not to collaborate.

•

Why having a city manager present makes interlocal collaboration easier
and what is present in the training and experience of those actors that
make them central players. How important is their professional training?
How important is their participation in professional associations and in
area networks?
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•

What roles in collaboration do elected and administrative officials play in
the collaboration process and what specific activities do they undertake in
furtherance of their goals.

•

What factors lead communities to collaborate and specifically what are
they expecting to gain from their participation, what specific terms are
they looking for in the collaboration agreement?

•

Is the loss of control over individual community service provision a
serious issue that may inhibit collaboration?

•

What kinds of communities make good or bad potential partners for one
another? What specific characteristics are decision-makers in one
community looking for in other communities they hope to collaborate
with? Specifically, how are collaboration partners selected?

•

What role does trust play in the collaboration decision-making process and
how is trust gained, damaged or lost? Can written agreements take the
place of trust in some circumstances?

•

What role is played by prior contacts and experiences that collaborating
communities have had with one another?
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•

What role, if any, is played by the formal networks and organizations
present in the metropolitan area? How important are they in getting
collaborations started and maintaining such activity?

•

What role, if any, is played by the informal networks of elected and
administrative actors in the metropolitan area?

•

Is it important to have a political constituency for collaboration within
communities or will decision-makers act in the absence of one or even
against public opinion?

•

Is collaboration in the provision of fire services easier or harder to
undertake and why?

•

How important is the role played by area community conferences?

This dissertation attempts to address these gaps, using data gathered from surveys
and long interviews conducted with elected and administrative officials in five suburban
cities in the metropolitan Detroit area attempting to form a fire authority to replace their
five separate fire departments.
The ICA framework of Feiock is useful in determining some of the larger factors
that go into the interjurisdictional collaboration process. However, what is missing from
this rational choice based argument is a clear understanding of who makes the ultimate
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decision to collaborate or not and what factors play an important part in their decisionmaking.
The following chapters examine all of these factors as regards an attempt by five
separate communities to pool their resources to form an authority to provide fire and
emergency services on an area-wide basis.
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CHAPTER 3
CASE SELECTION AND DATA COLLECTION

In the preceding chapter, I examined the theoretical and empirical literature
concerning the factors that either encourage or impede collaboration among local
governments. The next five chapters explore the dynamics of one particular effort at
interlocal collaboration, the efforts of five suburban communities located in the
“Downriver” area of Metropolitan Detroit, to create a joint fire authority.
In 2006, five Downriver communities began discussions centered on the idea of
creating a single fire and emergency medical services (hereinafter fire/EMS) authority
that would serve all of the communities. The Downriver area is located just down river or
south of Detroit, Michigan in the southeastern portion of Wayne County.
Figure 3.1 shows a map of Wayne County, Michigan indicating the twenty
member communities of the Downriver Community Conference outlined as a group and
the five communities that are the subject of this research (Allen Park, Lincoln Park,
Melvindale, Southgate and Wyandotte), more heavily outlined within that grouping. The
Downriver Community Conference (DCC) member communities had been cooperating
on a variety of fronts for many years and have had numerous opportunities for interaction
prior to undertaking this fire/EMS collaboration effort.
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Figure 3.1: Map of Wayne County, MI. and Collaborating Communities.

In-depth interviews were conducted in 2007-2008 to examine the current effort to
form an authority and also a previous attempt in the 1990s that failed. The individuals
selected to participate in this study were those engaged in the planning and development
of this authority. The interviews produced important insights about the motivations of the
participants and the obstacles encountered in this effort to create the authority.
This research contributes to a better understanding of interlocal service
cooperation in several ways. The study examines the factors that stimulate interlocal
cooperation, what participants are seeking from cooperation in terms of costs and benefits
and what characteristics they seek in a partnering community. Also, the study extends the
work of Eric Zeemering (2007) by examining differences in the ways that elected and
administrative actors perceive the factors involved in interlocal cooperation and
differences in the roles these two groups of officials play in the collaboration process.
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Earlier Effort to Collaborate: History of the Downriver Mutual Aid Agreement
Previous research has indicated that characteristics such as shared borders or
contiguousness of communities often leads to repeated contact between local government
neighbors and the growth of mutual assurances that make collaboration opportunities
more likely (Feiock 2008). Through a collaboration effort known as Downriver Mutual
Aid (DMA) started in 1967, the communities of the DCC have shared resources and
provided personnel backup to one another in the areas of police services, anti-drug
activities, fire services, and much more. It was because of the successful experience of
the DMA that in 1977 these communities formed the DCC to undertake greater
collaborative efforts in a variety of program areas.
These communities also have a history of collaboration in the area of public
health. For many years in the 1950s through the 1980s, the communities of the
Downriver area operated the People’s Community Hospital Authority (PCHA) in order to
build and operate hospitals to serve the residents of the member communities. It is
important to understand before examining the current effort that these communities have
a long and successful history of collaborating with one another for the collective benefit
of the Downriver area.4
In 2006, the fire chiefs of the respective cities and several of the elected and
appointed officials began to meet and discuss increasing their collaboration on fire
services. These meetings were held at the offices of the DCC. The DCC provided a forum
over many years for the discussion of a variety of issues of concern to the member
communities and acted as a facilitator of this particular effort in collaboration. Each of
4

The writer of this dissertation has lived most of his life in the Downriver area and has also worked for the
cities of Lincoln Park, Melvindale and River Rouge. Much of the background material for this dissertation
is the result of that experience over a period of more than twenty years.
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the member communities has one voting representative and one alternate representative
on the governing board of the DCC. The DCC has acted in many ways to facilitate
cooperation between the member communities on a variety of services.
Another factor that gave rise to this effort is a grant from the state of Michigan
Centers for Regional Excellence (CRE) Program in the amount of $25,000 to study the
feasibility of collaborating on fire services. The DCC Mutual Aid Committee, with the
support and assistance of the Wayne County Department of Homeland Security and
Emergency Management, engaged the services of Plante-Moran, LLP (Plante-Moran) to
conduct a feasibility study of regionalized public safety services and to specifically
examine the Downriver Fire Authority concept. That study, known as the Downriver
Community Conference Fire & EMS Consolidation Feasibility Study, was completed in
December of 2006 and concluded that the joint fire/EMS authority could be created under
state law and would result in reduced costs for services in the respective communities.5
The Plante-Moran study provided a current listing of equipment, manpower and physical
locations. The report included a cost model and proposed Articles of Incorporation
pursuant to the recommended use of Act 57 of the Public Acts of Michigan.
Michigan Public Act 57 of 1988, also known as The Emergency Services Act,
allows local governments to form a joint emergency services “authority” specifically to
jointly provide emergency services, including fire services. Such an authority is a body
politic capable of entering into contracts and levying taxes. Using this device, each
community adopts a governing agreement by a majority vote of the local government’s
legislative body. The working jurisdiction of this newly created authority would be the

5

Plante-Moran., PLLP. Downriver Community Conference Fire and EMS Consolidation Feasibility Study,
December 2006.
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combined jurisdictions of the communities joining the authority. Communities joining
can later withdraw from the authority by resolution of the Board, but would remain liable
for outstanding debts incurred up until the point in time that they withdrew. Fire service
employees are given an amount of protection in that existing contracts must be honored
for their remaining term even if their employing community joins in such an authority.
After their community joins an authority, the employees presumably would negotiate a
new contract. Pension, seniority and benefit issues are handled in a similar fashion.
The Plante-Moran study recommended a transfer of assets and liabilities from the
individual communities to the Authority. The study recommended the independent
funding of the Authority through a millage dedicated to that purpose. In essence, the
Authority would operate like a special district. The feasibility study developed a cost
model which indicated the potential for long-term savings. Under their currently separate
circumstances, residents of the five communities in the study area pay an average of $109
per person per year for fire and emergency medical services. The study concluded that
the Authority, if formed, would ultimately provide a better level of service and also
achieve National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1710 compliance for a cost of
about $88 per person per year, a 20 percent cost savings. Currently the five communities
in the study area provide slightly different services, with some providing transportation to
the hospital while others do not. According to many of the fire personnel interviewed for
this research, most of the five communities in the study area are not completely NFPA
1710 compliant. The cost model developed in the Plante-Moran study assumes that
eventually all of the communities in the Downriver area will join the Authority and it will
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be able to capture the economies of scale that are potentially available under the new
arrangement.

Comparison of the Participating Communities
According to the elected and administrative officials interviewed for this research,
it became apparent to them at a fairly early stage that attempting to consolidate all twenty
DCC member community fire departments at once would be too difficult. This view is
supported by the research of Lackey, Freshwater and Rupasingha (2002) which found
that it may be easier for a small number of governments to cooperate because the
transaction costs are lower. The findings of this research support the results of Rawlings
(2003) study, which theorized that the larger the group, the harder it may be to organize.
Adding to the difficulty of merging all twenty fire departments in the Downriver area is
the fact that some are full-time paid professional departments while others are part-time,
or volunteer, fire departments.
There are some other important distinctions in these communities. Some of the
communities are urban and densely populated, while others are more rural and less
densely populated. Some of the communities are home rule cities and others are
townships with very different methods of organization and electoral politics. Many of the
communities are predominantly bedroom communities with mostly single-family homes.
A few of the communities contain heavy industry, chemical plants and automotive
manufacturing plants that require different fire fighting skills and equipment. One of the
communities, Grosse Ile, is an island in the Detroit River and can only be accessed by
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Table 3.1:
City Population, Size, Budget and Fire Department Characteristics
one of two bridges, one of which had previously been disabled for a significant period of
time and the other is quite old and out of service periodically for maintenance.
As a result of real or perceived problems, many of the communities took a wait
and see attitude and ceased to actively participate in the collaboration effort. However, a
core group of five communities decided to continue planning for an Authority. The five
cities of Allen Park, Lincoln Park, Melvindale, Southgate and Wyandotte elected to move
forward together in planning for the fire/EMS authority. These five communities are
geographically contiguous and located on the northern tier of the Downriver area. The
five are located near the city of Detroit and are among the oldest communities in the
Downriver area. These five communities have a combined population of 138,300 and
cover 28.4 square miles. Their fire departments have a total of six fire stations and 135
fire fighting/emergency medical personnel. Together, these communities spend about
$15.1 million annually on their fire/EMS service provision (Rujan and Andrysiak 2006,
p. 24). Table 3.1 compares the population, size, budgets, and fire department staffing and
equipment levels for each of the potentially collaborating cities. Table 3.1 also includes
activity data for each fire department.
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COMPARISON OF
CITIES
1990 Population

Allen Park

Lincoln Park Melvindale

Southgate

Wyandotte

30,673

41,832

11,216

30,771

30,938

2000 Population

29,070

40,008

10,735

30,136

28,006

May 2007 SEMCOG

27,050

37,494

10,624

28,686

25,942

Total Acres in Community

4,486

3,744

1,740

4,400

3,316

General Fund Budget
(2009-10)
Fire Dept Budget
(2009-10)
Fire Spending per capita
(2009-10)
Number of Fire
Fighting/EMS Personnel
Fire Suppression/EMS
Staff
Fire Runs Annually
Percentage of fire runs to
total runs
EMS Runs Annually
Avg. Response Time
EMS
Avg. Response Time
Fire
Current Number of Fire
Stations
Current Number of
Pumper Trucks
Current Number of Ladder
Trucks
Current Number of
Rescue Units

22,863,465

23,352,647 10,145,000 21,454,555

20,615,192

3,456,590

3,276,523

1,439,000

3,266,526

3,353,490

$127.79

$87.39

$135.45

$113.87

$129.27

30

33

15

27

30

28

30

14

22

28

91

112

197

329

579

3.78%

2.96%

11.93%

10.32%

19.21%

2,318

3,678

1,453

2860

2,435

4 min./less

3.21 minutes 3-4 minutes

4-5 minutes

6.00 minutes

4.00 minutes

3.96 minutes 2-4 minutes

4-5 minutes

5.00 minutes

1

1

1

1

2

2

2

2

2

2

1

1

0

1

1

3

2

1

1

2

Source: City web sites and individual Fire Department Annual Reports

Much of the literature on public service cooperation examines the factors that
make communities more or less likely to engage in collaborative activities. A widespread
presumption in the literature is that relatively homogeneous communities are more likely
to collaborate with one another (Morgan, Hirlinger and England 1988; Rawlings 2003;
Feiock 2007; Feiock 2008). The next several sections examine the homogeneity of the
five communities in terms of type of government, type and size of fire department,
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demographic characteristics, land use patterns, and the similarity of their built
environment. The five cities that are participating in this fire/EMS collaboration have
very similar forms of government and very similar types of fire departments. Table 3.2
details the characteristics of the government and fire department of these five cities.

Table 3.2
Community Governmental and Fire Service Characteristics
MayorCouncil

Lincoln
Park
MayorCouncil

City Manager Present?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year City Founded

1957

1925

1932

1958

1854

Home Rule

Home Rule

Home Rule

Home Rule

Home Rule

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

3,456,590

3,276,523

1,439,000

$3,266,526

$3,353,490

$595 M

$781 M

$672 M

$941 M

$707 M

5.26

4.28

2.1

2.87

3.42

Allen Park
Type of Government

Class of City
Full-Time Unionized
Fire Fighters?
Current Fire Dept.
Budget
Taxable Value in City
Equivalent Millage/Fire
Services

Melvindale

Southgate

Wyandotte

MayorCouncil

MayorCouncil

MayorCouncil

Sources: City Websites, Fire Department Annual Reports and Plante-Moran December 2006 Feasibility Study

Government Structure
All of the communities studied here are “home rule cities” which means that they
are organized and governed in such a way as to give them the maximum governing
flexibility allowed under state law. Michigan’s Home Rule City Act, Public Act 279 of
1909, was designed to give power to local communities to govern themselves through
their citizens, under the framework provided by Michigan’s constitutional and statutory
provisions. The 1963 Michigan Constitution gave local units of government a broad
framework by which to operate and directed Michigan courts to give a liberal or broad
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construction to provisions dealing with local government (Michigan Municipal League
2010).
All of the cities have similar size fire departments relative to their population. All
of the fire departments experience a far greater percentage of emergency medical/rescue
runs than they do fire fighting runs. All of these cities have similar types and numbers of
fire fighting equipment relative to their population. Four of the five cities operate out of a
single, centrally located fire station.
All of the fire fighters working in these cities are unionized employees. Michigan
is considered by some to have a heavily unionized public sector workforce. Public Act
312 was passed by the state legislature in order to deal with the problem of “blue flu” that
plagued cities like Detroit in the 1960s and 1970s. This legislation is argued by some to
restrict the ability of municipal managers to respond to the severe fiscal stress they are
currently experiencing. Public sector unions contend that the legislation is necessary
since they do not have the right to strike like private sector employees do (Michigan
Municipal League 2009).

Demographic Characteristics
Previous research has indicated that demographic characteristics play a significant
role in whether a community will engage in collaboration and if so, the form it will take.
It is significant that these communities are located in the Midwest, are predominantly
residential with some industrial uses, and have housing and infrastructure that is
relatively the same age. Brown and Potoski (2003) have shown that older industrialized
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communities such as these five are more likely to produce public services through joint
contracting or out-sourcing than are the newer communities of the southwest.
Richard C. Feiock (2007) argues that demographic homogeneity is important
because it reduces the transaction costs for officials who have to negotiate collaboration
agreements with other communities. Demographic homogeneity between collaborating
communities is thought to reduce the cost of cooperating; however, homogeneity within
each community is also an important factor because it may reflect homogeneity in service
preferences (Feiock 2008).
In many ways, these five communities are highly homogeneous and have
developed in very similar ways. If previous research is correct, their homogeneity should
make them more willing and able to collaborate than less homogeneous communities.
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Table 3.3:
Demographic Characteristics of the Five Communities in the Study Area
DEMOGRAPHIC
FACTORS

Allen
Park

Lincoln
Park

Melvindale

Southgate

Wyandotte

1990 Population

30,673

41,832

11,216

30,771

30,938

2000 Population

29,070

40,008

10,735

30,136

28,006

May 2007 SEMCOG
2030 SEMCOG
Forecast
Percentage of
population over 65 years
of age in 2000

27,050

37,494

10,624

28,686

25,942

24,318

33,553

9,733

25,714

22,461

21%

14%

13%

33%

29%

Percentage White

96%

93%

87%

94%

96%

Percentage Black

1%

2%

5%

2%

1%

4%

3%

4.6%

6.2%

19%

20%

39%

37%

22%

24%

7%

6%

9%

9%

4%

4%

3%
6%
9%
Percentage Hispanic
Individuals Living Below
3.2%
7.7%
11.4%
Poverty Level
Percentage non H.S.
13%
25%
28%
Grad
Percentage Graduated
35%
41%
41%
H.S.
Percentage Some
26%
22%
21%
College
Percentage Associate
7%
5%
4%
Degree
Percentage Bachelor's
14%
5%
5%
Degree
Percentage Grad. or
6%
2%
1%
Professional Degree
Source: 2000 United States Census and SEMCOG Community Profiles, 2008.

Table 3.3 compares the five communities in terms of demographic measures.
Demographically, the five communities of the proposed DFA are relatively homogeneous
in terms of race, age, religion, education and socioeconomic factors. Populations in the
cities range from 10,624 persons to 37,494. The percentage of persons aged sixty-five
years and older has been cited as an important variable for predicting collaboration.
Previous research has shown that the larger the percentage of such persons in the
population, the more resistant to any proposed change in the existing level of services
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(Morgan, Hirlinger and England, 1988). In terms of the percentage of their population
aged 65 years or older, the five cities display some variance with the lowest percentage
being thirteen and the highest being two and one half times that at thirty-three.
In a comprehensive review of much of the theoretical and empirical literature on
metropolitan fragmentation and interlocal cooperation, Rawlings (2003), found that
heterogeneity and particularly racial heterogeneity is believed to have a negative impact
on levels of cooperation. Yet contrary to the bulk of the literature, Rawlings own research
involving MSAs across the nation found that racial variation within a metropolitan area is
positively linked to greater levels of interlocal collaboration.
Education levels in these communities are also relatively homogeneous as the
percentage of non-high school graduates, high school graduates, those persons with some
college education and those with a four year college degree display little variance across
the five cities. The percentage of persons with post-graduate or professional degrees is
relatively low in the study area.

Land Use Characteristics
Another important variable in predicting collaboration activities is the urban or
rural character of a community and the land uses present in the city. Research by Lackey,
Freshwater and Rupasingha (2002) indicated that local government officials and residents
in rural areas were often more suspicious of collaboration activities than their
counterparts in urban areas. The five communities involved in this study are all urban in
character and a part of the Detroit Metropolitan MSA. All five of these communities are
nearly fully developed. Table 3.4 shows the greatest single use of land in all of these
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communities is for the construction of single-family homes. The housing density of the
neighborhoods in these five cities is relatively high, ranging from 5.2 units per acre to 7.0
units per acre.

Table 3.4:
Land Use Characteristics of the Study Group Communities.
Community Characteristics
Percentage used for SingleFamily
Percentage used for Commercial
and Office
Percentage used for Institutional
Percentage used for Industrial
Percentage used for
Transp./Comm./Utility
Percentage used for
Cultural/Recreation/Cemetery
Grassland and Shrub
Total Acres in Community
Residential Density (Units per
Acre)
Land in Community Developed

Allen
Park

Lincoln
Park

Melvindale

Southgate

Wyandotte

51%

65%

37%

48%

57%

6%

11%

8%

15%

8%

7%
11%

7%
3%

6%
13%

8%
2%

5%
8%

14%

6%

20%

3%

7%

3%

3%

4%

3%

7%

2%
4,486

2%
3,744

8%
1,740

7
4,400

5%
3,316

5.20

6.65

7.00

5.66

6.32

93.30%

96.80%

89.60%

84.50%

93.90%

Source: SEMCOG Community Profiles, 2008

Very little of the land within these communities is used for industrial purposes,
which gives them similar requirements for their fire services. This commonality should
make cooperation easier to achieve. If one of the communities was heavily industrialized,
that city could have very different fire fighting requirements and costs than the other
predominantly residential communities. Those communities might not make good
collaboration partners because of different levels of staffing, training and equipment
needs. Given that these five communities have very similar fire department staffing,
training and equipment needs, they are seemingly good potential partners for this
proposed collaboration.
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Housing and Taxable Value Characteristics
Prior research predicts that the land use and housing characteristics of a city are
also important factors in collaboration on fire fighting and EMS services. Communities
with similar types, age and value of housing make better potential partners for one
another. Skip Krueger and Michael McGuire (2005) found that cities that enjoy a high
taxable value and high tax revenues were among the least likely to seek additional
revenues through interlocal collaboration. Having similar taxable values and having the
potential to raise similar levels of revenue are important factors if two or more
communities are going to collaborate on the provision of services.

Table 3.5:
Housing and Householder Characteristics
Housing Characteristics
Number of Households/2000
Percentage with Children
Median Households Income
(in 1999 dollars)
Percentage of Persons in
Poverty
Percentage Owner Occupied
Housing Units
Median Housing Value
(in 2000 dollars)
Percentage of Housing Units
Vacant
Percentage of Single-Family
Units
Percentage of TwoFamily/Duplex Units
Percentage Multi-Units
Apartments
Percentage Mobile Homes
Avg. Annual Res. Bldg.
Permits/1996-2000
Avg. Annual Res. Bldg.
Permits/2001-2005
Total Housing Units in 2000

Allen
Park
11,974
30%

Lincoln
Park
16,203
34%

$51,992

Melvindale

Southgate

Wyandotte

4,500
32%

12,836
29%

11,817
24%

$42,515

$37,954

$46,927

$43,740

3.2%

7.7%

11.4%

4.6%

6.2%

86%

76%

64%

68%

70%

$118,700

$84,100

$78,500

$109,200

$101,700

2%

4%

5%

4%

4%

91%

83%

72%

72%

77%

< 1%

4%

5%

0%

8%

9%

12%

21%

27%

15%

< 1%

1%

3%

1%

< 1%

3

8

4

173

29

3

9

9

66

48

12,254

16,821

4,760

13,361

12,303

Source: SEMCOG Community Profiles, 2008
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Fighting a residential house fire in a structure seventy plus years old is different
from fighting one in a newer structure. Both are different than fighting a fire in an
industrial structure. The equipment, staff and training needed for each are different and it
would seem logical that a city considering collaboration would look for a potential
partner that fights fires similar to those usually encountered by their own fire department.
One city containing several high-rise apartment buildings attempting to collaborate with
another that contains only single story, single-family residential homes can present
difficulties when establishing the staff, equipment and training needed by a joint fire
authority. As Tables 3.4 and 3.5 indicate, these five communities are very similar in
terms of the land use and housing characteristics found in each of them and hence in the
kinds of fires they are typically called upon to fight.

Current Fiscal Capacity
The existing literature is somewhat mixed in terms of the likely effect of fiscal
stress on a community when it comes to encouraging collaboration. When cost savings
are likely, fiscal pressures are noticeable and political opposition is weak, Morgan
Hirlinger and England (1988) argued that local officials are more likely to engage in
interlocal arrangements. Bartle and Swayze (1997) concluded that fiscal pressure was a
frequently mentioned reason for interlocal collaboration. Agranoff and McGuire (2003)
contend that financially stable jurisdictions are less likely to engage in collaborative
activities. Krueger and McGuire (2005) argue that fiscal stress often leads to more
collaborative activity. Zeemering’s (2007) research indicated that fiscal pressure stimulus
is consistently mentioned as a reason for communities collaborating.
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However, Morgan and Hirlinger (1991) argue that fiscal stress in a community is
not a major incentive for contracting out. Thurmaier and Wood (2004) also concluded
that cost savings and the presence of fiscal stress were not major reasons why cities and
counties in their sample collaborated. Likewise, Carr and LeRoux (2007) concluded that
fiscal constraints do not provide a universal rationale for undertaking collaborative
efforts.
In the case of the communities examined in this study, the continuing decline in
revenues available has reportedly been a strong incentive to search for alternative service
provision solutions. The relative openness to collaboration in general and a more
proactive approach to public policy may be factors stimulating this effort. “Cities that
have a more proactive policy agenda and viewpoint should be more interested in
collaboration” (Krueger and McGuire 2005, p. 16).

Shared Geographic Borders
Foster (1997) found that the absence of natural barriers often facilitates ties
between local governments who find it easier to collaborate across political boundaries.
There is no natural barrier separating the five DFA collaboration cities. They are
contiguous, tightly packed together and share common geographic borders. The City of
Allen Park shares borders with Melvindale, Lincoln Park and Southgate. The City of
Lincoln Park shares borders with all four of its potential collaboration partners. The City
of Southgate shares borders with Lincoln Park and Allen Park. The City of Melvindale
shares borders with Allen Park and Lincoln Park. The City of Wyandotte shares borders
with Lincoln Park and Southgate. Post (2002) found that the geographic concentration of
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local governments can cause them to cooperate and geographic density of metropolitan
area governments is a significant predictor of the occurrence of interlocal agreements.
Lackey, et al., (2002) found that a good and long-established relationship among
cooperating jurisdictions increases the chances of continuing success. In such
circumstances, processes often run smoothly because of accumulated levels of trust
between collaborating partners. Park and Feiock (2003) found that cooperation is more
likely the longer the partners have collaborated. When clustered together and with
repeated contacts, each community can benefit from acquiring and preserving their
reputation for cooperation and commitment to the effort. This research predicts that
successful past experiences are an important factor stimulating interlocal collaboration.
Successful collaboration in the past could potentially create a reservoir of social and
political capital used to encourage future efforts. The literature also indicates that past
interactions between interlocal neighbors can have a positive or negative effect on the
decision to collaborate. “Trying to negotiate with uncooperative or adversarial neighbors
is likely to discourage further attempts at cooperation” (Nice and Fredericksen 1995, p.
129).
For many years, these five communities have cooperated with one another
through a Mutual Aid System, whereby one community can call upon a neighboring
community for help in fighting a fire. They have had repeated contacts with one another
and fought fires in one another’s cities. Such repeated contact creates a kind of social
capital between the participants as individuals and as governmental units. Social capital
can often lead to better cooperation (Lackey, et al. 2002). Higher levels of social capital
have a positive effect on levels of intergovernmental cooperation across the nation as a

84
whole (Rawlings, 2003). “Strong social capital was associated with increased cooperation
in the US as a whole and in the Midwest” (Rawlings 2003, p. 24).
The literature indicates that collaboration is more likely to occur “when officials
believe that the benefits of cooperation will probably outweigh the costs.” (Nice and
Fredericksen 1995, p. 129). Therefore, a series of questions were asked that are designed
to elicit information about what the participants in the DFA collaboration hoped to gain.

Data Collection Strategy
In order to better understand why these communities were actively pursuing
collaboration, a series of extended interviews were conducted with the participants in the
Downriver Fire Authority (DFA) collaboration effort. Many of the questions developed
for these interviews are based on the factors identified by the Institutional Collective
Action framework of Richard C. Feiock (2007) and the conceptual framework used by
Eric Zeemering (2007) to study the roles played by elected and administrative officials in
promoting and maintaining cooperation on public services. Following Zeemering, the
interview questions were grouped into three main categories: a) the factors stimulating
interlocal cooperation, discussed in Chapter Four; b) the participants’ perceptions of the
terms of the collaboration, discussed in Chapter Five; and c) the participants’ perceptions
of the partners and potential partners in the collaboration effort, discussed in Chapter Six.
The questions in Chapter Seven deal with the differing roles played by elected and
administrative officials in undertaking collaboration efforts. Copies of the interview
questions and all materials provided to the interviewees are provided in Appendix A. A
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follow-up or supplemental interview was conducted as well and that survey instrument is
provided as Appendix B.

The Downriver Community Conference
The Downriver Community Conference (DCC) is a regional organization in
southern Wayne County. It was established in 1977 in order to facilitate better
programmatic cooperation between the twenty communities in the area. Because the
DCC was the facilitating organization through which this specific collaboration was
begun, a listing of all of the persons that currently were or had been actively engaged in
the discussion and planning of the DFA collaboration, was obtained. The list contained
the participants name, city, title, email address and telephone number. The listed
participants were all contacted via an email message, and the basis and purpose of this
research was explained to them. The lead investigator was identified as the person
sending the email and the person that would be conducting the interviews. The professor
directing this dissertation research, Dr. Jered Carr, was also identified and his telephone
number supplied. The persons contacted were encouraged to discuss the research with Dr.
Carr if they had any questions or concerns about the research that the lead investigator
had not answered.
Of the thirty persons identified by the DCC as having participated in the planning
process, several had moved out of the area or were no longer working for one of the
cities. Efforts were made to contact everyone listed and twenty agreed to be interviewed
and to participate in this research. I attended two of the monthly meetings of the DFA
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planning group at the DCC to introduce myself and start making appointments for the
interviews with these participants.
Initial face-to-face interviews were conducted between August of 2007 and
January of 2008. Elected officials, administrative officials, fire command officers and
rank and file fire personnel were interviewed in order to gather data on the causes and
effects of collaboration between these communities. In each case, the interviewee was
asked a series of open-ended and closed-ended questions. Although there were variations
in the length of time of the interviews, they averaged between 60 and 90 minutes each. In
addition to writing down the participant’s responses to the interview questions, their
responses were audio-taped, with their permission, and subsequently transcribed to
ensure completeness and accuracy. The interviewees were informed that they could
request confidentiality.
Table 3.6 lists the persons interviewed as a part of this research and indicate the
city they work in, time there, whether they reside in that city, their current position, other
positions that they have held, if they have worked for other communities and what they
did there. The names of the interviewees are not disclosed to protect the respondents.
In order to protect the confidentiality of the respondents, fictitious names are used
for each city in the remaining chapters and the names of the respondents themselves are
not used at all. All other information provided such as job titles and time in the
organization is drawn from actual responses given. In place of the actual city names the
following fictitious city names will be used: Coletown, Eliseville, Detour, Acme and
Bedford Falls. This method will protect the confidentiality of the respondents while at the
same time permitting the analysis to focus on commonalities and differences in the
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responses from individuals within the same city and among those in similar positions in
the five governments.
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Table 3.6:
Persons Interviewed for this Research
City

Time
with
City

Resides
in City

1

Melvindale

4 yrs

Yes

2

Melvindale

11 yrs

Yes

3

Melvindale

29 yrs

No

4

Allen Park

37
yrs.

5

Allen Park

6

Current
Position

How
Long in
Position

Other Positions
with this City

Other Downriver
Cities worked for

Previous Elected
administrative
experience

4 yrs

No

No

No

No

No

Council
Pres.
Union
Pres.
Fire
Chief

8 yrs

Yes

Mayor

4 yrs

City Manager 20
yrs

No

11 yrs

Yes

City
Manager

3 yrs

H.R. Director 8
yrs

River Rouge, MI.

Lincoln
Park

3 yrs

No

City
Manager

3 yrs

No

No

8

Allen Park

30 yrs

No

2 yrs

Fire Fighter, Sgt.
& Captain

No

No

9

Allen Park

17 yrs

Yes

9 months

Fire Fighter, Sgt.
Engineer

No

Active in PTA

10

Wyandotte

25 yrs

Yes

3 yrs

Fire Fighter, Sgt.

No

No

11

Lincoln
Park

4 yrs

Yes

4 yrs

No

No

No

12

Wyandotte

17 yrs

Yes

2 yrs

Fire Fighter,
Eng. & Lt.

Riverview &
Melvindale F.D.

No

13

Southgate

2 yrs

No

City Mgr.

2 yrs

No

Allen Park, MI.

14

Wyandotte

50 yrs

Yes

Mayor

40+ yrs

City Council

No

15

Lincoln
Park

29 yrs

Yes

6 months

Fire Fighter, Sgt.
Eng. & Lt.

No

No

16

Lincoln
Park

14 yrs

No

5 yrs

Fire Fighter &
Eng.

Ecorse FD &
Allen Park FD

No

17

Wyandotte

9.5
yrs

No

Sgt.

4 months

Fire Fighter,
Pipeman, Driver

No

No

New
Mayor

5 months

City Council 12
yrs

No

2.5 yrs

Asst. Dir. Parks
/Rec

No

No

1 yr

City Treasurer

No

No

3 yrs

Union Sec 3
years
Fire Fight, Sgt.
& Lt.

No

7

18

19
20

Allen Park

12 yrs

Yes

Lincoln
Park
Lincoln
Park

2.5
yrs

Yes

32 yrs

Yes

Fire
Chief
Lt. &
Fire
Inspector
Fire
Chief
City
Council
Fire
Captain

Fire
Chief
Sgt. &
Union
President

City
Council
Council
Pres.

17 years on local
School Board
City Manager
and County Road
Commissioner
Personnel
Director in River
Rouge, MI. 4 yrs
Howell, MI.
Corona, MI.
Marysville, Ca.
& Sterling
Heights, MI.
Requested
Confidentiality

City Council and
Mayor
Former Director
of MI. DOT

Wayne County
Sheriff 31 yrs.
Wayne County
Executive 4 yrs
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CHAPTER 4
FACTORS IN THE EFFORT TO COLLABORATE
ON FIRE SERVICES

This chapter examines factors that stimulated the effort to create a fire authority
for these five communities. The questions in the survey instrument used to examine this
topic draw on the Institutional Collective Action framework developed by Richard
Feiock and are also based to a large extent on research questions developed by Eric
Zeemering. Zeemering interviewed elected and administrative officials in Michigan to
determine what stimulated their collaboration efforts. He specifically examined the
factors that stimulated collaboration and the perception of the interviewees regarding
both the terms of collaboration and their intergovernmental partners.
Chapters Four through Seven are drawn from interviews done while the
collaboration was being actively developed. Chapter Eight, the Epilogue, is drawn from a
second, follow-up interview.
This chapter is organized around the questions used in the survey instrument. The
tables at the end of the chapter give the reader the answers of all respondents and are
grouped by the role of the respondent and by the respondent’s city of employ. In order to
alleviate the need to refer to the tables at the end of the chapter, those tables have been
broken down into several smaller tables throughout the chapter to aid in the readers
understanding of the data.
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The first section of the chapter deals with the responses to a group of closedended scaled questions. The second section deals with the responses to a group of openended narrative questions. Each section is then analyzed and important findings
summarized.

Factors Stimulating Interlocal Cooperation: Responses to Scale Questions
The first group of questions asks the respondent how open their organization is to
new ways of doing things and to collaborating with other communities.

Table 4.1:
Openness of Organization to New Ideas and Collaboration
All Respondents (n=20)
Scale: 1=Strongly Disagree

10=Strongly Agree

(a) My organization is usually receptive to doing things in new ways
(b) My organization usually approaches problems proactively
(c) My organization is usually open to possibilities for collaborating on services with
other local governments (other than the county)

Mean of All
Respondents

6.85
6.35
6.85

The mean response to question (a) is (6.85), indicating that most of the
interviewees agree that their organization is relatively open to new ways to provide
public services. As can be seen by examining the standard deviations in Table 4.16, there
is some variation in their responses when comparing the different roles of the
respondents. Mayors give an average response of (8.00) to that question, which is the
highest average response of any group. This indicates that they agree that their
organization is receptive to doing things in new ways. City council members, as a group,
responded to that question with the lowest average response of (5.66). This indicates a
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rather neutral opinion near the mid-point of the scale. City managers in the sample give
the second highest response of any group with an average response of (7.00) to the
question. This indicates that they agree with that statement displaying thinking much
more like the mayors group than the city council group. Fire chiefs, as a group, with an
average response of (6.20) and rank-and-file fire fighters with an average response of
(6.80) gave responses relatively close to one another, but lower than either the city
manager or mayor groups.

Table 4.2
Mean Responses Grouped by City
Detour
(n=5)

Eliseville
(n=6)

Acme
(n=3)

Bedford
Falls
(n=2)

Coletown
(n=4)

(a) My organization is usually receptive to doing
things in new ways

8.20

4.83

7.33

7.00

7.75

(b) My organization usually approaches problems
proactively

7.80

4.50

6.33

6.50

7.25

(c) My organization is usually open to possibilities
for collaborating on services with other local
governments (other than the county)

7.00

5.67

8.00

7.00

7.50

Scale: 1=Strongly Disagree

10=Strongly Agree

Table 4.3
Mean Responses Grouped by Role of Respondent
Mayor
(n=4)

City
Council
(n=3)

City
Mgr
(n=3)

Fire
Chief
(n=5)

Fire
Fighter
(n=5)

(a) My organization is usually receptive to doing things in
new ways

8.00

5.66

7.00

6.20

6.80

(b) My organization usually approaches problems
proactively

7.33

5.00

6.67

5.80

6.80

(c) My organization is usually open to possibilities for
collaborating on services with other local governments (other
than the county)

7.33

6.67

7.67

6.40

6.40

Scale: 1=Strongly Disagree

10=Strongly Agree
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When asked if their organization usually approaches problems proactively,
(question b), the mean response of all interviewees is (6.35) indicating a general
consensus that the organizations they work within usually approach problems
proactively. The average response of all five cities to that question is (6.48), but there is
some variance between the cities. Detour averaged the highest response at (7.80) but the
average response of Eliseville was a mere (4.50), indicating that they think their
organization does not proactively approach problems. The average responses of the other
three cities were much closer to that of Detour and closer to one another. A comparison
of the average responses grouped by role also indicates variance in the answers given.
The city council members and fire chiefs had the lowest average responses at (5.00) and
(5.80) respectively. The mayors had the highest average response at (7.33). The city
managers and fire fighters responded in similar ways with average responses of (6.67)
and (6.80) respectively.
When asked if their organization is open to collaborating with other local
governments, (question c), the average response of all those interviewed is (6.85). There
is not a great deal of variance among the average responses of the different groups to this
question. However, the mayors and city managers registered the higher or most strongly
agree responses at (7.33) and (7.67) respectively. A comparison of the responses grouped
by city shows little variance with four of the cities averaging responses between (7.00)
and (8.00). The one exception in this group was Eliseville. That city had an average
response of (5.67), the lowest of all five cities and significantly below the others.
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The response to this set of questions clearly indicates that these organizations are
perceived by these respondents as generally open to new ideas, acting proactively and
looking for ways to collaborate with other local governments.
Interestingly, the average response of Eliseville interviewees to (question a) (4.83)
is considerably below that of the other four cities and indicates that, as a group, they think
their organization less receptive to doing things in new ways than the respondents from
other cities. Again, the average response of Eliseville interviewees to (question b) at
(4.50) and (question c) at (5.67) is well below that of the other four communities. Yet,
that community was consistently seen by the other respondents to be taking a leading role
in advocating for the collaboration. That seeming inconsistency may be explained by the
presence of a City Manager who has worked for several other cities and brings a more
proactive approach to his work for Eliseville. He is frequently mentioned by other
respondents as being a leader or policy entrepreneur in this DFA collaboration effort.
A second group of questions (d-i) asked respondents their perceptions on how the
residents of their community view efforts to collaborate on public service provision.
When asked if they think their residents prefer to have most public services provided inhouse by local government employees, (question d), the mean response is (6.95),
indicating a general perception that residents prefer to keep service provision in-house. A
comparison of the responses grouped by city indicates some variance, the mean being
(7.21) with a standard deviation of 1.09. Two of the communities, Acme and Bedford
Falls, have an (8.00) average response, indicating that they agree more strongly than the
other cities with that statement.
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Table 4.4:
Respondents’ Perceptions of Community Residents All Respondents
Scale: 1=Strongly Disagree

10=Strongly Agree

(d) Our residents demand that direct provision be the default option for most basic public
services
(e) Our residents demand that we consider what's good for Downriver when we make
decisions about providing important public services
(f) Our residents tend to be suspicious of the motivations of elected officials from the
neighboring jurisdictions
(g) Our residents do not care about how services are delivered because they focus only on
the quality and cost of these services
(h) Our residents would rather we contract with other local governments than with private
or non-profit organizations for most services
(i) Our residents want us to let the county provide services whenever possible

Mean All
Respondents

6.95
4.05
7.05
5.10
5.60
2.05

Detour’s responses are relatively close with an average of (7.80) and the average
response of Coletown was (6.75). Eliseville had the lowest average response at (5.50) the
mid-point of the scale, indicating a neutral perception that in-house provision is not
preferred. Generally, these responses indicate that it is the perception of the respondents
that the residents of their respective cities predominantly prefer that most public services
be provided in-house. It is important to ask this question because such perceptions, if
correct, could lead to possible political opposition that might hamper collaboration
efforts.
When grouped by role, the comparisons indicate some variance between the
groups in their responses to (question d). The mayor group had the lowest average
response at (5.00), indicating they were neutral on this statement. All four of the other
groups had a higher average response than the mayor group. The city council group is
closest to the mayors’ at (6.00) and the city managers’ group is closer to the fire chief and
fire fighter groups at (7.00). The groups of fire chiefs and fire fighters had identical
average responses to this question at (7.80) and were the highest average response of any
group.
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Table 4.5:
Respondents’ Perceptions of Community Residents Grouped by City
Scale: 1=Strongly Disagree

10=Strongly Agree

(d) Our residents demand that direct provision be
the default option for most basic public services
(e) Our residents demand that we consider what's
good for Downriver when we make decisions
about providing important public services
(f) Our residents tend to be suspicious of the
motivations of elected officials from the
neighboring jurisdictions
(g) Our residents do not care about how services
are delivered because they focus only on the
quality and cost of these services
(h) Our residents would rather we contract with
other local governments than with private or nonprofit organizations for most services
(i) Our residents want us to let the county provide
services whenever possible

Detour

Eliseville

Acme

Bedford
Falls

Coletown

7.80

5.50

8.00

8.00

6.75

3.60

3.17

5.67

4.50

4.50

8.20

7.00

5.67

6.50

7.00

6.00

5.33

3.00

7.00

4.25

5.40

6.00

7.00

4.00

5.00

1.40

2.67

1.67

3.50

1.50

Question (e) was asked in order to measure whether the respondents think
community residents tend to ponder what is good for the entire metropolitan (Downriver)
area or whether they tend to be more concerned about their own community. The average
response rate of all interviewees is (4.05), falling well below the mid-point of the scale.
Respondents clearly perceive that their respective residents are more concerned about
what is good for their own community. The average response of Detour and Eliseville
registered well below the mid-point of the scale at (3.60) and (3.17) respectively. The
average response rate of Bedford Falls and Coletown is (4.50). The average response of
only one city, Acme, inched above the mid-point of the scale at (5.67). That difference
may be partially explained by the assumption expressed by many of the respondents that
the City of Acme has a great deal more to gain from this collaboration effort than do the
other communities. The City of Acme has far fewer resources than the other cities and
should therefore benefit more from collaboration.
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Table 4.6:
Respondents’ Perceptions of Community Residents Grouped by Role of Respondent
Scale: 1=Strongly Disagree

10=Strongly Agree

(d) Our residents demand that direct provision be the
default option for most basic public services
(e) Our residents demand that we consider what's good
for Downriver when we make decisions about providing
important public services
(f) Our residents tend to be suspicious of the motivations
of elected officials from the neighboring jurisdictions
(g) Our residents do not care about how services are
delivered because they focus only on the quality and cost
of these services
(h) Our residents would rather we contract with other
local governments than with private or non-profit
organizations for most services
(i) Our residents want us to let the county provide
services whenever possible

Mayor

City
Council

City
Manager

Fire
Chief

Fire
Fighter

5.00

6.00

7.00

7.80

7.80

6.00

3.67

3.33

4.00

3.60

5.33

7.00

5.33

8.60

7.60

7.00

6.67

6.33

3.80

3.40

5.67

5.67

6.33

4.00

6.60

1.00

3.67

3.67

1.40

1.60

When asked their opinion as to whether or not their residents tend to be suspicious
of the motivations of elected officials from neighboring jurisdictions, (question f), the
average response of all interviewees is (7.05), indicating the respondents agreed that their
residents are somewhat suspicious of the motivations of elected officials from
neighboring communities. Comparing the answers grouped by city indicates agreement
across cities with that statement. The lowest average, Acme, is (5.67) and the highest,
Detour, is (8.20). The other three cities show a consistent average response ranging
between (6.50) and (7.00). Several of the respondents volunteered that in their opinion, in
addition to residents being suspicious of neighboring elected officials, their residents are
also somewhat suspicious of the elected officials within their own community.
It is important to note that these responses are from elected and appointed
administrative officials as well as rank-and-file fire fighters. These communities share
common borders and these officials have repeated contacts. They have a long history of
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cooperation through the DCC and also share a common local newspaper, The News
Herald. Even though citizen attention to local politics is generally considered to be very
low, such factors would allow for speculation that the residents of these five communities
have had numerous opportunities to observe and form valid opinions about the actions of
elected officials from neighboring communities.
Asked if they think their residents do not care how services are provided, because
they focus only on the quality and cost of services, (question g), the average response of
all interviewees is (5.10), below the mid-point of the scale. When compared by city, some
interesting variance is revealed. Acme has the lowest average response of (3.00) and
Coletown only (4.25). Eliseville, Detour and Bedford Falls showed considerably higher
average responses at (5.33), (6.00) and (7.00) respectively. Such responses indicate that
the perception of the respondents is that their residents are divided or relatively neutral as
to this statement.
Another interesting variance is illustrated when a comparison is made based upon
the role of the respondent. The average responses of mayors (7.00), council members
(6.00) and city mangers (6.33) indicate that they moderately agree with this statement. A
considerable difference of opinion arises when the same question is asked of fire chiefs
and fire fighters whose average response is (3.80) and (3.40) respectively, indicating
moderate disagreement with this statement. The respondents employed in the fire service
perceive the public as more concerned about how services are provided than the other
groups of respondents.
When asked to assess resident preference for using other local governments for
service provision as opposed to private firms or nonprofit organizations, (question h), the
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average response of all interviewees is (5.60), just above the mid-point of the scale,
indicating a neutral position on this statement. It does show that there is a general
perception among the respondents that their residents are not necessarily averse to using
private firms or nonprofit organizations for service delivery.
Grouped by role, the average response is fairly consistent at ranges between
(5.67) and (6.60). The exception is the response by the fire chiefs, which, as a group,
provided an average response of only (4.00) indicating moderate disagreement. Grouped
by community, the average responses ranged between (5.00) and (7.00), indicating a
general consensus that their residents are relatively neutral to somewhat in agreement
with this statement. Again, the respondents from one city, Bedford Falls, provided an
average response of (4.00), well below the other four communities.
Especially interesting was the response to (question i) which measured the
respondent’s perception of their resident’s preference for letting the county (Wayne)
provide services whenever possible. The average response of all the interviewees is a
mere (2.05) indicating a very strong consensus that their residents oppose letting the
county provide services to them. When grouped by city, the average responses range
from a high of (3.50) Bedford Falls to a low of (1.40) Detour. When grouped by role, the
responses indicate some variance, with mayors averaging a response of just (1.00) and
fire chiefs and fire fighters averaging responses of (1.40) and (1.60) respectively. The
highest two groups, although still below the mid-point of the scale, are the city council
members and city managers with identical average responses of (3.67).
The responses to this question were by far the lowest in the study. Although there
is some variance in the answers given, they are overwhelmingly negative in response to
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allowing the county to provide services to local communities. Several of the respondents
volunteered that they thought their residents would be opposed to working with Wayne
County in particular, and mentioned unpleasant experiences they had working with the
County in the past. Three or four of the respondents volunteered that several counties
across the United States provide fire services contractually to their municipalities and that
such arrangements work well. The respondents expressed doubt that such would be the
case with Wayne County and were convinced their residents would be opposed to such an
arrangement.

Table 4.7:
Perception of the Importance of Maintaining Local Control of Fire Services
Scale: 1=Strongly Disagree

10=Strongly Agree

(j) Our residents place more value on protecting our city's control over public services than
on lowering costs
(k) Our residents place more value on protecting our city's control over public services than
on improving service effectiveness across the Downriver communities
(l) Our residents see themselves as highly interdependent with the local governments that
surround this community
(m) There is a significant constituency in my community for seeking regional solutions to
our problems

Mean All
Respondents

6.00
6.05
4.85
5.10

Questions (j-m) are designed to measure the respondent’s perceptions of their
residents’ opinions on the importance of the city maintaining control over service
provision. Previous research often asserts that the fear by local public officials of losing
control over service production and provision can hamper efforts at interlocal
collaboration. “If management thinks interlocal contracting adversely affects its capacity
to exercise close control over municipal services, the city is much less likely to pursue
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contracting with another jurisdiction” (Morgan and Hirlinger 1991, p. 138). These
questions identify their views of the attitudes of residents about this issue.
Asked their opinion of the statement that their residents place more value on
protecting the city’s control over public services than on lowering costs, (question j), the
average response of all interviewees is (6.00). This indicates that the respondents believe
that their residents are somewhat more concerned with maintaining control over public
services than with lowering costs.

Table 4.8:
Perception of the Importance of Maintaining Local Control of Fire Services
Grouped by City
Scale: 1=Strongly Disagree

10=Strongly Agree

(j) Our residents place more value on protecting our
city's control over public services than on lowering
costs
(k) Our residents place more value on protecting our
city's control over public services than on improving
service effectiveness across the Downriver
communities
(l) Our residents see themselves as highly
interdependent with the local governments that
surround this community
(m) There is a significant constituency in my
community for seeking regional solutions to our
problems

Detour

Eliseville

Acme

Bedford
Falls

Coletown

6.60

5.33

5.67

6.50

6.25

6.80

5.00

6.00

7.00

6.25

4.80

4.00

6.00

5.50

5.00

5.60

5.50

7.67

4.50

2.25

Grouped by city there was relative consistency among the five cities. Eliseville
had the lowest average with (5.33) and Detour the highest with an average response of
(6.60).When a comparison is made by grouping the respondents by role, there is also
considerable consistency in the average responses. City council persons provided
moderate disagreement with that statement at (5.00) and fire fighters the strongest
average agreement at (6.80).
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Table 4.9:
Perception of the Importance of Maintaining Local Control of Fire Services
Grouped by Role of Respondent
Scale: 1=Strongly Disagree

10=Strongly Agree

Mayor

City
Council

City
Manager

Fire
Chief

Fire
Fighter

(j) Our residents place more value on protecting our city's
control over public services than on lowering costs

5.33

5.00

6.00

6.40

6.80

(k) Our residents place more value on protecting our
city's control over public services than on improving
service effectiveness across the Downriver communities
(l) Our residents see themselves as highly interdependent
with the local governments that surround this community

3.67

4.67

6.67

6.40

7.20

5.00

4.33

3.67

6.20

5.00

5.33

6.33

4.67

5.00

5.20

(m) There is a significant constituency in my community
for seeking regional solutions to our problems

When asked their opinion about the value their residents placed on maintaining
control over public services in terms of potential improvements to the effectiveness of
services across all of the area communities, (question k), the average response of all
persons interviewed is (6.05). This score indicates respondents believe their residents are
inclined to consider maintaining local control over services slightly more important than
improving the service provision in the region as a whole.
The average response to this question is fairly consistent across the five cities,
ranging between (5.00) and (7.00). The lowest average response of (5.00) was recorded
in Eliseville. That lower average response may be partially explained by some of the
answers given to open-ended questions asking about the same issue. Eliseville
respondents by and large think that the city has very little control over fire services now.
Consequently, they may not see this as a serious issue. The answers given by Acme
respondents were just above the mid-point of the scale at (5.67). Detour, Bedford Falls
and Coletown averaged more moderate agreement with this statement, recording
responses of (6.60), (6.50) and (6.25) respectively.
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When the average responses to (question j), are analyzed based on the role of the
respondent, a fairly consistent pattern is shown, ranging just below or above the midpoint of the scale. However, a revealing difference between elected and administrative
officials emerges. Mayor and city council members responded below the mid-point of the
scale indicating moderate disagreement with the statement at (5.33) and (5.00)
respectively. City managers, fire chiefs and fire fighters all recorded scores above the
mid-point of the scale at (6.00), (6.40) and (6.80) respectively, indicating they somewhat
agree with this statement.
Frederickson (1999) argues that in the absence of a central authority and under
the conditions of high interdependency as is often found in metropolitan areas, there exist
highly developed systems of cooperation that serve essentially the same purpose as
diplomacy among nation-states. Cooperation is driven by recognition of the
interdependence among the local jurisdictions. Other analysts have proposed that “such
interdependency and common service delivery is potentially one way that inequities in
socioeconomic conditions, fiscal capacities and service distribution within a region can
be reduced” (Parks and Oakerson 2000, p. 174).
When asked if their residents see themselves as highly interdependent with
surrounding cities, (question l), responses averaged (4.85), slightly below the mid point
of the scale. This response suggests that the opinion of these elected and administrative
officials is that their residents do not think they are particularly linked or interdependent
with residents in the surrounding communities. When grouped by city, the average
response shows relative consistency around the mid-point of the scale. The lowest
average response was that of Eliseville at (4.00) and the highest was that of Acme at

103
(6.00). When grouped by the role of the respondent, the answers ranged from a high of
(6.20) for fire chiefs, to a low of (3.67) for city managers. The fire chiefs are the only
group recording a response above the mid-point of the scale. The average responses of
the other four groups ranged from (5.00) for the mayors and fire fighters to (4.33) for city
council members and (3.67) for city managers, revealing moderate disagreement with this
statement.
Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren (1961) argued that a political community may not be
coterminous with existing community boundaries, and that some mechanism must be
developed for dealing with the problems associated with the provision of services across
differing governmental jurisdictions. Question (m), was designed to measure whether the
respondents perceived any political demand in their respective community for developing
such a regional approach to problems. When asked if there is a significant constituency
within the community who wish to seek regional solutions to the problems facing it, the
response rate for all persons interviewed is (5.10), just below the mid-point of the scale
indicating a relatively neutral position on this question.
When grouped by city, the responses showed considerable variance, ranging from
(2.25) Coletown to (7.67) Acme. Clearly, the perceptions of community support for
regional solutions by the respondents of these two cities differ greatly. The responses
from Coletown respondents suggest they are engaging in the DFA collaborative without
the support of their city’s residents. When grouped by the role of the respondent, there is
relative consistency around the mid-point of the scale with scores ranging between a high
of (6.33) for city council members to a low of (4.67) for city managers. These responses
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reveal that in the opinion of the respondents, their residents are relatively neutral to
somewhat in agreement with this statement.

Table 4.10
Respondents’ Personal Views Regarding Collaboration
Scale:

1=Strongly Disagree

10=Strongly Agree

Mean All
Respondents

(n) I personally think that it is generally a good idea to look for ways to collaborate with
surrounding jurisdictions regardless of the service type or the problems faced

8.80

(o) I think that the Downriver communities are interdependent in terms of the problems
they face and possible solutions to those problems

8.40

(p) I think the Downriver communities should work collaboratively on providing services
whenever it will benefit these communities as a group even if some of the communities
would rather provide the service independently

8.35

The last set of questions (n-p) in the first section of the interview instrument are
designed to reveal the respondent’s personal views on the topic of collaborating with
surrounding communities. The response of all persons interviewed to (question n), (8.80),
indicated agreement with the concept that generally it is a good idea to collaborate with
surrounding communities on service provision. Comparing the responses when grouped
by city reveals they either moderately agree or agree with this concept. Bedford Falls
displayed the lowest, yet still high, response of (7.50) and Acme the highest at (9.33).
When grouped by role, the responses to this question again display remarkable
consistency. Fire chiefs had the lowest average response of (8.20) and mayors had the
highest average response of (9.33).
When asked if they think the area communities are interdependent in terms of
problems faced and possible solutions, (question o), the average response of all persons
interviewed is relatively high (8.40) indicating that the respondents agree that area
communities are interdependent.
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Table 4.11:
Respondents’ Personal Views Regarding Collaboration
Grouped by City
Scale: 1=Strongly Disagree

10=Strongly Agree

(n) I personally think that it is generally a good idea
to look for ways to collaborate with surrounding
jurisdictions regardless of the service type or the
problems faced
(o) I think that the Downriver communities are
interdependent in terms of the problems they face and
possible solutions to those problems
(p) I think the Downriver communities should work
collaboratively on providing services whenever it will
benefit these communities as a group even if some of
the communities would rather provide the service
independently

Detour

Eliseville

Acme

Bedford
Falls

Coletown

9.20

8.83

9.33

7.50

8.50

7.60

8.83

9.67

9.50

7.25

7.80

8.00

9.33

9.00

8.50

When grouped by city, the average responses display a small amount of variance,
with Coletown reporting (7.25) as the lowest, and Acme displaying the highest score of
(9.67). When grouped by role, the average responses again display modest variance, with
fire chiefs recording the lowest at (7.20) and city managers reporting the strongest
agreement at (9.67). Responses to this question indicate moderate to relatively strong
agreement among those working in them that area communities are interdependent.

Table 4.12:
Respondents’ Personal Views Regarding Collaboration
Grouped by Role of Respondent
Scale: 1=Strongly Disagree

10=Strongly Agree

(n) I personally think that it is generally a good idea to
look for ways to collaborate with surrounding cities
regardless of the service type or the problems faced.
(o) I think that the Downriver communities are
interdependent in terms of the problems they face and
possible solutions to those problems.
(p) I think the Downriver communities should work
collaboratively on providing services whenever it will
benefit these communities as a group even if some of the
communities would rather provide the service
independently.

Mayor

City
Council

City
Manager

Fire
Chief

Fire
Fighter

9.33

9.00

9.00

8.20

9.00

9.33

9.33

9.67

7.20

7.80

9.33

8.33

9.67

7.80

8.00
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When asked if the respondent thinks the area communities should work
collaboratively, even if some of do not want to do so, (question p), the average response
of all respondents is (8.35). This indicates agreement with the concept that the DFA area
communities should work collaboratively, even against the wishes of some of the area
communities. Grouped by city, the average response is consistently strong with a range of
(7.80) in Detour and (9.33) in Acme. Grouped by role, the responses show moderate to
strong agreement with this question ranging between (7.80) among fire chiefs and (9.67)
among city managers. Figure 4.1 highlights the closed-ended questions that evoked the
strongest responses.
Figure 4.1: Questions to which Respondents Expressed Strongest Agreement
Question
f
n
o
p
i

Opinion of Respondent
Residents are suspicious of neighboring elected officials
Think it is a good idea to collaborate generally
The area communities are interdependent
Should collaborate across area even if some disagree
Residents want us to let the county provide services
1=Strongly Disagree
10=Strongly Agree

Mean
Response

7.05
8.80
8.40
8.35
2.05

Summary Analysis of Closed-Ended Questions
The conclusions that can be drawn from the results of these closed-ended
questions provide some insights into the causes and factors important to communities
considering collaboration in the provision of public services. All of the respondents
participating in this collaboration are strongly opposed to allowing the county to provide
services. In general, the respondents to this survey were inclined to think collaboration
with surrounding jurisdictions is a good thing. The respondents to this survey also clearly
recognized that the area in which they operate (Downriver) is interdependent, and
recognize that they have a long history of successful collaborations.
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Factors Stimulating Interlocal Cooperation: Responses to Open-Ended Questions
The following series of open-ended questions were also asked of each respondent.
These questions are designed to elicit the respondent’s perceptions about why their city is
seriously considering collaboration on fire services. The questions are designed to reveal
whether policy entrepreneurs are present and if so, what kinds of activities they
undertake. Finally, this set of questions is designed to show whether the respondents
think fire services in particular are easier or harder to collaborate on than other public
services.

Table 4.13
Open-Ended Question: Factors that Motivate Interlocal Collaboration
Question B-2
Question B-2(a)

Question B-2 (b)

Question B-2 (c)

Question B-2 (d)

Question B-3

In your view, what are the factors that led to this effort?
Were there any specific events that directly encouraged your city’s participation in this
effort?
Is there a person in your city that has stood out as a policy entrepreneur/leader in this
effort? If yes, who? What are some examples of the activities this person undertook?
Why do you think this person took on this role? What motivated his or her efforts in
this regard?
In your view, has a person from another city been instrumental to this effort going
forward? If yes, who? What are some examples of the activities this person undertook?
What do you see as his or her motivations for this leadership role?
Are there any third parties whose involvement was instrumental to this collaboration
moving forward? If yes, who? How so? Can you offer some examples of how they
helped? Do you have any thoughts about their motivations for involvement in this
effort?
This effort involves collaboration on fire services. Does the fact that it involves fire
services make it more or less easy to do this? Please explain.

Factors Stimulating this Effort
As discussed in Chapter Three, the existing literature is somewhat mixed in terms
of the likely effect of fiscal stress on a community in encouraging collaboration. While a
variety of answers to question (B-2) were given, the most frequent response, by far, was
that declining revenues available to the community is the strongest motivation for the
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DFA collaboration. For example, the Acme city council president said it was “money, the
continuing cuts in revenue sharing received from the state.” Acme’s fire union president
indicated that the most important factor was the “lack of funding that is out there for
municipalities to obtain.” Acme’s fire chief stated that the leading cause was
“shortcomings on revenues from the federal and state governments to the cities . . . we’ve
been cut to the bone and there is nowhere else to cut.” The fire chief of Bedford Falls said
it was the “downturn in revenues . . . coupled with the increasing cost of equipment.”
Bedford Falls city manager indicated that Michigan has a systemic tax revenue problem
in that “the Headlee Amendment working with Proposal A is putting us in a real bind.”
The fire chief in Eliseville, who oversees a large department, stated that it is “purely
economics.”
Almost universally, the elected and administrative officials interviewed indicated
that it is the reduction in revenues, coupled with the increasing costs of equipment,
forcing them to consider collaboration. The respondents mentioned the multi-year
reductions in revenue sharing dollars coming to them from the state as a serious problem
for all Michigan municipalities. More than one respondent indicated that they believed
that Michigan has a structural tax problem that is long term and must be addressed soon.
The city manager of Eliseville stated that the way local government in Michigan is
financed is broken and needs to be fixed.
The fiscal stress that these communities are experiencing, coupled with the
rapidly increasing cost of equipment and labor in the provision of fire/EMS services, has
led them to seriously examine the idea of further collaboration in public service
provision. Yet, in assessing the factors that are motivating these communities to
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collaborate, it is worth noting that these same communities undertook a serious effort to
collaborate in the early 1990s when the fiscal situation was less severe. Although the
general condition of the United States and Michigan economies experienced a slow down
in the early 1990s, it is certainly not comparable to the fiscal stress that these
communities are currently experiencing. Hence, there must have been factors other than
severe fiscal stress in the early 1990s that led these communities to consider
collaboration. When asked about such factors, none of the respondents could remember
any of the particular reasons that motivated that attempted collaboration.

Specific Events that Trigger Collaboration
The interviewees indicated that there were certain relevant conditions leading
them towards collaboration. In response to the question regarding specific events
encouraging collaboration, Acme’s city council president said that more than anything
the cities in this area have a “long history of cooperation, through the Downriver
Community Conference and otherwise.” Detour’s mayor stated “I was involved in the
original study on fire consolidation that was done by the Downriver Community
Conference” and that he has long advocated this kind of cooperation. The mayor of
Coletown said that it was “the good experience we’ve had through Mutual Aid” that
made collaboration seem feasible.
The cities undertaking this DFA collaborative effort have participated, for many
years, in the Downriver Mutual Aid Pact organized through the DCC. Under that Pact,
each community may call upon neighboring communities for help when a problem is
encountered that strains their resources to handle alone. The Mutual Aid experience has
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led these jurisdictions to train personnel in very similar ways and to purchase similar
kinds of equipment. The fire chief of Eliseville stated that “there are a lot of fire chiefs in
this area that have been talking about some kind of regional effort. Mutual Aid
experiences have been driving it this way for a while. The bottom line is the driving
factor.”
The findings of this research are consistent with previous research, showing that a
long-established relationship among cooperating communities increases the chances of
collaboration (Lackey, et al. 2002). Cooperation is more likely the longer the actors have
cooperated with one another (Park and Feiock 2003).
In addition to the history of cooperation through the Mutual Aid Program that
nearly every respondent mentioned, several specific events were mentioned by the
interviewees as pulling them toward greater levels of cooperation over time. The city
council president in Acme mentioned that “there was a power outage in 2003…Marathon
Oil had a significant and frightening problem with their tank farm and there was a
positive response by several of the area communities. . . and that event led to further
cooperative development.” During that power outage, the public safety departments of
these communities engaged in significant cooperation. This event also raised awareness
that the communities share some common problems and that working together in the face
of serious problems is a better approach to take.
Acme’s fire chief said that his interest in this kind of collaboration started with the
automatic aid system his community developed with another city. Under automatic aid,
both fire departments are dispatched simultaneously to a fire in either city. This
arrangement has allowed each city to increase the number of fire fighters initially on site
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and fighting a fire. This dramatically increased their success rate and the safety of their
fire fighters. The chief also said the arrangement did not greatly increase the costs of
service to either city.
Respondents from two of the cities mentioned the success of the Police
Information System Consortium initiated by the City of Bedford Falls as an event that led
to further efforts of cooperation. The city manager of Eliseville stated that one
contributing factor was the “fairly quick success of the police information system
consortium involving these same five cities.” The city manager of Bedford Falls
described how that consortium came about.
Our information person came to me with a proposal to invite other
communities to share our computer server in order to share our
police information service, the Law Enforcement Information Network
(LEIN) System, the mapping software for dispatching, etc. as a way of
potentially saving a substantial amount of money. That made sense to
me and we are now up to 12 communities sharing the same information
technology. This includes the (Wayne) County Sheriffs Department by the
way too… Having a common dispatching operation is really important
to this kind of collaboration. It really has to be in place before we can
seriously consider a joint fire service or police service.
These computer services have the potential to facilitate joint dispatching of fire and
police assets and the sharing of information in a timely manner at a price that is greatly
reduced from the cost each individual community would bear. It was the success of this
information sharing effort that gave these cities the idea that they could accomplish more
by working together.
In sum, the communities participating in the DFA collaboration have a long
history of successfully cooperating. Through the operation of the Mutual Aid System
fostered by the DCC, these communities have fought fires together and have come to
train in similar ways and purchase similar types of equipment.
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The Role of Policy Entrepreneurs
This study also seeks to identify if any policy entrepreneurs, either elected or
administrative, are active in leading the DFA collaboration effort and what such
entrepreneurs do to advance the effort. John Kingdon (1984, 2003) discusses the idea of
policy entrepreneurs or persons instrumental in pushing an idea onto the local decisionmaking agenda and making sure that it moves forward. Such policy entrepreneurs can
play a significant role in the development of new joint service arrangements by lending
their expertise and experience to the group. Such people may expend considerable
amounts of time and prestige in the effort and can play a critical part in the successful
adoption of the new policy. Eric Zeemering (2007) found that city managers were
regularly mentioned as policy entrepreneurs doing the necessary work of collaboration
among communities.
When asked about persons in their own city who have acted as a policy
entrepreneur or policy leader in this effort, Acme’s city council president mentioned
Acme’s mayor and said, “he is a financial guy, a vice president of a local bank, so he is
very concerned about the fiscal well-being of the city.” The city manager of Detour
named the mayor of his community as one of the leaders in the effort and stated that “he
was an original proponent of the idea…we formed an auto-aid system.” Detour’s fire
chief mentioned that the mayor “is the chairperson of the collaborative, he was
instrumental in setting everything up.” The fire chief of Eliseville mentioned the union
president of his own fire fighters local and said that “he was motivated by a desire to do
some extra work to help educate and steer the direction of how this effort might go.” The
city council president of Eliseville stated that his city manager “is probably one of the
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more aggressive administrators in trying to facilitate the actual construction of that fire
authority.”
Respondents were also asked about the existence of policy entrepreneurs in other
communities. The city manager of Eliseville was consistently mentioned as a driving
force. The mayor of Detour, who mentioned that he was the primary facilitator of the
effort in his community, went on to also mention the city manager of Eliseville and said
“he has the same vision, the same thought process and it’s interesting now that we have
somebody in the political realm and somebody in the administrative realm that are
looking at this basically through the same binoculars. He is a dynamic leader.” Detour’s
fire chief said that the city manager of Eliseville “has taken a leading role in this effort.”
The fire chief of Coletown, identifying that same person said that he “was the most
outspoken promoter of this idea.”

The Importance of Governance Structures
Oakerson (2004) argued that in order to facilitate better processes of governance it
is first necessary to develop governance structures that are based on the willing consent
of the participants. Curtis Wood (2004) in his examination of the Kansas City
Metropolitan area noted that the presence of area councils of government was very
helpful in overcoming the difficulties of collaboration. Respondents were asked if there
were any third parties such as agencies of other governmental levels, networks or groups
whose involvement was instrumental to this collaboration. While a few of the
interviewees did not think there was any such third party, a majority of them indicated
that the DCC has been instrumental in organizing the collaboration effort and keeping it
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moving forward. The mayor of Detour said “the DCC, they seem to have a lot of
influence . . . whatever studies have to be done they seem to be the backbone that people
can fall back on to get information . . . a good contact point.” The city manager of
Eliseville stated “I think the network of the DCC provided the organizational structure
that aided and supported these individual initiatives. They provide a common platform to
facilitate and communicate. They are like a mini-regional voluntary government in some
sense.” The fire chief in Coletown said that “The Downriver Community Conference . . .
they have a role in it as facilitators.” The fire chief of Eliseville said the “Downriver
Community Conference was instrumental in getting the initial grant which was used to
fund the feasibility study.”
The city manager of Detour also mentioned that the consulting firm Plante-Moran
assisted them in putting the collaboration plan together. The fire union president of
Eliseville stated that “The IAFF (International Association of Fire Fighters) and also the
Michigan Professional Fire Fighters Union” were instrumental in assisting in the effort.
He went on to say that most of the dialog relative to the DFA collaboration was occurring
among the fire fighter unions.
Figure 4.2: Factors Mentioned most often as Motivating Collaboration.
Factors Motivating Collaboration
Previous Collaboration through the
Downriver Mutual Aid Pact
Fiscal Stress caused by Declining
Revenues
Presence of a Council of Government
Presence of a Policy Entrepreneur
Leading Effort
Collaboration on Police Information
System Consortium

Percentage of Respondents
Mentioning This Factor

95%
94%
85%
85%
40%
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These responses show that there are individual policy entrepreneurs active in the
DFA collaboration effort. There is a consulting firm and both formal and informal
networks providing encouragement and guidance in the development of the authority.
The formal network mentioned frequently is the DCC. The informal networks mentioned
frequently are the Downriver Fire Chiefs Association, the Downriver City Managers
Association and the fire fighting union locals in the area. The DCC is repeatedly
mentioned as a source of information and a facilitating influence in this effort. The city
manager of Eliseville is mentioned repeatedly as a driving force in the attempt to make
the DFA collaboration a reality. This research reinforces previous research on the
importance of policy entrepreneurs who work to facilitate collaboration and also the
importance of networks such as the DCC in helping to facilitate an effort and to
overcome the difficulties.

Is It Easier or Harder to Collaborate on Fire Services?
Different kinds of public services present differing opportunities and obstacles.
State level rules may make it easier or harder to achieve collaborative success.
Collaborative fire services have existed in different sections of the country for many
years. Some aspects of fire service have clear products or functions that make it a good
candidate for collaboration with other communities. However, the visibility of fire
protection to the public may also make it a difficult service to deliver through an
independent authority. Hence, it is useful to probe the participant’s views regarding
whether a collaborative effort to provide fire services was easier or harder to achieve than
other services, and why.
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Acme’s city council president said that it was harder to collaborate on fire
services because “people are use (sic) to a really excellent level of service . . . it’s
important to them that their fire fighters are very happy . . . they don’t want them getting
lost in a bigger organization…they worry that they would suffer a loss in the level of
service.”
Detour’s city manager thought it would be,
harder I believe. I think it stems from the fact that many cities are
so used to having their fire people respond to a rescue or whatever
and that their fire trucks show up . . . citizens feel that they are paying
taxes to this city and they should get this city’s fire personnel . . . they’re
worried about service.
The fire chief of Bedford Falls said it would be “harder . . . there is a public sentiment
against it. They like having local control.” He also indicated that “there are just so many
little things to consider such as going to a single key commercial building lock system.
The union rules that have been bargained for over a long period of time would be difficult
to mesh together into one authority.” A fire department lieutenant in Detour stated that it
would be harder because the fire departments have such strong union representation. A
fire department captain in Coletown thought it would be harder because their citizens are
“very protective of the fire services.” He went on to indicate that he thought people
would have different opinions depending on the services being considered for
collaboration. “I think our citizens view their fire department like their sports team . . . I
think our citizens feel that way about us.” The city council president in Eliseville said
“harder I think . . . you’re dealing with life and death issues…much more intense issues
involved in public safety. It’s different than if you get your trash picked-up or if the road
gets fixed . . . it’s different. It’s much more serious and thought provoking.”

117
On the other hand the city manager of Eliseville said “easier I think, because fire
services have more national standards and uniformity of service characteristics.” Acme’s
fire union president indicated that he thought it would be easier because they are already
working collaboratively through the Downriver Mutual Aid Program. The mayor of
Eliseville stated that “it’s a little easier because the IAFF and the fire services have been
moving toward standardization for some time now . . . there is already a certain amount
of uniformity in the fire services . . . they all tend to deliver services in the same way.”
Reflecting some of the conflicting opinions on this subject, the fire union president in
Eliseville said “I think it makes it harder and easier. The fire service is slow to change;
we rely on consistency a lot. We work from a teamwork multi-station tradition.”
Clearly there is a considerable amount of disagreement as to whether fire services
are harder or easier to collaborate on than other public services. Several respondents
mentioned that it should be somewhat easier because the fire services have been moving
toward national standards for some time now and they have already been collaborating to
a much greater extent than other types of public services. Certainly the adoption of the
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards would seemingly lead to greater
uniformity in fire services which in turn should make it easier for different departments to
collaborate with one another. According to the scope described in section 1.1.1 of NFPA
1710, the NFPA standards are the “minimum requirements relating to the organization
and deployment of fire suppression operations, emergency medical operations, and
special operations to the public by a substantially all career fire department.”
Yet in contrast to such uniformity and apparent ease of interlocal collaboration,
several respondents mentioned that residents of their communities are very parochial
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about their fire department and generally opposed to collaborating with other
communities. It should be noted that most of the respondents who cited “citizen
opposition” to interlocal collaboration are working members of the community fire
department. If the respondents are correct in their assessment of the perceptions of their
community’s residents, political opposition to transferring fire service operations to an
authority could be a serious hindrance to collaboration. Citizen opposition is an issue that
must be taken into consideration by any community contemplating collaboration on
fire/EMS services.

Summary Analysis of Open-Ended Questions
The responses to these open-ended questions reveal several factors that are
thought by these respondents to be important in this effort at collaboration. The issue of
fiscal stress is mentioned repeatedly by nearly all of the respondents as a major
contributing factor leading them to undertake this effort. The decreasing revenues
available to the cities, coupled with the increasing cost of labor and equipment is a
motivating factor for these respondents. Several of the respondents mentioned specific
events that led them to undertake this collaboration. A power outage in 2003 caused the
public safety departments of these communities to cooperate in a very real and significant
way which led directly to discussions of this collaboration. The success of the
collaboration on a police information system was another event that lead to further
discussions.
The long established working relationship these communities have developed as a
result of the Downriver Mutual Aid Pact was mentioned by nearly every respondent as an
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important motivating factor. These responses also reveal that policy entrepreneurs are
present in this area and are actively working to enable greater levels of collaboration
among the fire departments.
A formal network, the DCC, is frequently mentioned as being a critical
motivating factor in this collaboration. The DCC has long provided a forum for the
discussion of these issues by elected and administrative officials. The DCC applied for
and was awarded a grant from the State of Michigan to investigate the feasibility of
undertaking this form of collaboration. The DCC also provided meeting rooms and staff
support to this effort.
As to whether it is harder or easier to collaborate on fire services than other kinds
of services, the respondents had mixed opinions. Many of the respondents think it should
be easier, because the fire services have been developing uniform (NFPA) standards for
some time now as well as standardized training for their personnel. On the other hand,
many of the respondents indicated that collaboration on fire services might be more
difficult because the residents and some elected officials are committed to maintaining
and controlling their own individual fire department.
The next chapter will examine what potentially collaborating cities are looking for
in the specific terms of a collaboration agreement. In particular, this part of the research
study explores what cities are looking for in terms of the operating agreement and what
they expect to gain. The interview subjects are asked if they are expecting short or long
term cost savings as a result of collaboration. The issue of fiscal equity between the
collaborating communities is also examined. Finally, this section of the study examines
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the satisfaction levels of the participants and asks them to perform a cost benefit analysis
of the activity.

Table 4.14:
Factors Stimulating Interlocal Collaboration / All Respondent
Respondent

d
8
9
7
7
10
4
9
5
10
10
4
8
7
4
8
7
5
7
7
3
6.95
2.16

e
4
7
6
7
4
3
6
1
2
5
4
2
3
7
2
3
4
4
4
3
4.05
1.79

f
6
4
7
10
4
7
8
10
10
8
1
8
5
5
10
9
7
7
6
9
7.05
2.42

g
5
1
3
7
9
3
7
3
5
2
7
2
7
7
4
3
6
6
7
8
5.10
2.31

h
5
9
7
6
8
6
3
1
6
2
4
8
5
7
7
7
3
6
7
5
5.60
2.11

i
3
1
1
1
3
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
6
1
3
2
2
1
5
3
2.05
1.43

j
6
6
5
6
7
8
10
5
10
6
5
6
3
5
6
4
8
5
6
3
6.00
1.89

k
6
6
6
7
6
7
7
5
8
7
2
8
7
2
7
6
8
8
5
3
6.05
1.85

l
5
6
7
6
4
4
8
2
10
10
2
1
3
7
4
6
2
2
5
3
4.85
2.64

m
n
o
p
7
8
10
8
7
10
9
10
9
10
10
10
5
10
10
10
4
10
10
10
3
8
9
9
2
6
9
8
7
8
5
8
10
10
5
5
2
8
3
8
8
10
10
10
1
8
8
8
7
9
10
10
3
8
8
8
5
9
9
5
5
7
7
7
3
10
10
10
2
8
8
6
8
9
9
10
4
10
9
7
5.10 8.80 8.40 8.35
2.63 1.20 1.98 1.69
10=Strongly Agree
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a
b
c
1
7
6
8
2
8
7
10
3
7
6
6
4
8
8
8
5
8
8
10
6
4
4
5
7
5
5
6
8
7
6
4
9
8
10
5
10
8
8
10
11
6
5
6
12
4
4
4
13
9
8
8
14
10
9
8
15
4
4
6
16
5
5
5
17
9
8
8
18
10
7
8
19
5
4
6
20
5
5
6
Mean
6.85 6.35 6.85
STD DEV 1.98
1.84 1.90
Scale: 1=Strongly Disagree

Table 4.15:
Closed-Ended Questions Relative to Factors Stimulating Interlocal Collaboration / Grouped by City.
Scale: 1=Strongly Disagree

10=Strongly Agree

Detour

Eliseville

Acme

Bedford Coletown
Falls

Mean STD
DEV

N=5

N=6

N=3

N=2

N=4

N=20 N=20

a My organization is usually receptive to doing things in new ways
b My organization usually approaches problems proactively
My organization is usually open to possibilities for collaborating on services
c with other local governments (other than the county)

8.20
7.80

4.83
4.50

7.33
6.33

7.00
6.50

7.75
7.25

7.02 1.31

7.00

5.67

8.00

7.00

7.50

7.03 0.87

d Our residents demand that direct provision be the default option for most basic pub services

7.80

5.50

8.00

8.00

6.75

7.21 1.09

Our residents demand that we consider what's good for Downriver when we
e make decisions about providing important public services

3.60

3.17

5.67

4.50

4.50

4.29 0.96

f Our residents tend to be suspicious of the motivations of elected officials from neighboring cities

8.20

7.00

5.67

6.50

7.00

6.87 0.92

Our residents do not care about how services are delivered because they focus
g only on the quality and cost of these services

6.00

5.33

3.00

7.00

4.25

5.12 1.55

5.40

6.00

7.00

4.00

5.00

5.48 1.12

i Our residents want us to let the county provide services whenever possible
1.40
j Our residents place more value on protecting our city's control over public serv than lowering costs 6.60

2.67
5.33

1.67
5.67

3.50
6.50

1.50
6.25

2.15 0.91
6.07 0.55

5.00

6.00

7.00

6.25

6.21 0.79

Interview Question

Our residents place more value on protecting our city's control over public

k services than on improving service effectiveness across the Downriver communities

6.80

Our residents see themselves as highly interdependent with the local governments

l that surround this community
m There is a significant constituency in my community for seeking regional solutions to problems
I personally think that it is generally a good idea to look for ways to collaborate

n with surrounding jurisdictions regardless of the service type or the problems faced
I think that the Downriver communities are interdependent in terms of the

o problems they face and possible solutions to those problems

I think the Downriver communities should work collaboratively on providing services whenever it

p will benefit them as a group even if some of the cities would rather provide service independently.

4.80
5.60

4.00

6.00

5.50

5.00

5.06 0.75

5.50

7.67

4.50

2.25

5.10 1.97

9.20

8.83

9.33

7.50

8.50

8.67 0.73

7.60

8.83

9.67

9.50

7.25

8.57 1.10

7.80

8.00

9.33

9.00

8.50

8.53 0.65
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Our residents would rather we contract with other local governments than with

h private or non-profit organizations for most services

6.48 1.25

Table 4.16:
Closed-Ended Questions Relative to Factors Stimulating Interlocal Collaboration / Grouped by Role
Scale: 1=Strongly Disagree

10=Strongly Agree

Interview Question
a My organization is usually receptive to doing things in new ways
b My organization usually approaches problems proactively
c My organization is usually open to possibilities for collaborating on services

Mayor Council City Mgr Fire Chf Fire F.

MEAN STDEV

N=3

N=3

N=5

N=5

N=20

N=20

5.66
5.00

7.00
6.67

6.20
5.80

6.80
6.80

6.73
6.32

0.88
0.92

7.33

6.67

7.67

6.40

6.40

6.89

0.58

5.00

6.00

7.00

7.80

7.80

6.72

1.21

6.00

3.67

3.33

4.00

3.60

4.12

1.08

5.33

7.00

5.33

8.60

7.60

6.77

1.44

7.00

6.67

6.33

3.80

3.40

5.44

1.70

5.67

5.67

6.33

4.00

6.60

5.65

1.01

i Our residents want us to let the county provide services whenever possible
1.00
j Our residents place more value on protecting our city's control over public serv than lowering costs 5.33
k Our residents place more value on protecting our city's control over public

3.67
5.00

3.67
6.00

1.40
6.40

1.60
6.80

2.27
5.91

1.30
0.74

3.67

4.67

6.67

6.40

7.20

5.72

1.49

5.00

4.33

3.67

6.20

5.00

4.84

0.94

5.33

6.33

4.67

5.00

5.20

5.31

0.62

9.33

9.00

9.00

8.20

9.00

8.91

0.42

9.33

9.33

9.67

7.20

7.80

8.67

1.09

9.33

8.33

9.67

7.80

8.00

8.63

0.83

with other local governments (other than the county)

d Our residents demand that direct provision be the default option for most basic public services
e Our residents demand that we consider what's good for Downriver when we
make decisions about providing important public services

f Our residents tend to be suspicious of the motivations of elected officials from neighboring cities
g Our residents do not care about how services are delivered because they focus
only on the quality and cost of these services

h Our residents would rather we contract with other local governments than with
private or non-profit organizations for most services

services than on improving service effectiveness across the Downriver communities

l Our residents see themselves as highly interdependent with the local governments
that surround this community

m There is a significant constituency in my community for seeking regional solution to our problems
n I personally think that it is generally a good idea to look for ways to collaborate
with surrounding jurisdictions regardless of the service type or the problems faced

o I think that the Downriver communities are interdependent in terms of the
problems they face and possible solutions to those problems

p I think the Downriver communities should work collaboratively on providing services whenever it
will benefit them as a group even if some of the cities would rather provide service independently.
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N=4

8.00
7.33

124
CHAPTER 5
WHAT PARTICIPANTS EXPECT FROM THE TERMS OF COLLABORATION

This chapter examines how elected and appointed officials in the five communities
view the terms of collaboration for a joint fire/EMS authority. At the time of the
interviews, the respondents had been discussing collaboration for several years and
actively engaging in the planning of the fire authority for approximately eighteen months.
In general, community officials have enjoyed a good, cooperative relationship with
officials in other communities and have a relatively positive outlook toward collaboration.
This chapter examines what participants expect to gain from this collaboration.
Virtually all of the respondents are concerned about the financial condition of their
community and the fiscal outlook for the future. As detailed in Chapter 4, fiscal stress is
mentioned repeatedly as a causal factor driving the community to pursue collaboration.
This chapter examines other possible factors motivating this potential fire authority
collaboration. It also examines how collaboration is expected improve the fiscal situation
of the partnering communities.
Finally, this chapter examines the respondents’ assessments of the benefits and
costs of collaboration, and how satisfied officials are with the amount of input they have in
planning the fire authority.
The first portion of this chapter addresses a series of closed-ended survey questions
using a scale of one (not important at all to the respondent) to ten (critically important to
the respondent). These questions are designed to elicit the answer to, among other things,
what costs savings are expected, whether service quality will be improved, if any jobs will
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be lost, and will access to resources be improved. This series of questions is designed to
assess the respondents’ perceptions of the necessary terms of collaboration. What specific
results are potentially collaborating communities looking for when they consider
cooperating? The second portion of this chapter deals with a series of open-ended
questions designed to encourage the respondent to explain more fully and in a narrative
style what is important to them regarding the terms of collaboration. Tables 5.18, 5.19 and
5.20 at the end of the chapter contain all of the data gathered from the scaled portion of the
survey instrument. Smaller tables are interspersed throughout the chapter to make it easier
for the reader to refer to the information being discussed.
The terms of collaborative activity are important to study because it is important
whether participants are looking for the same things regarding any collaborative activity. It
is possible that public managers may not have a thorough understanding of what the terms
are before undertaking cooperation. Like any human relationship, if the participants are
expecting very different outcomes from the same activity, they will probably be very
disappointed with the results of that activity. If one community is interested in short term
cost savings while another is interested in long term service quality and enhancements,
they may not make the best partners and the relationship may quickly break down. If the
financial or other types of commitments are not equal and well understood beforehand, the
collaboration is likely to end badly.
Earlier research (Lyons, Lowery and DeHoog 1992) showed that local elected
officials are often concerned about citizen satisfaction with services. Officials may also be
concerned about the cost savings available through joint service production. Officials may
be more concerned with potential public criticism of the collaboration than with the
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economics involved. Eric Zeemering (2007 p. 80) has concluded that “from a political
economy and public contracting perspective, we know that local governments seek to
provide high quality public services at low cost. However, we are uncertain how these
officials weigh different aspects of the terms of collaboration in their decision-making.”
Thus the terms of collaboration and how those terms are perceived by the local actors may
have a significant impact on if and how collaborative activity takes place. Therefore, a
better understanding of how officials view the terms of collaboration can help in predicting
when collaboration will occur and when it may not.

Perceptions of Collaboration Terms: Responses to Scale Questions

Importance of Short and Long-term Savings
Previous research by Visser (2004) indicates that it is important that the local
governing unit be convinced that collaboration will have a positive outcome for their
communities. The following questions are designed to discover how potential cost savings
factor into the decision-making process and whether participating communities are looking
for short or long term savings.

Table 5.1:
Perceptions of Respondents Regarding the Terms of Collaboration
All Respondents (n=20)
Scale: 1=Not Important at All
a
b
c

10=Critically Important

Our city will save money in the short run (3-5 years)
Our city will save money in the long run (over 5 years)
Our residents see improvements in the quality of the service over what we
have provided previously

Mean All
Respondents

4.55
8.45
7.75
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Asked how important it is that their city save money in the short run (question a),
defined as three to five years, the mean response of all respondents is below the mid-point
of the scale at (4.55). The standard deviation in the responses is (2.65), indicating
considerable variance in the answers ranging from the lowest at (1.00) indicating it is not
important to the respondent, to the high point of the scale at (10.00) indicating that it is
critically important.6
Grouped by city, a comparison of the data shows the mean response is (4.15) with a
standard deviation of (1.59). The responses ranged from a low of (2.00) in Bedford Falls to
a high of (5.60) in Detour. Eliseville responses are at (5.50), and Acme and Coletown had
relatively low responses at (4.67) and (3.00) respectively.

Table 5.2:
Perceptions of the Respondents Regarding the Terms of Collaboration
Grouped by City
Scale: 1=Not Important at All
10=Critically Important
a
b
c

Our city will save money in the short
run (3-5 years)
Our city will save money in the long run
(over 5 years)
Our residents see improvements in the
quality of the service over what we
have provided previously

Detour
(n=5)

Eliseville
(n=6)

Acme
(n=3)

Bedford
Falls
(n=2)

Coletown
(n=4)

5.60

5.50

4.67

2.00

3.00

8.80

8.67

9.33

8.00

7.25

7.60

7.50

7.67

8.00

8.25

Table 5.2 compares data grouped by city and Table 5.3 compares that same data
grouped by the different jobs held by the respondents. When a comparison is made of the
responses based on the role of the respondent, the mean is higher but still below the midpoint of the scale at (4.75). The standard deviation is (1.87) indicating even more variance

6

See Tables at the end of the chapter for standard deviations.
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there than between the cities. Fire chiefs register the lowest response to this question at
(2.80) and city council members have the highest response at (7.00). Mayors have the
second highest response at (6.50). City managers and fire fighter responses are most
closely aligned with fire chiefs at (3.67) and (3.80) respectively.

Table 5.3:
Perceptions of the Respondents Regarding the Terms of Collaboration
Grouped by Role
Scale: 1=Not Important at All
10=Critically Important
a Our city will save money in the short run (3-5 years)
b Our city will save money in the long run (over 5
years)
c Our residents see improvements in the quality of
the service over what we have provided previously

Mayor
(n=4)

City
Council
(n=3)

City
Mgr
(n=3)

Fire
Chief
(n=5)

Fire
Fighter
(n=5)

6.50

7.00

3.67

2.80

3.80

9.00

9.00

7.67

7.80

8.80

8.00

7.00

8.33

7.40

8.00

Overall, the elected officials had much higher expectations of saving money in the
first three to five years than did the administrative officials and fire fighters. Having very
different expectations about the outcome of this collaboration may create obstacles to the
effort. It would seem helpful to the success of the collaboration to address such differences
early on in the process to avoid a breakdown in negotiations after considerable time and
other resources have been expended. However, based on these responses it seems that the
expectations for cost savings have not been adequately addressed by the respondents.
When asked how important it is that their city save money in the long-term, defined
as over five years (question b), the respondents indicated that it is very important to them
(8.45). The individual responses ranged from a low of (6.00) to a high of (10.00) which
clearly indicates an expectation that the collaboration effort will result in cost savings.
When the responses are grouped by city, it is clear that all of the cities have a high
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expectation that they will save money in the long run due to this collaboration. The lowest
average city response is in Coletown at (7.25) and the highest is reported for Acme at
(9.33). When the responses are compared based on the role of the respondent, the elected
officials again indicated higher expectations of cost savings than did the appointed and
administrative officials or employees. Both the mayors and city council members had a
response of (9.00), while fire fighters, fire chiefs and city managers had slightly lower
expectations as groups at (8.80), (7.80) and (7.67), respectively.
These findings support the conclusions of Visser (2004) that before local
government officials will seriously consider collaboration, they must be convinced that it
will have a positive outcome for their community. The administrative respondents’
answers indicate that they generally do not anticipate very much in the way of cost savings
in the first few years. In contrast, the elected officials do have expectations of near-term
cost savings. When considering the anticipated cost savings after the first five years of
collaboration, the elected officials again have higher expectations for such savings than the
employees or the administrative officials. Figure 5.1 indicates a considerable difference in
the expectations of elected and administrative officials, especially in terms of short-term
cost savings.

Figure 5.1: Differences in Expectations for Cost Savings
Elected
Officials
Range of Mean

Administrative
Officials
Range of Mean

Expectations for short-term
savings (first 3-5 years)

6.50 - 7.00

2.80 - 4.75

Expectations for long-term
savings (after 5 years)

9.00

7.67 - 8.80
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These findings indicate that for this collaboration effort, there does exist something
of a disconnect between the expectations of elected officials who will make the final
decision on whether to engage in this collaboration. The employees and administrative
officials will be charged with implementing the authority and making it work on a daily
basis. Such findings could indicate a problem in negotiating the operating agreement and
the labor agreement required for this collaboration. A clear understanding of the cost
savings that can reasonably be expected is needed in order to negotiate labor and other
costs. Such expected cost savings would also need to be factored in to the funding
agreement for the collaborative. Such differences could potentially lead to trouble in the
monitoring and evaluation phase after the authority is in operation. If the administrative
officials who are charged with making the collaboration work are anticipating that there
will not be any short term cost savings but the elected officials are fully expecting to enjoy
such costs savings, a serious issue might arise when the authority is created.

Importance of Residents Seeing Improvements in Service Quality
Respondents were asked how important it is that the residents of their respective
communities see improvements in the quality of services over what is currently provided
as a result of collaboration (question c). The responses make it clear that most respondents
consider it important that residents see some improvement in services, but there is variance
in the opinions. In terms of the cities as a group, the mean is (7.80) indicating that this
factor is perceived as very important by these communities. The issue was the most
important to the respondents from Coletown (8.25) and the least important (7.50) to the
Eliseville officials. When answers are compared based upon the role of the respondent, it is

131
clear that regardless of role, this factor is perceived to be important to community
residents. City managers have the highest response rate at (8.33) and city council members
have the lowest at (7.00).
Thus, in addition to obtaining cost savings as a result of this collaboration,
achieving an improvement in service quality is clearly thought by these respondents to be
very important to the residents of these five communities. There is serious disagreement as
to when such cost savings might be realized, but both elected and administrative officials
expect savings, at least in the long term. Both groups of respondents believe it is important
to residents to see service improvements as a result of collaboration.

Table 5.4
Importance to Respondents of Achieving Financial Equity / All Respondents
Scale: 1=Not Important at All
10=Critically important
Mean All
Respondents
d Cost savings are distributed equally among the participating communities
6.95
i The authority will distribute future nonlocal(state and federal) resources among
8.35
j

the Downriver communities in a more rationale way than is now the case
Creation of this authority results in equal spending on fire protection among the
participating jurisdictions

7.25

Is Achieving Financial and Service Equity among Participating Communities Important?
Three of the questions in this section (d, i and j) are designed to assess the
importance to the participants of achieving financial equity among the communities. When
asked how important it is that cost savings are equally distributed among the communities
(question d), the average response among all respondents is (6.95). When the responses
are compared grouped by city, the mean remains relatively high at (6.74), but there is a
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considerable difference of opinion as to how important this factor is in motivating these
communities to collaborate. The officials of Detour indicated equality in cost savings was
extremely important (9.20), but the Acme (7.00) and Coletown (7.50) officials indicated
this objective was less important to them. Eliseville (5.50) and Bedford Falls (4.50)
respondents consider this factor to be less important than the respondents from other cities.

Table 5.5:
Importance to Respondents of Achieving Financial Equity / Grouped by City
Scale: 1=Not Important at All
Detour Eliseville Acme Bedford Coletown
10=Critically important
Falls
d Cost savings are distributed equally
i

j

among the participating communities
The authority will distribute future
nonlocal(state and federal) resources
among the Downriver communities in a
more rationale way than is now the
case
Creation of this authority results in
equal spending on fire protection
among the participating jurisdictions

9.20

5.50

7.00

4.50

7.50

8.80

8.00

9.00

7.00

8.50

7.40

6.33

7.67

5.00

9.25

When asked how important is it that future state and federal funds be distributed in
a more equitable way (question i), all respondents registered a relatively high response of
(8.35) with a standard deviation of (1.42), indicating that it is very important to the
participants that such resources be more rationally and equitably allocated.
State revenue sharing in Michigan is distributed based largely on population and,
without a statutory change, will continue to be allocated as it is now. The resource that
these respondents mentioned most often as being, in their opinion, irrationally allocated is
federal Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funding. CDBG funds are
distributed based upon a formula that takes into account population, age of housing,

133
unemployment and several other demographic characteristics of the community. These
cities consider the current allocation to be irrational or unfair because of the entitlement
status of each city. Direct entitlement communities like Eliseville deal directly with the
U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). These communities receive
a great deal more in CDBG funding each year than do non-entitlement communities, such
as the other four participating in this collaborative effort. Non-entitlement communities
receive CDBG funding through the HUD sponsored Urban Counties Program or in some
cases the Small Cities Program of the Michigan State Housing Development Authority
(MSHDA), also funded by HUD. According to the websites and/or financial departments
of these five communities, for the 2008-2009 fiscal year, Eliseville, as a direct entitlement
city, received $850,651 in CDBG funding. The amount of CDBG funding that Eliseville
receives is five to seven times the amount that each of the other four communities receives
each year. The other four cities receive that much less in CDBG funding each year because
they are not direct-entitlement communities under the HUD Program.
Historically, these communities have used at least a portion of their annual CDBG
allocation to support fire fighting activities. The problem with using CDBG funds to
support such activities is that the funding is allocated on a community specific basis and
must be used within that community. Without a statutory change or some sort of official
waiver from HUD, CDBG funding could probably not be a part of the budget of the new
fire authority. If a different allocation of CDBG funds is a significant reason for the smaller
communities to participate in this collaboration, they will in all probability be disappointed
if a different allocation of CDBG funds does not occur.
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Table 5.6:
Importance to Respondents of Achieving Financial Equity / Grouped by Role
Scale: 1=Not Important at All

10=Critically important

d Cost savings are distributed equally among the
i
j

participating communities
The authority will distribute future nonlocal(state and
federal) resources among the Downriver communities
in a more rationale way than is now the case
Creation of this authority results in equal spending on
fire protection among the participating jurisdictions

Mayor

City
Council

City
Mgr.

Fire
Chief

Fire
Fighter

7.50

5.00

7.67 6.40

7.80

8.75

8.33

8.33 7.60

8.80

8.25

4.67

6.33 7.60

8.20

Some of the responses to the open-ended questions examined in this chapter
indicate that there is a perception in some of the communities that other communities no
longer have sufficient resources to assist in handling emergencies through the existing
Mutual Aid System. When asked how important it is to the respondents that the DFA
collaboration results in more equal spending on fire services among all of the participating
communities (question j), the overall response of all of those interviewed is (7.25). While
there is some difference of opinion, the majority of the respondents consider this an
important causal factor for collaboration.
When the responses are compared across cities, Coletown respondents indicated
equal spending was extremely important to them (9.25), but the Bedford Falls respondents
were far less concerned (5.00). When this same data is analyzed based on the role of the
respondents, some interesting differences become evident. Mayors as a group indicated
that this issue was very important at (8.25) while city council members indicated it was
moderately important to them (4.67), below the mid-point of the scale. Fire fighters had the
second highest response at (8.20) while fire chiefs and city managers rated it as slightly
less important at (7.60) and (6.33) respectively. This indicates that this issue ranges from
important to very important to them. It is unclear why city council member respondents
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might consider the equal dedication of resources by all participating cities as less
important.
Overall, when asked if achieving relative financial and service level equity among
the participating communities was an important reason for these cities to collaborate, the
overall responses of (6.95), (8.35) and (7.25) indicate that the respondents consider these
factors very important in motivating their collaborative efforts.

How Important Is It that None of the Fire Fighters Currently Working Lose their Job?
This particular question was posed to the respondents because the metropolitan
Detroit area is heavily unionized and all five community fire departments employ full-time
professional unionized personnel. According to the information gathered during these
interviews, the fire fighters’ union locals have taken a very active role in the feasibility
study and the planning of this collaboration. The fire union local president in Eliseville
stated that most of the discussion regarding this collaboration is taking place between the
union locals of the five communities.
“Local authority to enter into interlocal agreements is derived from state
constitutions and enabling legislation” (Feiock 2007, p. 55). Michigan statutes provide a
certain level of protection to fire fighters under Public Act 312 and other legislation. This
question is designed to measure the perceptions of the participants about how important
maintaining jobs is for this effort to be a success?
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Table 5.7:
Perception of the Importance of Maintaining Jobs and Gaining Additional Resources
All Respondents
Scale: 1=Not important at All

e
f

h

10=Critically Important

None of our fire department staff will lose their jobs due to this collaboration
Participation in the authority gives our community access to existing facilities &
equipment currently unavailable to us because of their location in another
jurisdiction
Participation in the authority gives our community access to the financial
resources needed to construct facilities or purchase equipment that we cannot
afford by ourselves

Mean
All
Respondents

8.70
7.60
8.30

When asked how important it is that no current fire department personnel lose their
jobs because of this collaboration (question e), the average response is (8.70). Only two
people responded below the mid-range of the scale. Sixty-five percent of the respondents
registered (10.00), the highest response they could give this question. When this data is
examined grouped by city, the mean response is (8.99). Eliseville participants registered
the lowest group response at (6.83). The other four cities registered responses between
(9.00) and (10.00).

Table 5.8:
Perception of the Importance of Maintaining Jobs and Gaining Additional Resources
Grouped by City
Scale: 1=Not important at All
Detour Eliseville Acme Bedford Coletown
10=Critically Important
Falls
e
f

h

None of our fire department staff will
lose their jobs due to this collaboration
Participation in the authority gives our
community access to existing facilities
& equipment currently unavailable to us
because of their location in another
jurisdiction
Participation in the authority gives our
community access to the financial
resources needed to construct facilities
or purchase equipment that we cannot
afford by ourselves

9.60

6.83

10.00

9.50

9.00

7.60

8.17

7.00

5.50

8.25

8.80

8.00

8.67

8.00

8.00
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When the same data is examined grouped by the role of the respondents, interesting
variances are revealed. Mayors registered the lowest response at (6.50) and fire chiefs the
highest at (10.00). The fire chiefs had a higher group response than did the fire fighters
(9.20). City council members were more concerned (9.33) that none of the fire fighters lose
their jobs. City managers registered the second lowest response as a group, but even this
group considered the job retention issue very important (8.00).

Table 5.9:
Perception of the Importance of Maintaining Jobs and Gaining Additional Resources
Grouped by Role
Scale: 1=Not important at All
e
f

h

10=Critically Important

None of our fire department staff will lose their jobs
due to this collaboration
Participation in the authority gives our community
access to existing facilities & equipment currently
unavailable to us because of their location in another
jurisdiction
Participation in the authority gives our community
access to the financial resources needed to
construct facilities or purchase equipment that we
cannot afford by ourselves

Mayor

City
Council

City
Mgr.

Fire
Chief

Fire
Fighter

6.50

9.33

8.00 10.00

9.20

8.75

6.33

8.67

5.80

8.60

8.75

8.00

8.00

8.20

8.40

Had this question been asked only of fire department personnel, such a high
average response would perhaps not be surprising. However, this question was also asked
of non fire department administrative officials such as mayors, city council members and
city managers. Whether these answers indicate that the respondents generally think that
current fire fighting personnel levels are necessary and perhaps painful cuts have already
been made; or whether they reflect the perception by the respondents that strong union
opposition would harm the effort is unclear from this data.
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Is It Important That You Obtain Access to Greater Resources Than You Have Now?
Two other questions within this section (f and h) were designed to assess if the
participants think it is important that this collaboration improve their city’s access to
physical and financial resources. When asked how important it is that this collaboration
result in the respondents’ city gaining better access to facilities and equipment that are
located outside of their own city (question f), the mean response of (7.60) indicates this
issue is very important to them. When comparing the data based on the role of the
respondent, the mean response is (7.63). The mayors (8.75), city managers (8.67) and fire
fighters (8.60) consider this factor more important than all the others.
When the data is examined based on city, the mean is slightly less at (7.30).
Coletown (8.25) and Eliseville (8.17) respondents consider this a very important factor.
Bedford Falls respondents registered the lowest group response of (5.50) to this question,
indicating ambivalence on the issue of obtaining access to existing facilities and
equipment.
When asked whether they think it is important that this collaboration give them
access to financial resources needed to construct facilities and purchase equipment that
they can not afford on their own (question h), the respondents indicated it is very important
to them (8.30). The responses to this question do not vary significantly by city. The
average response for all five cities was between (8.00) and (8.80), indicating access to
additional financial resources is a very important motivating factor.
When the responses are examined by the role of the respondent, little variance in
responses is seen. Essentially, all groups of respondents indicated that this factor is a very
important causal factor for collaboration. The responses ranged from the mayor’s high of
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(8.75) to the city council member’s and city manager’s low of (8.00). Fire fighters and fire
chiefs registered responses of (8.40) and (8.20) respectively. Clearly the respondents think
it is important that the DFA collaboration enhance their access to greater financial
resources and the facilities and equipment they cannot afford on their own. This is a goal
of collaboration they expect to achieve. Figure 5.2 indicates the respondent’s perceptions
as to which specific terms of collaboration are most important to them.
Figure 5.2: Importance of the Terms of Collaboration.
Potential Benefit of Collaboration

Mean
Response

Better allocation of state & federal resources

8.35

More equitable commitment of resources

7.25

No current fire fighters lose their jobs

8.70 *

Better access to resources outside of city

7.60

Resources to purchase facilities & equipment

8.30

* 65% of respondents answered 10.
1= Strongly Disagree

10= Strongly Agree

How Satisfied are you Personally with this Effort?
The last group of questions in this section (k. l and m) are designed to measure how
satisfied the respondents are with the collaboration thus far. Initially, the respondents were
asked to perform a personal cost-benefit analysis of the collaboration from their
perspective. Secondly, the respondents were asked how satisfied they are with the amount
of input they are having on the collaboration.
When asked about their satisfaction with the benefits associated with the DFA
collaboration (question k), the average response is (7.45). This indicates that generally the
participants are very satisfied with what they perceive as the benefits of this collaboration.
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However, several of the respondents added that it is too soon to accurately assess the
benefits as this collaboration is still in the planning phase.

Table 5.10:
Respondents Satisfaction with Costs, Benefits and Input in the Process
All Respondents
Scale: 1=Not Important at All
k
l
m

10=Critically Important

I am satisfied with the benefits associated with this project
I am satisfied with the costs associated with this project
I am satisfied with the amount of input I have on this joint project

Mean All Respondents

7.45
5.95
7.10

When analyzed by city, the mean response to this question is (7.52). All of the
communities appear to be satisfied with the benefits of this collaboration. Acme registered
the highest response to this question (8.67), which reinforces the opinion expressed by
many of the respondents that Acme has the most to gain from this collaboration.
When analyzed by role, the mean response to this question is (7.56). The city
managers are the most satisfied with the benefits of this collaboration, with a group
response of (9.00). The other four role groupings are clustered within a range of a high of
(7.33) for city council members to a low of (7.00) for fire chiefs.
When asked how satisfied the respondents are with the costs associated with this
collaboration (question l), responses were somewhat lower. The overall mean response of
(5.95), with a standard deviation of (2.69), indicates that the respondents are not as
satisfied with the perceived costs as they are the expected benefits of this collaboration.
Grouped by city, the mean response is (6.24). Interestingly, two large communities, Detour
and Eliseville, registered the lowest level of satisfaction with the costs of this collaboration
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with responses of (4.20) and (5.50) respectively. Coletown (7.50), Bedford Falls (7.00) and
Acme (7.00) expressed higher levels of satisfaction as to the costs of collaboration.

Table 5.11:
Respondents Satisfaction with Costs, Benefits and Input in the Process
Grouped by City
Scale: 1=Not Important at All
10=Critically Important
k
l
m

I am satisfied with the benefits associated
with this project
I am satisfied with the costs associated with
this project
I am satisfied with the amount of input I have
on this joint project

Detour

Eliseville

Acme

Bedford
Falls

Coletown

7.20

7.00

8.67

7.00

7.75

4.20

5.50

7.00

7.00

7.50

6.80

6.50

8.67

5.50

8.00

When the data is examined based on the role of the respondent, an interesting
variance in opinion is revealed. City managers are most satisfied with the costs of this
collaboration with a group response of (7.67). City council members (5.33), fire chiefs
(5.40) and fire fighters (5.60) are less satisfied with the costs of this collaboration. The
satisfaction level of the mayors (6.25), is below that of city managers (7.67) and closer to
the other groups.
The responses to this question, three above the mid-level of the scale, and two
below, may indicate that the cost-benefit tradeoffs involved in this collaboration may not
be completely satisfying to the respondents. This response may indicate that not all of the
costs of the DFA collaboration are known or fully understood because the collaboration is
still in the planning stage and has not yet been implemented. It may also indicate that the
respondents do have a good understanding of the costs and benefits of this collaboration
and simply disagree with other groups in how it applies to their city.
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Table 5.12:
Respondents Satisfaction with Costs, Benefits and Input in the Process
Grouped by Role
Scale: 1=Not Important at All
10=Critically Important
k
l
m

I am satisfied with the benefits associated with
this project
I am satisfied with the costs associated with this
project
I am satisfied with the amount of input I have on
this joint project

Mayors

City
Council

City
Mgr

Fire
Chiefs

Fire
Fighters

7.25

7.33

9.00

7.00

7.20

6.25

5.33

7.67

5.40

5.60

7.00

6.33

9.33

5.60

7.80

When asked if they are satisfied with the amount of input they have in the
collaboration (question m), the mean response is (7.10) with a standard deviation of (3.06).
These scores indicate that in general, the respondents are satisfied with the amount of input
they have in the planning of this collaboration, but there is a considerable amount of
variance in the responses. When examined by city, the responses reveal a potential
problem for this collaboration. The mean response is (7.09) with a standard deviation of
(1.25). Two of the communities, Acme and Coletown, indicated they are very satisfied
with the level of input they have in this collaboration, with responses of (8.67) and (8.00)
respectively. In contrast, Detour (6.80) and Eliseville (6.50) indicated less relative
satisfaction with their input. The Bedford Falls respondents averaged only (5.50) to this
question. The wide range in satisfaction across the cities may indicate the collaboration has
a basic problem; or it may merely indicate a temporary rift between some of the actors.
Examining the responses to this question based on the role of the respondent,
indicates some interesting differences of opinion. City managers (9.33) averaged the
highest level of satisfaction with the input they were having in the process. Fire fighters
(7.80) and mayors (7.00) also indicated that they are satisfied with their level of input.
However, city council members (6.33) and fire chiefs (5.60) indicated they are far less
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satisfied with the level of input they have in the process. A satisfaction level at or just
above the mid-point of the scale indicate a potential problem for this collaboration. City
council members will have to vote on the approval for this authority and fire chiefs will be
charged with the day-to-day operation of the authority. It would seem prudent to ensure
that they enjoy higher levels of input during the planning process.

Initial Conclusions Drawn from Responses
It is clear that the non-elected officials do not expect short-term labor cost gains but
instead are expecting long-term cost savings as a result of this collaboration. Perhaps these
responses reflect a belief that current fire fighting personnel levels cannot be reduced.
Perhaps these responses are just indicative of the high unionization levels in the
Metropolitan Detroit area. Whatever the reasoning behind the answers, these responses
indicate that it is very important to the respondents that none of their current fire
department personnel lose their jobs as a result of the DFA collaboration.
It is also clear from the answers given that the respondents think it is important that
all of the jurisdictions share equally in any cost savings resulting from this collaboration.
Based on these answers it is also quite clear that the respondents see collaboration as an
important tool that will allow them access to financial, facility and equipment resources
that they do not currently have.
It appears from this data that the participants are generally satisfied thus far with
the benefits and costs associated with this collaboration. However, the variances in the
responses when grouped by city and by role reveal a potential problem. Elected officials
have higher expectations for saving money in the first three to five years than do the
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administrative officials and fire fighters. Even longer term, the elected officials have higher
expectations for savings than do the administrative officials and fire fighters. Such a
significant difference in expectations could prove a serious issue for the DFA
collaboration.
Finally, variances in answers to the question measuring satisfaction with the level
of input, reveals that generally the participants are satisfied with the level of input they
have, but some of the participants are not as satisfied. In particular, city council members
and fire chiefs are less satisfied with their input into the process.

Perceptions of the Terms of Collaboration: Responses to Open-Ended Questions
In an effort to elicit fuller and more narrative responses to the issues surrounding
the terms that participants are looking for in their collaboration effort. Table 5.13 lists the
open-ended questions which were asked. These questions are designed to attain a better
understanding of the role played by metropolitan area interdependencies, the use of an
authority as the vehicle for collaboration and the issue of maintaining control over local
fire service provision.
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Table 5.13:
Respondents Perceptions of the Terms of this Collaboration
Question C-2
Question C-3
Question C-3(a)
Question C-3(b)
Question C-4
Question C-4(a)
Question C-4(b)
Question C-4(c)
Question C-4(d)
Question C-4(e)
Question C-4(f)

Are there benefits I have not mentioned that you hope will result from this
collaboration?
Previously, we discussed the perceptions of your city’s residents about the existence of
interdependencies among the Downriver communities. I would like you to elaborate
further on this question on interdependence.
Do you agree these interdependencies exist among the Downriver communities?
If so, what do you think is the nature of this interdependence?
Turning to the specific issue of the fire authority as the mechanism for this collaborative
effort, I have several questions about your views of and expectations for the authority.
Is the use of a fire authority important to your support for this effort? Why or why not?
How confident are you that your city will be better off by participating in this authority?
Are you confident that your community will retain sufficient control over the quality of
services provided to your residents? If so, why?
In your mind, how do the potential gains of the fire authority outweigh the loss of
complete control over this service?
How confident are you that the elected officials of your community will be able to exert
meaningful influence over the managers of the fire authority?
If your residents become dissatisfied with this arrangement, can it be easily altered? Can
your community easily withdraw from the authority?
How will the costs of fire authority be allocated among the communities?

Additional Benefits not Previous Mentioned
The first question (C-2) is designed to discover some additional causal factors that
this research has not anticipated. When asked if there are any benefits not mentioned by the
researcher that the respondent hopes will result from this collaboration, the Acme city
council president indicated that she was “looking for a better and safer environment for the
fire fighters as a whole . . . a more stable fire fighting workforce . . . there is a lack of a mix
of younger fire fighters and older more experienced ones…we hope to get a better mix
with the new authority.”
The Detour city manager raised the question “how do we use equipment purchased
with Community Development Block Grant (federal) funds outside of the city?” As
discussed previously in this chapter, CDBG funds are allocated by the federal government
through HUD. CDBG funds have been used to purchase fire trucks, fire rescue units, fire
hose, turn-out gear, decontamination equipment, site illumination equipment, jaws-of-life
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devices and a variety of other kinds of fire-fighting equipment. The CDBG Program has
contributed critically needed funds to the operation of these fire departments over the
years. All of the communities participating in this collaboration have previously or are
currently using CDBG funds to purchase equipment for their respective fire departments
and, it would be a benefit if they could use those funds through the fire authority.
Both the fire chief of Coletown and the fire chief of Bedford Falls stated that it is
important that the area fire departments achieve National (NFPA) 1710 Standards for
everyone’s benefit and safety. It is the consensus among fire-fighting personnel
interviewed that the cities in the DFA collaboration are not currently meeting all of the
requirements of this national standard.
The mayor of Eliseville indicated that he “actually saw the opportunity for
improving services” through this collaboration, not just maintaining existing services. The
mayor of Coletown expressed his hope that this collaboration would advance the “concept
that we as cities can work together successfully.” One of the more interesting comments
came from the fire union president of Eliseville, a person very active in the planning phase
of the collaboration. He stated “I think reflection on where we are right now is a
benefit…Talking about these issues is a benefit in and of itself.”
The responses to this question make it clear that the participants have a variety of
expectations relative to potential benefits that may be realized as a result of this
collaboration.
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Is the Interdependency of Jurisdictions a Motivating Factor in Collaboration?
One factor often mentioned in the literature (Frederickson 1999; Parks and
Oakerson 2000) is the idea that cities within urban metropolitan areas in the United States
are interdependent as a result of several factors and that such interdependency may lead
them to consider collaboration in the provision of public services. Cooperation is often
driven by recognition of this interdependency and the natural desire of local government
officials to reduce uncertainty (Frederickson 1999). Collaborative service delivery
arrangements are one way that local governments can bridge the inequities in an area
(Parks and Oakerson 2000).

Table 5.14:
The Interdependency of the Collaborating Communities
Question C-3(a)
Do you agree these interdependencies exist among the Downriver
communities?
Question C-3(b)
If so, what do you think is the nature of this interdependence?

When asked if the area communities are interdependent, the Acme city council
president stated that she agreed that the area communities are interdependent because they
are small and “they cross each other…if we have a fire it’s often near our border with
another community . . . it doesn’t make sense not to respond . . . the physical locations of
the cities make them interdependent . . . the small size of each…we are all inner-ring hub
cities and we have never been really alone in this.” The Acme fire chief agreed that the
Downriver cities are interdependent and added that the “lack of resources makes us
interdependent…when something major comes up, you have to rely on your neighbor to
come and help you out.” The Eliseville city manager said that he agreed there existed a
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great deal of interdependence and said “on a daily basis there is mutual aid . . . our borders
are seamless.” Detour’s fire chief concluded that “hardly a day goes by that we don’t call
on each other for help . . . we rely on each other.” A Detour fire department lieutenant
stated “we’re all individuals, but we are very reliant on one another . . . we depend a lot on
Mutual Aid now.” The mayor of Eliseville said “absolutely . . . city barriers don’t mean as
much as they used to mean . . . these artificial barriers, artificial city lines . . . it’s kind of
ridiculous . . . we are very interdependent.”
A fire captain in Coletown stated “our commonalities make us more
interdependent. We are all bedroom communities, very similar in nature . . . our people are
similar, our schools are similar, our housing is remarkably similar. If Ford Motor Company
should lay off employees in this area, we all feel it.” A former city council member and
the newly elected mayor of Detour put it this way, “these communities have a lot in
common with one another. We are all somewhat industrial, older cities; our residents are
similar to one another. We have common objectives, similar socioeconomic status.” The
Eliseville city council president summed it up stating “we have a lot of the same
problems.”
Analysis of these responses would seem to indicate that the recognition of an area’s
interdependence is an important causal factor motivating communities to consider
collaboration. The responses to these questions make it abundantly clear that the
participating communities in the DFA collaboration consider themselves highly
interdependent. The responses indicate that the close geographic proximity of these
communities, their similarities, and a long-standing tradition of assisting one another have
resulted in a general feeling of interdependency. The responses also indicate that they have
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been interdependent for some time now and recognized that fact some 40 years ago with
the development of Mutual Aid. These communities share a lot of the same problems and
are remarkably similar in terms of age, population and resources.

Figure 5.3: Most Frequent Responses Regarding Collaboration
Percentage of Respondents
Mentioning This Factor
95%

These Cities are very Interdependent
We've been Cooperating for Years

95%

Our Communities are so Similar

60%

Our Borders are Seamless

40%

Table 5.15:

Question
C-4
Question
C-4(a)

Responses Related to the use of a Fire Authority
Turning to the specific issue of the fire authority as the mechanism for
this collaborative effort, I have several questions about your views of
and expectations for the authority.
Is the use of a fire authority important to your support for this effort?
Why or why not? How confident are you that your city will be better off
by participating in this authority?

How Important is the Use of an Authority in Facilitating this Collaboration?
The respondents were also asked about the importance of the proposed authority as
a vehicle to pursue collaboration on fire protection services. The specific questions asked
are provided in Table 5.15. In response to this question the Acme city council president
replied, “yes, it is very important. We already have Mutual Aid and even Auto Aid with
one other city and I don’t think that totally solves the problems.” Acme’s fire union
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president stated “yes, it’s important . . . one city could not control it . . . there are three or
four (fire) authorities operating in Michigan right now and they work well.” The Acme fire
chief said “I don’t know how else you would do it with each of the cities having their own
jurisdiction.”
The city manager of Detour said “by going with an authority, we have more options
to tax and do some things to level off or reduce our in-house costs.” The city manager of
Eliseville indicated that
given the nature of state law allowing us to do these things,
the authority makes sense right now…formation of a larger
department would not work here, we need equal
representation . . . the authority creates a better governance
mechanism . . . it has the utility of size and the ability to raise
resources on a larger geographic basis.
The Detour fire chief concluded that,
yes, I think it’s important. It’s becoming apparent to me
that the mutual aid system is starting to fall down because
we don’t have the people to send each other. Also, some
of our personnel now live 25 miles outside the city and it’s
getting harder to get them in quickly. A larger department
would have less of a problem as I see it.

The mayor of Eliseville stated “I cannot imagine how else we would manage collaboration
like this without the formation of an authority . . . we can streamline administrative costs . .
. frankly having five separate entities like we do now is just kind of costly and ridiculous.”
The Bedford Falls city manager said “I think using the authority is important. In the long
run it’s important that the fire service have a separate millage and a dedicated revenue
source. The fire service shouldn’t have to compete with other city departments for the
money.” The fire union president of Eliseville stated “I think the authority is the only way
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to get an equitable return . . . a good partnership. The only way we can all mutually benefit,
establish some uniformity.”
Very few of the respondents indicated that they were indifferent to the method of
organization used for this collaboration. None of the respondents indicated that they
believe using an authority for collaboration purposes was a bad idea.
It is readily apparent that nearly every one of the participants in the DFA authority
has concluded that using a fire authority is important to the success of this collaboration.
The fire authority is seen as providing better flexibility and a more stable revenue source
than other alternatives. Interestingly, the elected and administrative officials were in strong
agreement with the fire fighters and fire command officers that a fire authority is the best
institutional arrangement for this problem.

Will the Cities Be Better Off Collaborating?
With the exception of the fire chief of Bedford Falls and a fire lieutenant in Detour,
everyone interviewed described themselves as very confident their city would be better off
by participating in this proposed authority. The Acme fire chief said that he was “100%
confident that we’ll be better off as a result of participating.” Detour’s mayor said “I’m
very confident they will be better off. Our people in the long term will get better
protection.” The Eliseville city manager stated “I’m very confident that we’ll be better
off.” Likewise, the mayor of Eliseville said “I’m 100% confident that our community will
be better served both financially and through service improvement.” Only one respondent,
a fire lieutenant in Detour voiced opposition stating “no, I’m not that confident that we’ll
be better off. If the finances are not there, it won’t be a good thing.”

152
Importance of the Potential Loss of Control over Service Provision
Much of the literature has concluded that the fear of losing control over the
provision of public services is a serious concern for local officials. The fear of losing
control over service production is strong and therefore benefits from new arrangements
must be substantial (Ferris 1986). A major obstacle to collaboration often cited is the
reluctance of local government officials to surrender autonomy and resources to other
governments (Morgan, Hirlinger and England 1988, Morgan and Hirlinger 1991).
Reaching a mutually acceptable agreement for joint service provision may also be
an important causal factor motivating collaboration. Visser (2004) found that it is
important that local governments be allowed to maintain their autonomy and that the effort
be locally driven rather than imposed on them by a higher level of government. Bickers
(2005) proposed that elected officials may have to give up a certain amount of control in
order to achieve collaborative benefits, but that doing so might have detrimental political
consequences for them. Most recently, Feiock (2008) argued that local governments will
generally resist giving up authority to other units or higher units of government.

Question C-4(b)
Question C-4(c)

Table 5.16:
Maintaining Control over Community Fire Services
Are you confident that your community will retain sufficient control over
the quality of services provided to your residents? If so, why?
In your mind, how do the potential gains of the fire authority outweigh the
loss of complete control over this service?

When asked how confident they are that their community will be able to retain
sufficient control over service quality, the Acme city council president indicated that she
was not at all concerned about the potential loss of control by her community because fire
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services are regulated by the state. The Acme fire union president stated that he was not
concerned because his community would have one of the five representatives sitting on the
governing board of the authority and he was satisfied that person would still have his
community’s best interest at heart. Acme’s fire chief said that he thought the quality would
actually improve because a centralized dispatch center would be better able to send the
appropriate equipment and personnel to any given emergency scene. The mayor of Detour
said that with each of the five cities having an equal voice in the governing of this new
authority, he was not concerned about a lessening of control. The Eliseville city manager
echoed that sentiment saying that with equalized representation, control should not be an
issue. The fire chief of Bedford Falls stated that he thought control might even improve in
some ways.
However, not all of the respondents agreed that the loss of control was not a serious
problem. A fire department captain in Coletown stated that, “loss of control is an important
issue . . . we are aware of that danger, but the benefits potentially outweigh that loss.” The
Detour fire chief was not sure how much control his community would retain until the
authority was up and running. A fire lieutenant in Detour stated that he thought there
would be a loss of control because his city would be only one of five votes on the
governing board of the authority.
Concluding that control was not the most important issue to be considered, the
mayor of Eliseville stated that, “as an elected official I don’t have any control of (SIC)
them now . . . we don’t have complete or direct control over fire services now. We have the
responsibility to pay for them, but have no control over them really.” The Eliseville fire
union president stated that, “yes, absolutely. Being equal and having control is different.
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What control does a politician have over the fire service now? The control is perceived at
best. Control is overestimated I think.”
The response from a Coletown Fire Department sergeant straddled the two view
points saying, “I think from what I know now, yes, each city would give up some authority
but it would be the same for each.” The Eliseville city council president said that he wasn’t
sure whether or not his city would suffer a loss of such control, but that he wasn’t worried
about it “because we can pull out if we are not satisfied.”
The reduction in direct control over the provision of services is often presented as a
significantly inhibiting issue in the formation of authorities and other forms of service
collaboration or consolidation. Information provided by these respondents indicates that
collaborators are not concerned about the issue or think that control of this service is
illusory. Some respondents indicated that the loss of control, if any, was equally shared by
all five cities and would therefore not prohibit their collaboration. Several other
respondents indicated that although they do anticipate a loss of control as a result of the
DFA collaboration, the potential benefits far outweigh that loss of control.
When asked how the potential gains of the fire authority outweigh the loss of
complete control over service the Acme city council president responded that she thought
the loss of some control was actually an important benefit. She thinks it is better to place
the control of fire services in the hands of professionals that have statewide and national
standards for acceptable levels of equipment, personnel and methods of fighting fires. In
her mind, this benefit more than compensated for any loss the city might suffer in terms of
control over service provision.
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The Acme fire union president indicated that the benefit of improved staffing,
better equipment and potential grant funding offset any loss of control. He mentioned that
Michigan Governor Jennifer Granholm recently gave a speech in which she offered
additional state funding to communities that engaged in this sort of collaboration.
Additional funding would be an important benefit for communities such as these five that
are currently suffering significant fiscal stress. The Acme fire chief stated, “people
shouldn’t be worried about losing control . . . that is why such collaborations failed in the
past, everyone wanted to know what was in it for them . . . it’s all about improving services
and that is what people should be thinking about.”
The mayor of Detour described the geographic layout of the collaboration area and
stated that he could see other community fire departments reaching points in his city faster
than his own centrally located fire personnel could at times. He also stated that he believes
such rapid response is a very important potential benefit of the DFA collaboration effort.
The city manager of Detour said that the only control issue he was concerned about
was the loss of control over hiring practices. The control of personnel hiring was an
important issue to this public manager, but he thought such issues could be worked out by
the DFA collaboration planning group. The city manager of Eliseville said, “I don’t
consider this a loss of control. The mayor and city council will still appoint a
representative to the board . . . very similar to how our Public Safety Commission works
now . . . the police and fire services are separate already.” Among the many benefits this
public manager saw resulting from this collaboration was a more professional fire service,
enhanced training, better fire prevention efforts, increased service levels, better long-range
planning, better use and replacement of assets and the spreading of the costs over a larger
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base. The Eliseville city manager concluded his response with “such control is illusory, I
think.”
An Eliseville city council member agreed “we don’t have control of our Public
Safety Commission as it is, except for their budget. In anything else they are independent.
That is the control we would be giving up, financial and what difference does that make
just as long as you’re getting the service you want?” The fire union president in Eliseville
said that “the gain is that we’ll actually have a competent fire service for the citizens. The
control is illusory.” The fire chief of Eliseville stated succinctly “anything that brings
more hands to the task, the better off we’ll all be.”
The fire chief of Bedford Falls said he didn’t really see any loss of control or any
huge gains, but the potential financial stability from a dedicated tax was the real benefit
from this collaboration. The Detour fire chief agreed saying that a real benefit of this
collaboration was the potential that it “could be funded with its own tax base . . . the
manpower available would be better . . . a larger pool of people for the inspectors and other
specialized jobs.” The fire chief of Coletown stated that “non-residency has changed the
dynamics of this industry too. Some of our guys live farther out of town and getting them
here in an emergency is an issue.” He saw better utilization of personnel as a main benefit
of the collaboration. A fire captain in Coletown stated “personally I would rather be a
member of a 130 member fire authority than a 28 member city fire department. In terms of
job security, potential advancement, training . . . gains of consistent services, better and
quicker response to emergencies.” The Eliseville city council president summed it up
nicely saying “if we get the cost savings and service, I’m not concerned about the control.”
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Table 5.17:
Importance of Having Influence on the Authority Governing Board
How confident are you that the elected officials of your community
Question C-4(d) will be able to exert meaningful influence over the managers of the
fire authority?
If your residents become dissatisfied with this arrangement, can it be
Question C-4(e) easily altered? Can your community easily withdraw from the
authority?

When asked the closely related question of how important political control of the
authority’s governing board is and how confident they are that the elected officials will be
able to exert meaningful influence over the fire authority, the council president of Acme
stated “there is always some loss of authority with a collaboration . . . I think we will lose
some control and it’s okay to lose it . . . we will be able to require that state standards are
maintained.” The Acme fire union president commented “I know it is hard sometimes for
elected officials to give up their identity, their name on the side of the fire truck, but if they
place the right person on the board they will still be able to voice their opinion and exercise
some control.” The fire chief of Acme stated “as long as the authority is shared five ways
and everybody has an equal say, I don’t see any problem.” The mayor of Detour stated
“what is meaningful control? If it gets unacceptable to a city they can withdraw.”
The city manager of Detour said “if we have input and influence over the
management, it’s not really a big concern for us.” The city manager of Eliseville said that
he was very confident elected officials would have meaningful influence, “it will be a
performance-based organization and will, I think, have greater accountability.” The city
manager of Bedford Falls stated “nobody should think that they have to have complete
control. Thinking about it, frankly how much control do they have right now? Probably not
as much as they think.” The fire union president of Eliseville said “the perception of power
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is different than it really is. They will control the purse strings…it forces you to do things
for the right reasons.” An Eliseville city council member said that “it would have a lot to
do with time. At the beginning it will be rocky, but over time it should run more
smoothly.”
Expressing a contrary view, the fire chief of Bedford Falls said “I’m not sure they
necessarily will…think about the Huron-Metro Authority (a multi-jurisdictional parks
authority in the region), how much control do we have there? None, they are
autonomous…we approve or turn down tax proposals but there isn’t much control.”
The responses to this question consistently show that the potential loss of control to
the fire authority governing board is not seen as a serious problem. The benefits expected
to be generated by this collaboration are seen to greatly outweigh any potential loss of
control. Many respondents indicated a belief that control over the fire service was illusory
and not affected by this change.

Importance of Having an Escape Clause in the Interlocal Agreement
Given the difficulty that often accompanies the planning and start-up phases of
collaboration, most participants interviewed considered it important that all partners have a
similar commitment to the collaboration. However, nearly all participants interviewed for
this study indicated that there had to be an escape clause in the agreement no matter how
difficult it might be in reality to accomplish.
When asked if the arrangement can be altered if residents become dissatisfied with
this arrangement, the Acme city council president stated that while her city could withdraw
from the collaboration it “would be difficult and expensive to alter or withdraw after we’re

159
in it.” The fire union president from that same community said “it wouldn’t be an easy
thing to do after we’re in it.” The mayor of Detour indicated that “there are terms being
written into the process that will allow for the dissolving of the authority” but that
withdrawal by any one city would be very difficult. The mayor of Eliseville said that
withdrawal was possible because, “nobody will have a gun to anybody’s head. Once we
join I assume it would be difficult and costly to withdraw.” The mayor of Coletown said
that withdrawal would be “very hard, almost impossible because you would have to build
your fire department from scratch . . . it would be cost-prohibitive I think.”
A few of the respondents raised the issue of how shared assets would be divided if
any city decided to withdraw from the authority, and how a new fire department could be
established after that. The Eliseville city manager stated that “withdrawal is possible . . .
obviously some division of assets has to be determined, a new department would have to
be formed and personnel transferred from the authority or newly hired. It can be done but
it’s not easy.” The fire chief of Bedford Falls said that withdrawal would not be easy and
“it would be a very costly adventure.” The fire chief of Detour said “if stations and
equipment are sold how do we start all over again?” A fire lieutenant in Detour said that
while withdrawal was possible it wouldn’t be easy “after everything is transferred over to
the authority.” An Eliseville city council member summed it up well when he stated “you
have got to go into this thinking this is long term.”
These responses indicate that participants are aware that although an escape clause
is expected to be written into the DFA collaboration agreement, it would be very difficult
and costly to withdraw once the authority is in operation. The responses indicate that
participants believe it is important to think long-term when considering such a
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collaboration effort, and potential collaborators must share a commitment to making the
effort a success.

Table 5.18:
Responses as to How the Costs will be Allocated among Communities
Question How will the costs of the fire authority be allocated among the participating
C-4(f)
communities?

Issue of Funding and Cost Allocation among these Communities
When asked how the costs of the fire authority will be allocated among the
participating communities, the city council president of Acme stated that she was unclear
about the particulars of the issue but that her understanding is “it would be independently
funded by a percentage from each individual city.” According to the mayor of Detour
“there have been several thoughts on that, several formulas that could be used for that.”
The city manager of Detour said “I really don’t know yet, we have not really decided on
that yet. I have not heard anything for sure.” The city manager of Eliseville said “several
formulas are being discussed . . . we’re considering ad valorem, start up with the existing
five budgets . . . special assessments, a per capita basis.” The fire chief of Bedford Falls
thought “it would probably be a dedicated millage that would ultimately be a tax increase
to the taxpayers . . . it might be a hard sell to the taxpayer.” The fire chief in Detour
believed it might be “total SEV of the city, number of runs made, but nothing really
concrete yet.” A fire captain in Coletown stated that it was his “understanding that a dollar
amount per city will be contributed . . . my thought is that we will be able to get away from
the city and go to the citizens of the whole area and get a dedicated revenue stream
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separate for the fire authority.” An Eliseville city council member said that it “never got
that far really as far as I know.”

Summary Analysis of Open-Ended Questions
How collaboration activities are going to be funded in both the short and the long
term is a basic issue that must be addressed by any group of local governments considering
collaborative activity. One of the problems that arose early in the planning phase of this
collaboration was how the authority is to be funded and what sort of cost-sharing
mechanism would be used to distribute costs among the participating communities. After
reviewing the answers of all respondents, it is apparent that the issue of funding and costsharing had been delayed until a later time and that no two respondents had exactly the
same concept of how the authority will be financed or this problem addressed.
Although the planning and discussion for this collaboration had been underway for
over eighteen months at the time of these interviews, almost everyone interviewed thought
that the financing posed a serious question, yet the group as a whole is failing to address it
in any significant way. The lack of a clear understanding among the participants as to how
the authority is to be funded could potentially be a serious issue. Most of the respondents
indicated during their interviews that relative equity among the participating communities
is important to them and that any cost savings be shared equally between the communities.
Yet when dealing with communities of different size and fiscal ability, equity and
equality are not the same thing. It is important that such issues be addressed before the
authority is implemented. These responses indicate that it is important that each of the
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communities provide a relatively equal share of the resources necessary to make the
collaboration successful.
Clearly, these respondents believe the Downriver communities are interdependent
and that such interdependency should make collaboration easier. Some of the factors
mentioned by the respondents are the shared borders, collaboration for many years through
the Downriver Mutual Aid Pact, and many similar economic forces affecting them all.
Turning to the issue of using a fire authority as the vehicle for creating and
operating the collaborative, nearly every one of the respondents agreed that use of an
authority was the best alternative. Respondents indicated that the Mutual Aid arrangement
is working to it’s fullest extent and a more formal arrangement is needed. None of the
respondents indicated that using an authority was a bad idea.
The responses to the three questions dealing with the potential loss of control over
fire services indicate that many of the respondents do not believe presently their city has
much control over the fire service. Many respondents indicated that such control was
illusory and that the state of Michigan has preempted many of their prerogatives for
dealing with public safety. Those respondents that did indicate there would be a loss of
control believe the benefits outweigh such costs.
As to the issue of an escape clause in the operating agreement allowing a city to
leave if dissatisfied, such a clause is considered a necessary condition to this kind of
collaboration. However, many of the respondents elaborated that once such an authority is
established and assets and personnel are transferred to the authority, it would be very
difficult and costly to establish a new fire department for their individual city.

Interviewee

Table 5.19:
Perceptions of the Respondents Regarding the Terms of Collaboration
All Respondents
a
b
c
d
e
f
h
i
j
k
5

8

3

1

10

1

2

5

10

10

10

10

3

4

10

10

10

10

4

6

9

8

10

5

4

8

8

10

6

5

6

8

7

2

7

7

8

3

7
10

m

8

6

8

7

8

3

10

9

10

10

8

8

10

10

10

9

10

10

7

8

10

8

9

9

9

10

8

10

10

10

7

8

9

10

6

10

6

5

7

8

8

7

8

8

9

2

10

2

7

5

7

5

5

2

5

10

10

5

10

10

10

9

4

9

10

10

10

5

8

8

3

5

1

5

9

10

10

2

6

8

8

10

6

6

9

9

7

7

8

11

8

10

10

7

2

10

8

10

10

10

10

10

12

1

8

9

5

10

10

8

8

10

8

8

8

13

2

9

9

7

9

9

9

9

3

9

9

9

14

7

7

7

7

6

7

8

7

8

7

5

8

15

3

9

7

2

10

6

8

5

2

4

4

1

16

1

8

2

4

6

8

7

8

8

6

1

8

17

2

8

9

10

10

10

10

10

10

9

10

8

18

5

10

7

6

8

10

10

9

6

2

2

0

19

9

9

8

6

10

9

9

9

5

5

5

4

20
Mean

7
4.55

10
8.45

10
7.75

8
6.95

8
8.70

9
7.60

8
8.30

8
8.35

6
7.25

9
7.45

5
5.95

7
7.10

STD DEV

2.65

1.36

2.24

2.96

2.25

2.72

1.17

1.42

2.77

2.28

2.68

3.06
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Table 5.20:
Perceptions of the Respondents Regarding the Terms of Collaboration
Grouped by City
Scale: 1=Not Important at All
10=Critically Important
Interview Question

Eliseville

Acme

Bedford
Falls

Coletown

MEAN

STDEV

N=5

N=6

N=3

N=2

N=4

N=20

N=20

5.60
8.80

5.50
8.67

4.67
9.33

2.00
8.00

3.00
7.25

4.15
8.41

1.59
0.80

7.60

7.50

7.67

8.00

8.25

7.80

0.31

9.20

5.50

7.00

4.50

7.50

6.74

1.82

9.60

6.83

10.00

9.50

9.00

8.99

1.26

7.60

8.17

7.00

5.50

8.25

7.30

1.13

8.80

8.00

8.67

8.00

8.00

8.29

0.41

8.80

8.00

9.00

7.00

8.50

8.26

0.80

7.40

6.33

7.67

5.00

9.25

7.13

1.58

7.20

7.00

8.67

7.00

7.75

7.52

0.71

a

Our city will save money in the short run (3-5 years)

b
c

k

Our city will save money in the long run (over 5 years)
Our residents see improvements in the quality of the service
over what we have provided previously
Cost savings are distributed equally among the participating
communities
None of our fire department staff will lose their jobs due to
this collaboration
Participation in the authority gives our community access to
existing facilities & equipment currently unavailable to us
because of their location in another jurisdiction
Participation in the authority gives our community access to
the financial resources needed to construct facilities or
purchase equipment that we cannot afford by ourselves
The authority will distribute future nonlocal (state and federal)
resources among the Downriver communities in a more
rational way than is now the case
Creation of this authority results in equal spending on fire
protection among the participating jurisdictions
I am satisfied with the benefits associated with this project

l

I am satisfied with the costs associated with this project

4.20

5.50

7.00

7.00

7.50

6.24

1.36

m

I am satisfied with the amount of input I have on this joint
project

6.80

6.50

8.67

5.50

8.00

7.09

1.25

d
e
f

h

i

j
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Detour

Table 5.21:
Perceptions of the Terms of Collaboration
Grouped by the Role of Respondent
Scale: 1=Not Important at All

10=Critically Important

N=4

City
Council
N=3

City
Mgr.
N=3

Fire
Chief
N=5

a Our city will save money in the short run (3-5 years)

6.50

7.00

3.67

2.80

3.80

4.75

1.87

b Our city will save money in the long run (over 5 years)

9.00

9.00

7.67

7.80

8.80

8.45

0.66

8.00

7.00

8.33

7.40

8.00

7.75

0.54

7.50
6.50

5.00
9.33

7.67 6.40 7.80
8.00 10.00 9.20

6.87
8.61

1.19
1.38

8.75

6.33

8.67

5.80

8.60

7.63

1.44

8.75

8.00

8.00

8.20

8.40

8.27

0.32

Interview Question

c

Our residents see improvements in the quality of the service over what we
have provided previously

f

Participation in the authority gives our community access to existing facilities
& equipment currently unavailable to us because of their location in another
jurisdiction

h Participation in the authority gives our community access to the financial
resources needed to construct facilities or purchase equipment that we cannot
afford by ourselves

Fire MEAN
Fighter
N=5
N=20

STDEV
N=20

i

The authority will distribute future nonlocal (state and federal) resources among
the Downriver communities in a more rationale way than is now the case

8.75

8.33

8.33

7.60

8.80

8.36

0.48

j

Creation of this authority results in equal spending on fire protection among
the participating jurisdictions

8.25

4.67

6.33

7.60

8.20

7.01

1.52

k

I am satisfied with the benefits associated with this project

7.25

7.33

9.00

7.00

7.20

7.56

0.82

l

I am satisfied with the costs associated with this project

6.25
7.00

5.33
6.33

7.67
9.33

5.40
5.60

5.60
7.80

6.05
7.21

0.98
1.44

m I am satisfied with the amount of input I have on this joint project
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d Cost savings are distributed equally among the participating communities
e None of our fire department staff will lose their jobs due to this collaboration

Mayors
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CHAPTER 6
WHAT ARE POTENTIAL COLLABORATION PARTNERS
LOOKING FOR IN ONE ANOTHER?

This chapter questions what characteristics potential collaborators seek in their
partners. What are the factors and characteristics that make another city a good or bad
partner to an interlocal agreement or for any other form of interlocal service
arrangement? The importance of partnering cities being adjacent to one another? What
importance is attached to past interactions between cities and individuals and does the
racial and socioeconomic composition of a community make any difference in the
decision to cooperate? Is it important that all potential partners seek the same results from
their collaborative effort? And finally, how important are informal networks, developed
over time among the actors, to the decision to collaborate?
As outlined in earlier chapters, the five communities that are the participants in
the DFA collaboration have a long history of cooperating with one another to provide a
variety of public services. This includes fire services. Through the Downriver Mutual Aid
Pact, these communities can, and often do, call upon one another to help with fire and
police-related services. These communities have also assisted one another in the
provision of public works services, recreational services, and three of them cooperate in a
popular annual vintage car cruise along a state highway (M-85) that passes through their
communities. Successful past interactions are expected to exert a positive influence on
the perceptions of participants toward one another, and encourage them to collaborate
again.
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Using the IGR framework developed by Eric Zeemering (2007), this chapter
examines the perceptions that officials interviewed for this study have toward actual and
potential partners in collaborative activity. Of particular interest is how similar or
dissimilar communities must be to collaborate. In most collaborative activity, both
communities want joint benefits. That collaborating cities should be similar to one
another and approach the bargaining situation from equally strong positions is a common
theme in the literature on local government cooperation (Feiock 2007).
These communities have competed with one another for retail and commercial
developments. Eliseville and Coletown both have traditional downtowns that developed
early in the 20th century and were considered retail destinations before the creation of
regional shopping malls in the 1960s. Detour and Bedford Falls both have newer style
shopping venues and large box retailers. In terms of traditional retail/commercial
development, these cities would be considered to be and consider themselves to be in
competition with one another for future development.
The first portion of this chapter deals with a series of closed-ended survey
questions using a scale of one (not important at all to the respondent) to ten (critically
important to the respondent). These questions are designed to elicit, among other things,
what the respondents seek in potential collaboration partners. The interviewees were
asked questions related to characteristics of other cities that might be important to them:
the similarity of the cities in terms of wealth and racial composition, whether it is
important that the cities be in competition with each other for residents and economic
development, and whether it is important that the cities they partner with have similar
governmental structures. Another section of the closed-ended questions deal with issues
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such as the importance of having similar resources available, seeking the same benefits
from collaboration, and having similar land uses and fire service requirements. Finally, a
series of questions posed to respondents, examines the importance of networking and
having frequent contact with potential partners. This series of questions is designed to
assess the respondents’ perceptions of potential partners.
The second portion of this chapter deals with a series of open-ended questions
that are designed to encourage the respondent to explain more fully and in a narrative
style what is important to them regarding the terms of potential collaboration partners.
The Tables 6.18, 6.19 and 6.20 at the end of the chapter contain all of the data gathered
from the scaled portion of the survey instrument. Smaller tables are interspersed
throughout the chapter to make it easier for the reader to refer to information being
discussed.
These questions also provide insights into the level of existing trust among the
participating communities prior to this collaboration and how confident the participants
are that the other communities will meet their obligations. The transaction costs
associated with establishing and maintaining interlocal service arrangements, monitoring
performance and enforcing the collaborative agreement can be reduced when the local
government actors have repeated contacts with one another, over time (Feiock 2007). In
some cases, voluntary cooperation takes the place of a centralized authority in governing
the collective activities of a metropolitan area (Frederickson 1999).
Table 6.1 presents detailed information about the DFA communities, including
each city’s population, racial makeup, average age of residents and characteristics of its

169
housing stock. The information in this table also indicates the density of each community
and the size and total value of the housing stock.

Table 6.1:
Community Characteristics, Population, Race, Age and Housing

2007 Population Est.
Percentage White
Percentage Other
Median Age
Percentage Population
65+ Years old
Size of City
Total Housing Units
Median House Value
Median Household
Income
Households in Poverty
Single Family Detached
Multi-Unit Apartments
Percent of Land
Developed
Residential Density
(Units per acre)
SEV per Capita

Detour

Eliseville

Acme

27,356
96%
4%
41.0 yrs

37,494
93%
7%
35.5 yrs

10,624
87%
13%
35.7 yrs

28,686
94%
6%
38.0 yrs

25,942
96%
4%
38.0 yrs

21%

14%

13%

16%

16%

4,486 acres
12,254
$118,700

3,744 acres
16,821
$84,100

1,740 acres
4,760
$78,500

4,400 acres
13,987
$101,700

3,316 acres
12,303
$101,700

$53,503

$42,515

$37,954

$46,927

$43,740

4%
90%
8%

8%
82%
12%

11%
70%
21%

6%
69%
27%

6%
75%
15%

93.30%

96.80%

89.60%

84.50%

93.90%

5.20

6.65

7.00

5.66

6.32

$41,127.32

$25,324.63

$26,111.30

$35,759.40

$31,744.15

Bedford Falls

Coletown

Perceptions of Partners: Responses to Scale Questions
The series of questions listed on Table 6.19 asks how important the presence or
absence of certain characteristics are in a potential local government partner. The
participants are asked to think of these questions as pertaining to general principles of
collaboration rather than just their current collaboration.
The questions are prefaced with the statement “Our local government partners
should be…”
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Table 6.2:
Perceptions of Collaboration Partners
All Respondents (n=20)
Scale” 1=Not Important at All 10=Critically Important
Our local government partners should be
a Communities we do not directly compete with for residents and development
b Similar to our community in terms of wealth and racial composition
c Similar to our community in terms of governmental structure (i.e.) either both
d

council-manager or both mayor-council systems
Similar to our community in terms of powers (i.e.) both cities or both
townships

Mean
All
Respondents
4.60
4.30
5.25
5.50

Competitors as Partners
When asked how important it is that the collaborating cities not be in direct
competition with one another for residents and economic development (question a), the
respondents average response was (4.60), below the mid-point of the scale. When
responses are examined by city, some variation is evident. Respondents from Detour
(6.33) and Bedford Falls (6.00), the communities with much newer and larger retail and
commercial developments, consider such competition to be a more important obstacle
than do the older cities of Coletown (4.00) and Eliseville (4.00). Acme respondents also
averaged (6.33) on that question, the same score as Detour respondents. These two cities
have close commercial and economic ties.
When the responses are grouped by the role of the respondent, additional
differences are evident. Fire chiefs (6.20) and fire fighters (5.80) consider this factor
more important than the other three categories of respondents. The city council members
(3.67), and city managers (3.67), and mayors (2.50) did not consider competition to be an
important obstacle to potential collaborative activities. Given the tremendous amount of
personnel and resources that these communities and others in the Downriver area devote
to economic development, the responses by the elected officials and the city managers

171
was unexpected. These responses may indicate that the actors involved in this
collaboration are able to compartmentalize their various activities. They might be willing
to collaborate in the provision of fire services, but equally unwilling to collaborate on
issues involving economic development.

Table 6.3:
Perceptions of Collaboration Partners
Grouped by City

a
b
c
d

Scale” 1=Not Important at All 10=Critically
Important
Our local government partners should be
Communities we do not directly compete with for
residents and development
Similar to our community in terms of wealth and
racial composition
Similar to our community in terms of
governmental structure (i.e.) either both councilmanager or both mayor-council systems
Similar to our community in terms of powers
(i.e.) both cities or both townships

Detour
(n=5)

Eliseville
(n=5)

Acme
(n=3)

Bedford
Falls
(n=2)

Coletown
(n=4)

6.33

4.00

6.33

6.00

4.00

6.33

5.00

6.33

4.50

3.25

6.67

4.83

6.67

5.50

5.00

7.00

4.50

7.00

5.00

5.50

The obstacles to cooperation created by large differences across communities in
wealth and racial composition is a constant theme in the extant literature. Morgan,
Hirlinger and England (1988), found that the percentage of blacks in the population
appeared to significantly reduce the likelihood of that city contracting out for health and
human service activities. Krueger and McGuire (2005) found that cities enjoying high
taxable values and high tax revenues were among the least likely to seek additional
revenues through interlocal agreements. The economic, social and political characteristics
of a community’s population can help shape populations’ preferences for public goods.
Demographic homogeneity is important, because such features reduce the transaction
costs for the officials who are negotiating collaborative agreements (Feiock 2007).
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Homophily in Race and Wealth
When asked how important it is that partnering communities be similar in terms
of the wealth and racial composition of their populations (question b), the mean response
of all respondents is (4.30) with a standard deviation of (2.63). The respondents express
ambivalence toward or a neutral stance regarding such differences in terms of racial
composition and relative wealth of the communities. When the data is examined grouped
by city, there was some variance in the answers. Coletown (3.25) respondents think these
factors are only somewhat important. Detour and Acme both registered the highest
response at (6.33), indicating it is important to them. Eliseville (5.00) and Bedford Falls
(4.50) hovered below the mid-point of the scale, indicating that these factors are
moderately important.
When responses are examined in terms of the role of each respondent, other
differences are seen. The city council members (6.00) reported similarity in wealth and
racial composition to be important while the city managers averaged a response of just
(3.00) indicating that it is only somewhat important. The responses of the mayors (4.00),
fire chiefs (4.40), and fire fighters (4.20) expressed the opinion that this factor is only
moderately important.
All of the city council members in these five communities are elected on an atlarge or city-wide basis. The racial composition shown in Table 6.1 for these
communities indicate that all five cities are relatively racially homogenous, with the
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percentage of the population reporting themselves as white ranging from a low of 87 to a
high of 96. The low average response to this question may simply reflect that racial
composition is a non-issue in these communities because of such homogeneity.

Table 6.4:
Perceptions of Collaboration Partners
Grouped by Role
Scale” 1=Not Important at All
10=Critically Important

a
b
c

d

Our local government partners should be
Communities we do not directly compete
with for residents and development
Similar to our community in terms of
wealth and racial composition
Similar to our community in terms of
governmental structure (i.e.) either both
council-manager or both mayor-council
systems
Similar to our community in terms of
powers (i.e.) both cities or both
townships

Mayor
(n=4)

City
Council
(n=3)

City
Manager
(n=3)

Fire
Chief
(n=5)

Fire
Fighter
(n=5)

2.50

3.67

3.67

6.20

5.80

4.00

6.00

3.00

4.40

4.20

3.75

4.67

6.00

5.80

5.20

3.50

5.67

6.00

6.60

5.60

Importance of Similarities in Structural Powers
Another issue examined in this research is the importance of similar forms of
governmental structure and power among potential collaborators. A political community
may have different boundaries than do existing cities, and some mechanism must be
developed for dealing with the problems that arise with the provision of services across
different governing entities (Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren 1961). Campbell and Glynn
(1990), examining interlocal cooperation in Georgia, concluded that the presence of city
managers did not make the community more likely to collaborate. Contrary to that study,
Morgan and Hirlinger (1991) argue that the presence of a city manager does facilitate
more intergovernmental contracting, especially in the area of public safety, the same type
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of service that is the focus of this study. Brown and Potoski (2003) argue that the
presence of a city manager is positively related to collaborative activities. Carley (1991)
and Sabatier (1999), contend that similarity in political institutions across government
units in a region can serve to facilitate collaborative exchanges, perhaps because local
actors view issues in much the same way which makes collaboration easier.
When asked how important it is that the collaborating partners have similar
governmental structures (question c), the average response of all respondents is (5.25)
indicating a neutral stance on this issue. The use of the phrase “governmental structures”
in this question is designed to measure how important it is that collaborating cities all be
either council-manager or mayor-council types. Interestingly, the mayor’s response (3.75)
indicates they believe this factor to be somewhat important, while the city managers
value this factor quite differently with a response (6.00) indicating it is important.
Clearly, the mayors consider this issue to be less important than the city managers. Also
the responses varied by city, ranging from (4.83) in Eliseville indicating it is moderately
important to (6.67) in Detour and Acme indicating it is important to very important to
those respondents.
When asked how important it is that partnering cities are similar to one another in
terms of the powers they have and specifically, whether cities and townships could
effectively collaborate (question d), the mean response (5.50) was the mid-point of scale
and similar to the mean response to (question c) at (5.25). The responses did vary
somewhat across the cities. The respondents from Detour (7.00) and Acme (7.00)
consider the factor more important than their counterparts in Eliseville (4.50), Bedford
Falls (5.00), and Coletown (5.00) do.
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Table 6.5:
Similarity in Resources Contributed and Benefits Sought
All Respondents
Scale: 1=Not Important at All

e
f

10=Critically Important

Mean All Respondents

Our partners should be
Able to provide similar levels of resources to the effort
Seeking the same benefits of this collaboration as we are

7.40
8.50

Importance of Comparable Resources and Similarity of Goals
A persistent and important theme in the literature on interlocal cooperation is that
the fiscal capacity of the jurisdiction does matter. If one community brings more
resources to the table than its partner, it is presumed to be much less likely to cooperate
(Foster 1997). The responses from this group of participants support this view. When
asked how important it is that all collaborating partners are able to provide similar levels
of resources to the effort (question e), the mean response was (7.40) with a standard
deviation of (2.44) indicating that, although there was some variance in the responses,
this factor is generally considered very important.

Table 6.6:
Similarity in Resources Contributed and Benefits Sought
Grouped by City
Scale: 1=Not Important at All
10=Critically Important

e
f

Our partners should be
Able to provide similar levels of resources to the
effort
Seeking the same benefits of this collaboration as
we are

Detour

Eliseville

Acme

Bedford
Falls

Coletown

8.00

8.00

8.00

5.50

5.50

8.33

8.83

8.33

5.50

8.50

Examining these responses by city and by role shows some interesting
differences. The officials from Detour, Eliseville and Acme averaged an (8.00) on a 10
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point scale indicating this issue is very important. In contrast, at almost three points
lower, the officials from Bedford Falls (5.50) and Coletown (5.50) thought this issue was
less important. It is unclear based on other responses from the officials of these two cities
why they would rank this issue so much lower than the other three. When the responses
to that question are examined by role of the respondent, city council members (8.00), fire
chiefs (8.00), and mayors (7.50) all considered this factor very important. Fire fighters
(6.80) and city managers (6.67) consider this factor important but less than the other three
groups.

Table 6.7:
Similarity in Resources Contributed and Benefits Sought
Grouped by Role
Scale: 1=Not Important at All
10=Critically Important

e
f

Our partners should be
Able to provide similar levels of resources to the
effort
Seeking the same benefits of this collaboration as
we are

Mayor

City
Council

City
Manager

Fire
Chief

Fire
Fighter

7.50

8.00

6.67

8.00

6.80

9.25

8.00

6.67

9.00

8.80

There was far less variation in the responses to the question about the importance
of potential partners seeking similar benefits from the collaboration. The average
response to (question f) the respondents is (8.50) and nearly forty percent of the
respondents responded with a (10.00). This indicates that it is critically important that
their partners seek the same benefits from their collaboration. When the data is examined
grouped by city, only one community deviates from this position. The Bedford Falls
respondents ranked this factor at (5.50), the mid-point of the scale. Respondents from the
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other four communities ranked this factor much higher, ranging from (8.83) to (8.33),
indicating similar benefits sought is a very important issue to the group.

Table 6.8:
Importance of Past Collaboration and Frequency of Contacts
All Respondents
Scale: 1=Not Important at All

10=Critically Important

Mean All
Respondents

Our partners should be

g Communities that have successfully collaborated with us in the past
h Communities whose elected officials are in frequent contact with ours
i Communities whose senior administrators are in frequent contact with
ours

6.65
7.65
8.40

Importance of Past Interactions and Frequency of Contact
The next series of questions examines the importance these participants place on
having collaboration partners who have cooperated in the past and how important it is
that elected and administrative officials have regular contact with one another. Research
has shown that repeated contact between local government actors leads to greater levels
of trust and performance experience, which often leads to increased levels of cooperation
between government units in a metropolitan area (Post 2002). Fixed geographic borders
require repeat play among neighboring communities. Positive experiences reduce
transaction costs and make collaboration easier (Feiock 2007).
When asked how important it is that partnering communities have successfully
collaborated with one another previously (question g), the response of (6.65) indicates
these participants consider it an important factor. Some variation in this view emerges
when the responses are grouped by city. The respondents from Coletown (8.25) consider
this factor to be very important, while those from the neighboring community of Bedford
Falls (4.00) ranked this issue as far less important. Detour and Acme once again had
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identical responses (7.33), indicating this issue is very important to them. Eliseville, as a
group, responded at (5.50), the mid-point of the scale, revealing a neutral position on the
importance of this issue. When the same data is examined grouped by the role of the
respondent, there is not nearly as much variation in the responses. Fire fighters ranked it
the most important at (7.40) and city managers the least important at (6.00).
When asked the importance of elected officials of prospective partners being in
frequent contact (question h), the responses average (7.65), indicating that the typical
respondent considers this to be a very important factor to successful collaboration. When
grouped by city, the responses show little variance, with a mean of (7.83) and a standard
deviation of 0.88. The responses are also consistent among all roles of the participants.
The fire fighters and city managers considered frequent contact between elected officials
the most important with rankings of (8.80) and (8.67) respectively.

Table 6.9:
Importance of Past Collaboration and Frequency of Contacts
Grouped by City
Scale: 1=Not Important at All
10=Critically Important

g
h
i

Our partners should be
Communities that have successfully
collaborated with us in the past
Communities whose elected officials are in
frequent contact with ours
Communities whose senior administrators
are in frequent contact with ours

Detour

Eliseville

Acme

Bedford
Falls

Coletown

7.33

5.50

7.33

4.00

8.25

8.67

6.83

8.67

7.00

8.00

8.33

8.00

8.33

7.50

8.25

Responses to the question about the importance of senior administrative officials
of the collaborating communities being in frequent contact (question i) averaged (8.40).
This indicates the group considers this contact to be very important to a successful
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collaboration. Their responses to this question are roughly one point higher than the
(7.65) score averaged for the question about contact among elected officials.

Table 6.10:
Importance of Past Collaboration and Frequency of Contacts
Grouped by Role
Scale: 1=Not Important at All
10=Critically Important

g
h
i

Our partners should be
Communities that have successfully
collaborated with us in the past
Communities whose elected officials are in
frequent contact with ours
Communities whose senior administrators
are in frequent contact with ours

Mayors

City
Council

City
Managers

Fire
Chiefs

Fire
Fighters

6.25

6.67

6.00

6.60

7.40

7.50

6.67

8.67

6.60

8.80

9.25

6.67

8.67

8.00

9.00

The respondents indicated contact among administrative officials is very
important to collaboration, regardless what community they belong to or the role they
play. When grouped by city, the responses averaged (8.08), with a standard deviation of
(0.35). When the responses are examined in terms of the role of the respondent, minimal
variation is seen. Of the five groups, mayors (9.25) and fire fighters (9.00) consider this
factor the most important, followed by the city managers (8.67) and the fire chiefs (8.00).
City council members ranked this factor lowest at (6.67). They considered administrative
contact to be an important factor in a successful collaboration, but saw it as less important
than the other four groups of officials.

180
Importance of Similarities in Service Requirements and Operations

Table 6.11:
Similarities of Land Uses, Service Requirements, Equipment and Training
All Respondents
Scale: 1=Not Important at All
j
k
l

10=Critically Important

Our partners should be
Communities that have similar land uses to ours (i.e., mostly residential)
Communities that have similar service requirements to ours (i.e., nonindustrial)
Communities that have equipment and training similar to ours

Mean All
Respondents

6.00
7.55
8.15

The first question in this section measures the importance placed on the
communities involved having similar land use, in this case, mostly residential. This issue
affects the types of fires a community fire department is called upon to fight, and this
affects the costs and risks of collaboration. This issue is potentially very relevant to the
DFA, because there are serious differences in land use patterns among the five
communities. Does it matter whether one partnering community has all residential and
another has some industrial? Does it matter that one of these communities borders a large
oil refinery and tank farm and they would be called upon in the event of a fire or other
emergency there? Does it matter that two of these communities have a greater number of
and larger commercial developments than the others do?
When asked the importance of their partners having similar land uses (question j),
the average response was (6.00), with a standard deviation of (2.43). The respondents
clearly perceive this an important factor, but there is considerable variance of opinion on
this question. Respondent’s indicating this factor was very important or very
unimportant, were asked a follow-up question why it was or was not important. Those
that responded that this factor was very important generally answered that too great a
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difference in the typical types of fires fought would make collaborating with that
community more difficult. Those who responded that it was not very important added
that because of the Mutual Aid Agreement they currently operate under, these five
communities are already required to assist one another in fighting fires regardless of the
type. This collaboration would not change that.

Table 6.12:
Similarities of Land Uses, Service Requirements, Equipment and Training
Grouped by City
Scale: 1=Not Important at All
10=Critically Important
j
k

l

Our partners should be
Communities that have similar land uses to
ours (i.e., mostly residential)
Communities that have similar service
requirements to ours (i.e., non-industrial)
Communities that have equipment and training
similar to ours

Detour

Eliseville

Acme

Bedford
Falls

Coletown

7.67

5.50

7.67

4.50

6.75

8.33

7]33

8.33

5.00

7.00

7.67

8.50

7.67

5.50

7.75

In terms of the different cities, the average responses are clustered around the
mid-point of the scale. Bedford Falls (4.50) was the only community with an average
response below the mid-range of the scale and Eliseville (5.50) responses averaged the
mid-point. Detour and Acme had the same average response (7.67) and Coletown
averaged (6.4). Examining their responses in terms of their role in the city reveals that
fire fighters (6.60) and city council members (6.67) are similar in their assessments of the
importance of having similar land use. Mayors (5.50) and fire chiefs (5.40) were also
closely aligned on this question. The city managers response (6.00) fell between the other
four.
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Table 6.13:
Similarities of Land Uses, Service Requirements, Equipment and Training
Grouped by Role
Scale: 1=Not Important at All
10=Critically Important

j
k
l

Our partners should be
Communities that have similar land uses to
ours (i.e., mostly residential)
Communities that have similar service
requirements to ours (i.e., non-industrial)
Communities that have equipment and training
similar to ours

Mayors

City
Council

City
Managers

Fire
Chiefs

Fire
Fighters

5.50

6.67

6.00

5.40

6.60

8.00

8.00

6.33

6.80

8.40

8.75

7.33

6.67

8.80

8.40

The last two questions in this section examine a closely related factor, the
importance of partnering communities having similar service requirements, training and
equipment for their fire departments. The term service requirements is understood to
mean the type of training that community fire fighters need, types of equipment normally
required and any special equipment or training. The first question asked them to indicate
the importance of having similar service requirements (question k). The mean response
from the interviewees as a group is (7.55), indicating this is a very important factor to
these respondents.
When the responses are examined by the role of the respondent, the answers
ranged from a high of (8.40) for the fire fighters to a low of (6.33) for city managers. The
mayors and city council members were closely aligned with the fire fighters on this
question providing a mean score of (8.00) each. Fire chiefs (6.80) and city managers
(6.33) were the only two groups under (8.00). The data indicates that the two groups of
senior administrators (fire chiefs and city managers) place less importance on this factor
than other groups. Similar variation is seen in the responses across cities. The responses
of four of the communities are grouped together ranging from a high of (8.33) in Detour
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and Acme to a low of (7.00) in Coletown. Once again, the Bedford Falls (5.00)
respondents viewed this issue as less important than the others.
When asked how important it is that potential collaboration partners have similar
fire equipment and training (question l), the respondents as a group (8.15) indicated that
this factor is very important to them. In terms of the different cities, Eliseville (8.50)
respondents think it is more important than do the Bedford Falls (5.50) respondents. The
other three cities had very similar average responses ranging from (7.75) to (7.67). City
managers (6.67) considered this issue less important than the others and the fire chiefs
(8.80) considered it more important than the rest. The other three groups fell between
(7.33) and (8.75). Mayors (8.75) and fire fighters (8.40) provide answers similar to fire
chiefs. City council (7.33) members were closer to the city managers on this question.
Figure 6.1 displays the mean responses of all the interviewees in terms of
questions asked and ranked from most important to least important in their opinion.
Figure 6.1: Importance of Particular Traits in a Partner.
Trait in Partner
Seeking the Same Benefits we are
Frequent Contact of Administrative Officials
Have Similar Equipment and Training to ours
Frequent Contact of Elected Officials
Have Similar Service Requirements to ours
Successfully Collaborated with us Previously
Have Similar Land Uses to ours
Have Similar Governmental Powers to ours
Have Similar Governmental Structures to ours
Not in Direct Competition with us
Similar to us in Terms of Race and Wealth
Scale: 1=Not Important at All

10=Critically Important

Mean Response
All Respondents

8.50
8.40
8.15
7.65
7.55
6.65
6.00
5.50
5.25
4.60
4.30
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Initial Conclusions Drawn from Responses
The frequency of contact between officials from neighboring communities is a
potentially important area of study. Previous research has indicated that formal and
informal metropolitan networks such as the DCC, the Downriver fire chiefs group, and
other social and professional networks can facilitate collaboration and problem solving
(Frederickson 1999, Thurmaier and Wood 2002). However, past interactions, perceived
negatively, may prevent future collaboration.
Jurisdictions that share borders and have repeated contacts with one another have
numerous opportunities to consider collaboration. Over the course of many years of
interaction, neighboring jurisdictions have experienced positive and negative encounters.
It is important to future local government actors considering collaboration to have a
better understanding of what role these perceptions play in determining the success or
failure of collaboration activity. Their responses indicate that they consider it important
that the elected and administrative officials from collaborating communities had prior
regular contact with one another. The responses also made it clear that the participants
believe it important for the communities to have similar requirements in terms of types of
fires and equipment and training needed.
The long history of successful collaboration among these five communities
through the Downriver Mutual Aid Program has likely affected their attitudes toward
each other. They have purchased similar types of equipment and engaged in similar
training over a period of many years. Their responses indicate that they see similar fire
fighting needs, the purchase of similar equipment, and similar training of personnel as
important factors when considering prospective partners for collaboration.
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Theorization on this subject usually emphasizes the importance of similarity
among communities in terms of racial composition and wealth, and suggest homogenous
communities find it easier to collaborate than do heterogeneous ones (Feiock 2007,
Morgan, Hirlinger and England 1988 ). However, respondents to this survey did not
indicate that racial and wealth issues were important to them in terms of their willingness
to undertake this collaboration.

Perceptions of Potential Partners: Responses to Open-Ended Questions
The interviewees were also asked a series of questions designed to elicit more
detailed narrative answers. These questions examine the respondents’ perceptions of their
partners. In particular, the issue of the development and maintenance of trust is examined
and how partners for this collaboration were selected.

Table 6.14:
Perceptions of Potentially Collaborating Partners
D-2

D-2 (a-b)

D-2 (c)
D-2 (d)
D-2 (e)

A general concern about intergovernmental collaborations on public services involves the
level of trust among the participating governments. We are interested in understanding how
trust is developed, maintained and lost.
Do you agree that the level of trust your residents and government officials have for the
officials of potential local government partners is an important factor in the success of
intergovernmental collaborations? If yes, why? If no, why not?
How do you define trust in this context (joint service provision)?
How can the required trust be developed?
Can this trust be undermined? If so, how?

The Issue of Trust among Collaboration Partners
As in any ongoing relationship, the issue of trust is an important one. It is
important to future collaboration to better understand the role trust plays in this activity.
Is trust necessary? How is such trust developed and nurtured? Can such trust be damaged
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or destroyed and, if so, how? Finally, what can elected and administrative officials do to
ensure that the necessary trust is maintained?
The respondents were asked if they agreed that the level of trust their residents
and government officials have for the officials of potential local government partners is
an important factor in the success of intergovernmental collaborations (question D-2a). If
so, they were also asked why this trust is important (question D-2b). The city council
president of Acme stated “people work better if they can establish a level of trust . . . set
up some common understanding.” The fire union president of Acme said that it was
indeed important and that “all the cards must be on the table . . . in order for trust . . .
can’t be any surprises.” The mayor of Detour said it was important, but not the most
important thing. He said “it’s a matter of how you structure the legal framework so that
they have the protection necessary to meet the mission . . . structure is more important
[than trust].”
The fire chief of Bedford Falls said that it was absolutely important that
collaborating partners trust one another. “You’ve got to trust your partners . . . you have
to have shared goals.” The Bedford Falls city manager stated “you can’t work with folks
you don’t trust.” The Eliseville fire union president, who was instrumental in the
planning phase of this collaboration, said “creating a partnership requires trust . . . less
trust equals less ability to collaborate.” The mayor of Detour thought “a level of trust is
really a prerequisite to undertaking something like this.”
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The Issue of Trust within Each Community
While agreeing that trust among collaborating jurisdictions is an important factor
in establishing collaboration, three respondents expressed concern that the required trust
did not currently exist in this particular effort within their city. A fire department
lieutenant in Detour stated “we don’t completely trust our own elected officials right
now.” The fire chief of Coletown said “we have a lot of suspicions right now between our
citizens and the elected officials.” A fire captain in Coletown said “ultimately, it’s very
important. There is some lack of trust right now…as soon as it becomes adversarial the
trust breaks down; it becomes us versus them and you might as well put cinder blocks
around your feet.”

How is Trust Defined by these Respondents?
When asked to define trust in the context of joint service provision (question D2c), and how they personally define trust, common themes emerged. The Acme city
council president stated that she defined it as the ability to “believe what people have
said, that they have a proven track record.” The mayor of Detour said it meant “that you
have the same vision, the same mission, a common understanding of the services that
need to be provided . . . I don’t have to agree with everything the other mayors say, but I
can trust them if I believe we are headed down the same road.” The Eliseville city
manager defined trust as a “sharing of the work-load during the development and
governance of the authority. The more that people have done of their own heavy lifting in
a project the less likely they are to mistrust the motives of others.” The Detour fire chief
said “I think you make a statement . . . we expect you to follow through on that . . . you
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stay committed once we start this effort. I have a genuine belief in your sincerity.” A fire
department lieutenant in Detour said it meant “doing what you say you will . . . respect
for one another.”
The fire captain in Coletown defined trust as “winning some and losing some . . .
doing what you say you’ll do.” The city manager of Bedford Falls said that to him it
meant “people who say what they mean . . . are not devious . . . that are straight shooters .
. . their word is good, you can count on them.” The fire chief of Eliseville said that it
meant “at some point having to take on faith what people are telling you and just moving
forward.” The Eliseville city council president concluded that trust was “being able to sit
next to somebody and being able to trust that people will be true to their word . . . some
people don’t have the intestinal fortitude to be good partners . . . people have to have
some backbone to work at this sort of thing.”

How is Trust Developed?
When asked how this required trust can be developed (question D-2d), the Acme
fire union president stated that “at the beginning we made a gentlemen’s agreement that
there would not be any hidden agendas . . . everybody would be up front.” The mayor of
Detour said it takes “communication . . . open, candid, adult communication . . . I would
rather someone tell me I’m full of shit to my face and then discuss that with me than to
have somebody go behind my back and say it.” The city manager of Eliseville said trust
is developed as “an act of participation and it needs to be reevaluated constantly . . . it
takes a certain emotional mix of people and perhaps a certain level of experience.” The
fire chief of Bedford Falls said that when it came to developing trust “actions speak
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louder than words . . . it has to be developed . . . focus on the goals . . . don’t become
jaded.” The fire chief in Coletown said “the cities can’t just think of this as a quick fix to
their current problems . . . it has to be much more than that . . . a long-term solution to
these fundamental issues.”
The mayor of Eliseville thinks that trust is developed by “working together over
the years on various projects . . . I’ve come to trust many of my colleagues through our
work at the Downriver Community Conference.” The city manager of Bedford Falls said
that trust was developed “by working together . . . you learn pretty quick who returns
phone calls, who shows up for meetings.” The mayor of Coletown said that trust couldn’t
be taken for granted. “After a while you can tell if the person is just trying to sell you
something rather than working with you.” The fire chief of Eliseville said that trust “to a
large extent comes from people taking a leap of faith and letting folks do things . . . it’s
easy for someone to say ‘trust me’ . . . it’s harder for someone else to believe that.” The
fire union president in Eliseville said “it takes time . . . working together, cities following
through on their commitments to one another.” The mayor of Detour indicated that trust
is developed “by working together on common projects . . . working through issues
together in the Michigan Municipal League, the Southeast Michigan Council of
Governments, that kind of thing.” The Eliseville city council president said “it’s a time
thing . . . it takes time and it’s difficult because of the changes in personnel, elected and
appointed, that makes it tough. But over time I think it builds on itself.”

190
How is Trust Undermined?
When asked if trust can be undermined (question D-2e) in any way and, if so,
how, several respondents had strong views. The mayor of Detour said that trust could be
damaged if “you have a problem and you aren’t communicating…you are not both
wanting the same things from the collaboration.” The city manager of Detour said that
trust was damaged if the “collaboration doesn’t deliver . . . don’t promise something that
you can’t deliver. People don’t want to hear excuses in the public sector.” The city
manager of Eliseville said that trust is damaged when someone “takes a contrary position
without warning the group beforehand . . . making it an (us versus them) issue and
redefining the group’s interest as individual interests.” The fire chief of Bedford Falls
stated that trust could be damaged by “inappropriate political influence.” The fire chief
of Coletown said trust could be damaged “if one partner portrays our efforts publically in
a bad light, if one of the shareholders betrays it; that can damage the effort a lot.” The
mayor of Eliseville stated that damage results when “my partners tell me one thing and
go back to their own city and say something different; that damages the relationship.”
The city manager of Bedford Falls said that trust could be destroyed if someone
“didn’t do what they agreed to . . . lied about what they agreed to. Actually, I thought I
had seen the worst of humanity in practicing law . . . it turns out that I hadn’t . . . my
years in the Mayor’s office of another city . . . I believe I found the lowest forms of life in
politics.” The fire chief of Eliseville said it is the “same for communities as it is for
individuals . . . if honesty prevails you have trust if not, you don’t.” A former city council
member and the current Mayor of Detour said that trust could be damaged “by a more
powerful community dictating to another as opposed to working with them.” He went on
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to explain that throughout his years of working for Wayne County he had experienced
“the City of Detroit dictating to surrounding communities, and that has been a trust killer
over the years.”
Figure 6.2 is a synopsis of several of the commonly mentioned factors that, in the
opinion of these respondents, can develop or undermine trust in the context of a
collaborative effort.
Figure 6.2: Developing and Undermining Trust in Collaboration
How is Trust
Developed?
Working together over
time
Communication
Focus on the goals
No hidden agendas
Thinking long-term
Taking a "leap-of-faith"

Percentage of
Respondent’s
Mentioning
Factor

55%
25%
20%
15%
15%
5%

How is Trust Damaged?
Saying one thing and doing
another
Not communicating
Not delivering on promises
Inappropriate political
influence
Not doing assigned tasks
Bigger cities bullying
smaller ones

Percentage of
Respondent’s
Mentioning
Factor

45%
25%
25%
20%
10%
5%

Insights about the Importance of Trust to Collaboration
These respondents strongly believe that trust among participants is a necessary
prerequisite to successfully starting and implementing collaboration. Ultimately, every
one of the respondents indicated that it was important to develop and maintain trust. The
responses to these questions also indicate that open and honest communication is an
absolute necessity for the participants in a collaboration like the DFA. Not doing what
you say you will do, not following through on commitments and saying one thing within
the group and something different in your own community are seen by these respondents
as serious problems that would interfere with the development and maintenance of trust
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among the participating partners and communities. The respondents were clear that the
necessary trust, once developed, could most definitely be destroyed by inappropriate
actions on the part of collaboration participants.

How Partners were Selected
With imperfect information and no experience working together, potential
partners may face relatively high start-up costs (Feiock 2007). To examine this issue,
several questions were asked to delve deeper into how the participants for this effort at
collaboration were selected. The authority might have included all twenty of the DCC
member communities, but the effort went forward with only five. Geographically nearby
are other communities that expressed some interest in participating, but did not end up in
the group. Other communities in the area who seemed to be good potential partners were
also excluded. The basis for choosing the cities in this effort is explored in the next few
sections.

Table 6.15:
Selection of Potential Collaboration Partners
D-3
D-3 (a)
D-3 (b)
D-3 (c)
D-3 (d)

I am interested in understanding how the participants in this effort were decided on.
How were the participants decided on? Is this the final group or do you envision others will
be added in the future?
Are there any nonparticipating communities that you wish were involved? If yes, who and
why do you think they are not participating at this time?
What makes the current participants good partners for your community on this service?
Can you think of any Downriver jurisdictions that would NOT be good partners for your
community? If yes, who and why?

When asked how the final five communities were selected to participate in this
collaboration, the fire union president of Acme indicated that “we all touch borders in
some way. They tried this once before, but it was too big and didn’t work.” The fire chief
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of Acme explained, “the five mayors got together through the Downriver Community
Conference.” The city manager of Detour stated that these five “were picked because of
their contiguous borders . . . also probably because similar services are being offered.”
The city manager in Eliseville concluded “we were doing the Information System Joint
Project and we started to discuss the Auto-Aid program that two of the cities were
implementing . . . All of these different initiatives kind of raised a new dialog about these
issues . . . partly it was the fire chiefs’ discussions and then with the auto-aid discussion
we had a kind of perfect storm.” The fire chief of Bedford Falls said “I think they were
chosen because of a geographic perspective. They share borders; it’s almost like a square
box . . . it makes sense . . . these five I think are more financially stable.” A fire
department lieutenant in Detour said “originally we talked to all of the Downriver
communities . . . but there were so many issues, part-time versus full-time . . . on-call . . .
it was just too hard.” Coletown’s fire chief attributed the selection of the five to “some
fire chiefs volunteered and others didn’t…it rather quickly narrowed down.”
The mayor of Eliseville thought it was “almost organic how we came together . . .
we border one another . . . we have very similar populations, same demographics . . . it
was a natural sort of thing. We also shared the same auditing firm (Plante-Moran, LLP)
and we had discussed these issues through them.” The city manager of Bedford Falls
asserted “these five were chosen because they were close enough together so that the
sharing of resources seemed to make sense. With our computerized police information
sharing you don’t have to be close geographically . . . but with fire you need to be close
together to effectively use the equipment.” The fire union president for Eliseville thought
“originally the whole Downriver Community Conference group of cities was looked at
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but it became apparent that it would be too complicated . . . mix of urban and rural would
be difficult.” The city council president of Eliseville believed that these five were
selected because of their “similarity in needs, structure and capabilities. They have to be
able to contribute to the joint effort. These five are all relatively solid financially and that
makes for a good partner.”
The respondents were then asked the follow-up question why the nearby cities of
Ecorse and River Rouge were not invited to join the collaboration. They are adjacent to
some of the other collaborating communities and geographically, seem to be a natural fit.
They are approximately the same size in terms of land mass and have about the same size
population as two of the other collaborating cities, but the two cities are much more
racially diverse than the other five. The City of River Rouge also has a single chief in
charge of the police and the fire departments, which is unusual in the Downriver area.
The fire union president of Acme indicated that he was told their inclusion would
make the authority too large. The fire chief of Acme was called by his counterpart in one
of those cities and specifically asked why they had not been included. He told the other
fire chief, “you better talk to your mayor” because he believed the mayors had made
those decisions. The fire chief of Bedford Falls thought that it was more a financial issue,
due to the belief that Ecorse and River Rouge are not as financially stable as the other
five cities. He then went on “I think its politics . . . there is no stability in those [fire]
departments.” The Coletown fire chief said “I think River Rouge and Ecorse could be
easily incorporated into this authority. I don’t know of any underlying issues for them not
being involved except for their financial issues and the political issues going on in those
cities.” The city manager of Detour who formerly worked for another nearby city said,
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I wish River Rouge and Ecorse had been included. I think there
may have been other reasons for why they were not involved…
they are heavily industrialized, they are older…they are mixed
race communities and I think that may have played a part in it.
I don’t know but I think it might have.

Addition of other Communities to the Group
Another follow-up question asked the respondents if there are any other cities not
currently involved in the collaboration that should be. The fire union president of Acme
indicated he would like to see the cities of Ecorse and River Rouge included because
“they are close by and it would be a bigger authority with them and they could bring
resources to the table. If they are left out they can still call on us through the Mutual Aid
Pact.”
Most of the respondents, however, seemed to think that the initial five
communities is a big enough group to start the process and others could be added later.
The fire chief of Acme said “I think with five cities it’s already a full board to handle all
of this.” Detour’s mayor said “no, I think this is the right size and the right group to get
this thing started right now. You can be too big and you can be too small . . . there is a
best size.” The mayor went on to comment generally on the polycentric nature of many
urban areas and said, “with all this proliferation of small cities in a metropolitan area,
especially of 5,000 or 10,000 . . . can the taxpayers really afford all of these
administrators and staff, chiefs, school superintendents?”
The city manager of Eliseville responded “at this point no, I wouldn’t want any
others. Group size has a lot to do with it. I don’t know what is too big or too small but
functionally, five is a workable group . . . we have modeled it for expandability so we can
add to the authority later on.” The fire union president of Eliseville agreed stating “no,
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the idea was to start small and to work from there.” Arguing a contrary approach, the
Bedford Falls city manager believed “yes, any city that borders our authority I think . . .
we would all be better off with a larger group.”

Explicit Selection Criteria
It is clear from their responses that deciding who is a good potential partner for
collaboration involves logistical considerations, the similarities or dissimilarities in
community make-up and financial issues. The interviewees were asked whether
participation in the fire authority was open to all interested local governments or if
selection criteria were employed to choose or limit participants. While many of the
respondents seemed not to fully understand how these five communities were selected for
participation, other responses indicated that it was the financial considerations that played
the largest part in deciding which communities were included. Also, to a certain extent,
some respondents thought that the five communities were simply the coalition of the
willing. Other respondents believed that the cities of River Rouge and Ecorse would
make good partners in the DFA collaboration as well. At least one of the respondents
indicated that there may have been underlying issues that prevented those two racially
mixed communities from participating in the effort.
Interestingly, the responses to that particular question showed differences between
the opinions of elected and appointed officials. Most of the elected officials seemed to
think that the initial five collaborating communities were enough, at least to start with.
However, many of the fire chiefs, command officers, and union officials thought that
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other nearby communities such as Dearborn, Dearborn Heights, Taylor, Riverview and
Trenton would have been good partners to include in that initial group.
When asked to consider what makes the current participants good partners for
their community, the Acme city council president said that it was “nearness . . . size of
the community . . . having shared interests with us.” The fire union president for Acme
said that what made them good partners was the “working relationships that we already
have . . . Mutual Aid with all of them and Auto-Aid with one of the others.”
The mayor of Detour said it was the “commonality of quality of life, services, and
people . . . common social and economic makeup of these cities.” The city manager of
Detour said it was the fact that “the mayors have worked well together in the past and the
city administrators too.” The city manager of Eliseville made a particularly interesting
observation responding, “proximity . . . similar characteristics as far as density,
population grouping . . . the pure happenstance of current fire station locations. If you
looked at this whole 30 square miles and tried to figure our where to drop the five fire
stations they are already pretty much where you would want them to be.”
The fire chief of Eliseville said that the important factors were “adjacent
geography, first and foremost . . . they’re all mature communities . . . similar services
being offered . . . training levels/types are similar . . . we have a lot of knowledge of one
another because of Mutual Aid . . . we’ve fought fires in each others communities
already.” The fire union president in Eliseville pointed out that all five cities and fire
departments “are structured the same way…all mayor and city council, all full-time fire
personnel.”
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Characteristics of Bad Partners
The respondents were also asked if any Downriver jurisdictions would be a bad
partner for their community. The city manager of Detour said that yes, “any community
that has a volunteer or part-time department might not be a good partner. Then you’re
talking different wages, different personnel . . . also a city that is too much larger than the
others might try to dominate the authority.” The city manager of Eliseville said “a city
that was not contiguous to us would not be a good partner . . . how do you jump over the
community in between . . . logistics would be difficult.” The city manager of Bedford
Falls pointed out that the nearby Township of Grosse Ile would be difficult to incorporate
into the authority because it is an island. “it’s isolated you know . . . how would you
handle getting equipment across the bridge…what if one of the two bridges was out like
one of them is right now.” An Eliseville city council member pointed out that a city
might not be a good partner “because of their lack of financial resources.”
Figure 6.3: Characteristics of the Partners Selected Most Often Mentioned.
Good partners for us would be cities with
Similar Demographic Characteristics to ours
Geographic Proximity to us
Same Governmental Structure as ours
Good Previous Collaboration with us
Financial Ability to Participate Effectively
Shared Borders with us

Percentage of Respondents
Mentioning this Factor

45%
40%
35%
30%
20%
20%

Their responses indicate that it is very important to the participants in the DFA
collaboration that the participating communities be geographically contiguous. All five
communities share borders with one another and are very similar in terms of size,
population, type of fires, equipment and training. Their responses also reveal that it is
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important to these officials that the included cities have cooperated on fire and other
public services over a long period of time. This finding is consistent with the conclusions
drawn from the research of Bingham (1981) and Post (2002). When asked what factors
might make a community a bad partner, the respondents again indicated that geography
played a central role. The logistics of crossing through non-partner communities to get to
partner communities would prove problematic. According to these respondents, mixing
full-time with part-time or volunteer personnel would also make it difficult to effectively
collaborate on fire services.

Table 6.16:
Affect of Past Collaboration Experiences
D-3 (e)

How are your perceptions about these actual and potential partners affected by past
interactions? Please explain with an example or two.

The final question asked regarding this topic was how the respondents’
perceptions about these actual and potential partners are affected by past interactions. The
fire union president of Acme said that he had a positive view of surrounding cities
because “we have worked in other cities over time, we’ve had a good relationship and
good communications.” The fire chief of Bedford Falls said “I’ve had good positive
interactions in the past . . . we all get along well, we use Mutual Aid . . . fires bring fire
fighters together; we all attack the beast and put the fire out.” The fire chief of Coletown
stated that “we have a long history through Mutual Aid . . . we have a fairly good
relationship with them.”
The mayor of Coletown said “my experience with the other mayors over a long
time has been very good. If not, I would have been a lot more cautious . . . I would have
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preferred to merely enhance our current Mutual Aid Agreement rather than go through all
of this to create an authority.” The fire chief of Eliseville stated that he had positive
experiences over the years with other fire departments . . . “in the fire services you don’t
come in here being trusted . . . you have to earn that trust and earn that respect.”
An Eliseville city council member said he had “long standing relationships with
surrounding cities relative to the provision of parks and recreation services. They were
good relationships so because of that I was looking forward to working with them on this
fire authority . . . I think we could collaborate on a variety of other services like
engineering, site plan review, building inspectors.” The city council president of
Eliseville said “we’ve had some good experiences working through the Downriver
Community Conference. Mutual Aid has worked well, DRANO [an area-wide antinarcotics working group] has been a positive experience.”

Table 6.17:
Current Collaboration and the importance of Public Opinion
D-4

D-5

Does your city already cooperate on any of the services that will be provided through the fire
authority? If yes, could you talk about specific services, which of the Downriver cities are
involved and the nature of the cooperative arrangement with the city?
What has been the public reaction in your community to this effort?

Existing Collaboration of these Services
When asked if they already collaborated to a certain extent on some of the same
services with their DFA partners, respondents indicated that a considerable level of
collaboration already exists in the provision of fire services. When asked if they already
collaborate on the services that would be a part of the DFA collaboration, the fire chief of
Acme stated that his city already collaborated to a lesser extent with many of their
partners and other communities through their participation in the Mutual Aid Agreement.
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He also indicated that they had even enhanced that system with one of their neighboring
partners by instituting an automatic-aid system between their two fire departments. The
city manager of Detour said “yes, through Downriver Mutual Aid we already share a lot,
most of these services.”
Indicating a slightly different position, the city manager of Eliseville added “we
share legislative concerns through the Michigan Municipal League . . . we are all in the
same MML risk pool for insurance . . . we are all in Wayne County so we have
mandatory cooperation on sewers . . . we all use the same land fill . . . there are a lot of
things we already collaborate on.” The fire chief of Coletown noted that although they
were already collaborating on most of the services the authority would provide, “with a
bigger department we could have specialized training . . . we could have real ladder
companies, more rescue units . . . it would give our guys more opportunities to specialize
in various areas.” The mayor of Eliseville stated that “we have a long and rich history of
cooperation.” Coletown’s mayor stated while they already collaborate on many of the
same fire services, he hoped to achieve through the new fire authority “the purchase of
equipment, standardization of equipment is what we are trying to enhance. We don’t have
that through Mutual Aid now and it would have some real value and savings.”
The responses to this question indicate that the participants have enjoyed good
working relationships with surrounding jurisdictions on a variety of services. That
experience has favorably inclined them to consider the DFA collaboration on fire
services. This is consistent with previous work (e.g., Bingham 1981 and Post 2002) that
repeated contacts between local governments that have been successful and increased
levels of trust between the actors made increased levels of collaboration easier. If their
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previous attempts had not been successful, many of the respondents indicated they would
have been much more cautious in undertaking this effort. Specifically, many of them
mentioned that their cooperation through the DCC Mutual Aid System has been a very
beneficial experience and has led them to consider enhancing that system and/or
undertaking the DFA authority.

Public Reaction to Proposed Authority
When asked to describe the public reaction in their community to this specific
effort at collaboration, most of the respondents indicated that the public was uninformed
or generally opposed to efforts to collaborate with neighboring jurisdictions. The Acme
fire union president said “they have a lot of questions that we can’t answer . . . there are
still a lot of unknowns and we are taking baby steps.” The fire chief of Acme said that
public reaction was “kind of negative at first, but when we explain that service should
actually improve, they kind of like that idea.” The mayor of Detour responded that “we
went through a fear period . . . but since then it’s been a wait and see . . . political leaders
need to do a better job of educating the public about what is going on.”
The fire chief of Bedford Falls stated “some citizens are guardedly pessimistic . . .
I have not gotten any positive feedback on this effort from our citizens at all.” The fire
chief in Coletown said that “a lot of them are suspicious . . . our city has a long history of
being self-sufficient . . . we have our own hospital, our own water, power, cable and have
had them for a long time . . . this is going to be hard for us to sell to the citizens because
of that sense of identity, separate identity.” The captain of the Coletown Fire Department
said “our citizens want to keep OUR (emphasis is respondents) fire department.”

203
Expressing a much different point of view, the Bedford Falls city manager said that he
does not “think that citizens really care . . . they want the services provided, that’s all.”
The fire chief in Eliseville said that he had gotten mixed reviews “probably 50-50 for and
against this thing.” The Eliseville city council president said “as long as it saves money
and provides a good service then I think our people are favorable toward this idea.”
Most of the respondents indicated that there was not a great deal of public support
for the DFA collaboration effort among the citizens of their communities. Several of the
respondents did not think that the public was very well informed about their efforts yet
and needed to be educated about what is being attempted. At least one respondent
indicated that elected officials need to do a better job of educating the public about this
activity.
The responses to this question revealed some differences in the answers,
depending upon whether the respondent was an elected or an administrative official.
Most of the elected officials indicated that they needed to do a better job of educating
their citizens, of making them more aware of the specifics. They expressed the belief that
with better understanding, the public would be more accepting of the concept of joint
service provision. In contrast, the majority of the fire administrative officials indicated
that the public is strongly opposed to the DFA collaboration or at the very least, fearful
about what it means for their community. Two of the fire officials indicated that their
citizens are very protective of their fire department personnel and would probably be
opposed to the collaboration.
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Summary Analysis of Open-Ended Questions
The responses to these questions make it clear that in the opinion of these
respondents, trust is an important to very important factor in the decision to collaborate.
Not only must trust among the cities exist, but there must also be trust within each city
between the elected officials and the employees.
The respondents had several different definitions of trust such as “doing what you
say you’re going to do”, and “not saying one thing in meetings with your partners and
then going back to your own city and saying something else.” One city manager indicated
that trust comes in time, from “doing your own share of the heavy lifting” in
collaboration and is something that must be constantly reevaluated. Trust can be damaged
as well. A few respondents mentioned that elected officials grand-standing for their home
crowd damaged this effort. One command officer stated that having the Auto-Aid system
forced upon them after losing a court fight damaged this collaboration.7
Respondents were asked how these five cities were selected to be partners in this
effort. Most of the respondents thought that involving all twenty Downriver communities
would have been an obstacle to collaboration. Several of the respondents indicated that
these five were selected because they are close geographically, very similar and
financially stable enough to undertake this effort.
The respondents were asked about the affect of past collaboration on this effort.
Almost every one of the interviewees indicated that having good past collaboration
experiences make them more willing to attempt this effort. Had they not had good
experiences already, they would be reluctant to try anything new.

7

The Auto-Aid system was an agreement between two of the five cities to work more closely and respond
immediately to fires in each others city.
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Finally, the respondents were asked if they were already collaborating on most of
the services being proposed for the authority. While they admit that they are already
collaborating on these services, most respondents indicate that they believed they had
accomplished as much as they could under the current service arrangement and needed to
undertake the authority to maintain or improve the quality of services.
The next chapter examines the differences in the roles played in collaboration
efforts by elected and administrative officials. Elected and administrative officials play
different roles, but they are complimentary in many ways and both have an important role
in making collaboration work.
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Interview

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Mean
STD
DEV

a
4
5
10
4
5
3
9
2
8
4
3
2
3
1
6
5
9
2
4
3
4.6
2.58

Table 6.18:
Perceptions of Partners in the Collaboration
All Respondents
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
i
4
3
5
5
5
4
6
6
7
9
5
10
10
10
10
10
8
8
9
8
10
8
10
9
5
5
5
8
10
6
5
9
1
8
8
10
10
8
10
10
6
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
7
9
8
9
9
6
6
7
2
6
8
9
10
8
5
8
5
5
9
8
8
8
10
10
4
4
6
6
8
8
7
7
4
3
2
8
10
3
6
9
1
1
2
2
8
6
6
7
2
2
2
2
2
2
8
8
5
6
5
5
8
9
9
9
1
2
2
8
8
3
5
9
5
5
3
5
8
3
8
8
3
9
9
9
10
10
10
10
2
1
2
9
9
7
10
10
5
8
9
9
9
7
7
9
9
3
3
10
10
9
7
5
4.3 5.25 5.5 7.4
8.5 6.65 7.65 8.4
2.36 2.79 2.8 2.44 1.99 2.46 1.9 1.43

Scale: 1=Not Important at All

j
6
8
9
7
9
7
7
5
5
4
5
5
2
8
2
5
10
2
9
5
6
2.43

k
6
10
9
9
9
8
8
9
10
5
8
5
2
8
3
7
10
7
9
9
7.55
2.28

l
4
10
9
9
9
9
9
10
10
7
8
5
2
9
9
7
10
9
9
9
8.15
2.16

10=Critically Important

Table 6.19:
Perceptions of Partners in the Collaboration
Grouped by City

a
b

Detour

Eliseville

Acme

Bedford
Falls

Coletown

MEAN

STDEV

Interview Question

N=5

N=6

N=3

N=2

N=4

N=20

N=20

6.33

4.00

6.33

6.00

4.00

5.33

1.22

6.33

5.00

6.33

4.50

3.25

5.08

1.31

6.67

4.83

6.67

5.50

5.00

5.73

0.89

7.00

4.50

7.00

5.00

5.50

5.80

1.15

8.00

8.00

8.00

5.50

5.50

7.00

1.37

8.33

8.83

8.33

5.50

8.50

7.90

1.36

7.33

5.50

7.33

4.00

8.25

6.48

1.71

8.67

6.83

8.67

7.00

8.00

7.83

0.88

8.33

8.00

8.33

7.50

8.25

8.08

0.35

7.67

5.50

7.67

4.50

6.75

6.42

1.39

8.33

7.33

8.33

5.00

7.00

7.17

1.57

7.67

8.50

7.67

5.50

7.75

7.42

1.13

Communities we do not directly compete with for residents and
development.

d

Similar to our community in terms of wealth and racial composition.
Similar to our community in terms of governmental structure (i.e.) either
both council-manager or both mayor-council systems.
Similar to our community in terms of powers (i.e.) both cities or both
townships.

e

Able to provide similar levels of resources to the effort.

f

Seeking the same benefits of this collaboration as we are.

g

Communities that have successfully collaborated with us in the past.

h

Communities whose elected officials are in frequent contact with ours.
Communities whose senior administrators are in frequent contact with
ours.
Communities that have similar land uses to ours (i.e., mostly
residential).
Communities that have similar service requirements to ours (i.e., nonindustrial).

c

i
j
k

l Communities that have equipment and training similar to ours
Scale: 1=Not Important at All

10=Critically Important
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Our local government partners should be…

Table 6.20:
Perceptions of Partners in the Collaboration
Grouped by Role

a
b
c

Our local government partners should be…

Mayor

Interview Question
Communities we do not directly compete with for residents and
development.
Similar to our community in terms of wealth and racial composition.

f

Seeking the same benefits of this collaboration as we are.

g

Communities that have successfully collaborated with us in the past.

h

Communities whose elected officials are in frequent contact with ours.

i

Communities whose senior administrators are in frequent contact with
ours.
Communities that have similar land uses to ours (i.e., mostly
residential).
Communities that have similar service requirements to ours (i.e., nonindustrial).
Communities that have equipment and training similar to ours.

d

j
k
l

1=Not Important At All

Fire
Chief
N=5

Fire
Fighter
N=5

STDEV

N=20

N=20

2.50

3.67

3.67

6.20

5.80

4.37

1.57

4.00

6.00

3.00

4.40

4.20

4.32

1.08

3.75

4.67

6.00

5.80

5.80

5.20

0.97

3.50

5.67

6.00

6.60

5.60

5.47

1.17

7.50

8.00

6.67

8.00

6.80

7.39

0.64

9.25

8.00

6.67

9.00

8.80

8.34

1.05

6.25

6.67

6.00

6.60

7.40

6.58

0.53

7.50

6.67

8.67

6.60

8.80

7.65

1.05

9.25

6.67

8.67

8.00

9.00

8.32

1.03

5.50

6.67

6.00

5.40

6.60

6.03

0.59

8.00

8.00

6.33

6.80

8.40

7.51

0.89

8.75

7.33

6.67

8.80

8.40

7.99

0.95

10=Critically Important
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e

Similar to our community in terms of governmental structure (i.e.) either
both council-manager or both mayor-council systems.
Similar to our community in terms of powers (i.e., both cities or both
townships).
Able to provide similar levels of resources to the effort.

City
Manager
N=3

MEAN

N=4

City
Council
N=3
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CHAPTER 7
DIFFERENCES IN THE ROLES PLAYED BY ELECTED
AND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS

Frederickson contends that modern public administration has developed techniques
to deal with the problems associated with what he calls the fragmented and disarticulated
state. Much of the existing literature on interlocal collaboration examines and emphasizes
the role played by administrative officials. Elected officials are usually described as having
a narrow or more parochial view of interlocal issues, but administrative officials, because
of their training and participation in professional organizations, are thought to have a
broader or more metropolitan view. H. George Frederickson argued that “there are few
incentives for elected officials to spend much energy or political capital in the interests of
non-constituents who cannot vote for them” (Frederickson 1999, p. 710). According to this
line of reasoning, while elected officials are more concerned with jurisdictionally based
issues, their administrative counterparts are engaged in networks to solve various
intergovernmental problems (Frederickson 1999).
The one major exception to this approach is Eric Zeemering’s case analysis of
interlocal cooperation in western Michigan. Contrary to Frederickson’s predictions,
Zeemering (2007) shows distinct differences in the roles played by elected and appointed
officials engaged in collaboration activity. Zeemering’s research showed the elected
officials interviewed had a clear understanding of their roles and that the involvement of
elected officials is “rarely assessed in current inter-local cooperation research . . . elected
officials are attentive to the terms of collaboration and the economic implications of
service sharing for their jurisdictions” (Zeemering 2007, p. 331).
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The importance of administrators, often city managers, in the use of external
service delivery arrangements has been examined in many studies. For instance, Morgan
and Hirlinger (1991) found that the presence of a professional administrator was associated
with greater levels of intergovernmental contracting. This general finding is also supported
by Brown and Potoski (2003), Carr and LeRoux (2005) and Zeemering (2007). This
research tends to equate the lack of a city manager with an absence of incentives to adopt
external service production arrangements, including collaborative arrangements with other
governments.
Zeemering shifted attention back to the role that elected officials play in these
issues. This is an important shift, because elected officials are key actors in local
governments. Their role in these issues must be fully understood. Elected officials must
give the final approval to any decision to collaborate inter-jurisdictionally. Elected officials
play an important part in making our democracy work at the local level, indeed at every
level of American federalism. Obtaining public approval and support of collaboration
activities may be desirable but not always possible. As Lyons, Lowery and DeHoog (1992)
have argued, local citizens do not always demonstrate a thorough understanding of or
appreciation for how public goods and services are produced and provided. The national
government has been trying since the Great Society days of the 1960s to foster, at the city
level, greater citizen involvement in the decision-making process of policies and programs
affecting them. Those efforts have provided mixed results.
The American governmental system is a representative democracy. Encouraging
citizen involvement and approval of government actions is important. Yet, in a modern
metropolitan area, obtaining that involvement can be problematic. In one sense, elected
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officials provide a channel through which such citizen involvement is achieved. “In a
representative democracy, our attention should turn to the role of local elected officials,
serving as intermediaries for citizens in the negotiation of intergovernmental service
arrangements” (Zeemering 2007, p. 22). Elected officials can serve to articulate the
preferences of their residents because “elected officials enter into intergovernmental
discussions as direct representatives of citizens, but also as representatives of a government
with authority and responsibilities for its citizens” (Zeemering 2007, p. 23).
This chapter builds on Zeemering’s work by uncovering the different roles played
by the elected and administrative actors in planning, negotiating and facilitating the DFA
collaboration. As seen in previous chapters, elected and administrative actors in
collaboration think differently about the relevant issues in some respects. Question B-1(j)
in Chapter Four asks for the interviewee’s perception of whether they thought their
residents placed more value on protecting the city’s control over public services than on
lowering the costs of those services. City council members averaged the lowest group
response at (5.00) and fire fighters registered the highest group response at (6.80).
Question C-1(a) in Chapter Five asks the respondents how important it is that their
city save money in the first three to five years. Elected officials had much higher
expectations of saving money through this collaboration than the administrative officials.
Question C-1(b) asks how important it is that the city save money after the first five years.
Elected officials registered a mean response of (9.00) to that question while administrative
officials (fire chiefs 7.80 and city managers 7.67) had lower expectations for savings.
Question D-1(a) in Chapter Six asks how important it is that collaborating cities not
directly compete with one another for residents and economic development. Fire chiefs
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(6.20) and fire fighters (5.80) gave the highest group responses. City council members
(3.67), mayors (2.50) and city managers (3.67) consider that issue as less important.
Question D-1(b) asks how important it is that collaborating partner cities be similar to one
another in terms of wealth and racial composition. City council members
(6.00) and city managers (3.00) perceive the issue much differently. Question D-1(c) asks
how important it is that collaborating partners have similar governmental structures. The
mayors (3.75) and city managers (6.00) perceive that issue much differently.

Roles of Elected and Administrative Officials: Responses to Open-Ended Questions
Elected officials and administrative officials in this study tend to view the issues in
collaboration differently. A series of open-ended questions were asked of elected and
administrative officials to gain a better understanding of the role of regular contact among
collaboration partners and the role networks play in collaboration efforts. These questions
are designed to also reveal what kinds of activities officials engage in, whether other
options were considered, what is the most difficult aspect of pursuing collaboration, and
the official’s biggest concerns about this effort.
This dissertation uses a case study and qualitative data to test theory and achieve a
better understanding of the role that both elected and administrative officials play in the
development of collaborative activities. These questions also provide insights into the role
of elected and administrative officials and the important activities of, and influences upon,
each. Tables are interspersed throughout the chapter to make it easier for the reader to refer
to the question being asked.
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This chapter reads differently than the previous empirical chapters as scaled
questions were used. A series of open-ended narrative questions are used to delve the
perceptions of these respondents and gain a better understanding of the roles played by
elected and administrative officials in this DFA collaboration.

Table 7.1:
Regular Contact, General Cooperation and the Perceptions of Officials
E-1 (a)
E-2
E-3

Do you talk with officials from other local governments on a regular basis? If so, how often
would you say you do in a typical week? Month? Or year?
Do you think local governments in this area work together on public policy/public service quite
a bit? some? or not much at all?
Assuming there is no right or wrong way to do so, do you think administrative officials and
elected officials think about the issue(s) of collaboration in the same way or differently? If
differently, what might account for any differences between them?

Attitudes toward Interlocal Issues
In an effort to better understand the frequency and importance of networking
among collaboration partners, the respondents were asked if they talked with officials from
other local governments on a regular basis (question E-1a). The Acme fire union president
indicated “pretty regular contact with my counterparts in other cities.” All five fire chiefs
stated that they had regular contact with their counterparts at least monthly and often
weekly. The elected officials interviewed responded that they have regular contact with
each other, ranging from a high of weekly contact to a low of contact at least once a month.
When asked what form these regular contacts took, the administrative official
respondents noted that they spoke with one another on the telephone, most of them
regularly sent email messages to one another and met regularly at meetings of the
Downriver Fire Chiefs Association, City Managers Association or at monthly union
meetings of the fire fighters locals. The elected officials indicated that they had regular
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contact through the DCC, the Michigan Municipal League and less formal social
gatherings in the area, but do not have the same frequent contact with their counterparts
that administrative officials do. Contact among administrative officials tended to be less
social and more substantive or work-related. When asked if they consider this regular
contact important, the majority of the respondents thought that this regular contact was a
significant contributing factor to this collaboration.
When asked if, in their opinion, the local governments in their area cooperated
quite a bit, some or not much at all (question E-2), the respondents answered
overwhelmingly some or not much at all. The responses of the elected and the
administrative officials tended to be somewhat different. The administrative officials
indicated that they regularly discuss and cooperate on the development of fire-related
policy. The elected officials indicated that they did not discuss or cooperate on policy
development to any real extent. Any discussions relating to policy was reportedly during
DCC meetings but otherwise was conducted on a strictly informal basis, often at social or
political gatherings.
When asked if elected and administrative officials think the same way about the
issues involved in collaboration and if differently, what might account for that (question E3), the Acme city council president said she believed elected and administrative officials
thought “differently. The administrators consult one another.” The Acme fire union
president believed they think “differently . . . I think they have different time frames . . .
elected officials have to work in the here and now and other people [administrative
officials] have to plan twenty years down the road.” The Acme fire chief said “elected
officials are more concerned with the money being paid . . . administrators have to be
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concerned with how to make it work.” The city manager in Eliseville said “I think
administrators think more on the mechanics, nuts and bolts of costs savings . . . the elected
official is more concerned with the political ramifications, how this will affect my political
base.”
A fire lieutenant in the Detour Fire Department said “elected officials are thinking
about their legacy, their reelection.” The Coletown fire chief stated “differently I think,
elected officials are looking at the financial end of things . . . administrative officials like
myself are more concerned with the day-to-day operations of making this thing work
properly.” The mayor of Eliseville concluded that they “think differently . . . their
motivations are different . . . administrators should be looking for efficiency and
effectiveness . . . elected officials sometimes have other motivations, I think.” A fire
captain in the Coletown Fire Department said that they are remarkably different, “elected
officials are more focused on the budget, battles won and battles lost. Appointed officials
like me have to be more practical in their approach . . . we all have to win with this
collaboration . . . I think some elected officials want a win and that mentality is not going
to work here.”
The four respondents who have worked as elected and administrative officials over
the course of their careers provided interesting insight on this issue. The mayor of Detour
was previously a city manager for over thirty years. He said that “we think the same way . .
. when I was a city manager the mayor and I thought in pretty much the same ways.” The
city manager in Bedford Falls was previously the mayor in another city. He said “I think
that they see it differently. Administrators think in terms of efficiency but elected officials
don’t want to anger the electorate.” The newly elected mayor of Detour, who previously
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worked as an administrator for many years at the County Sheriffs Department and then in
administration in the same County said that he believed they thought “similarly . . . cost
factors are important to both of us.” Finally, an Eliseville city council member who had
worked for over thirty years as a city administrator, said “I’ve been on both sides . . . I see
a bigger picture now that I’m an elected official. I think we need to have better
communication and understanding between elected and administrative officials on these
issues.”
These responses suggest that the majority of elected and administrative officials
involved in this joint effort do think differently about the issues involved in collaborating
on these services. When asked if they thought elected and administrative officials think
about the issues of collaboration in the same way, both elected and administrative officials
overwhelmingly concluded that they think differently. Generally, both groups indicated
that elected officials have to be worried more about the budget, public reaction and the
political consequences. The consensus was that administrative officials are generally more
focused on the day-to-day operations of the fire service, making things work smoothly and
properly. Some administrative officials expressed concern that some elected officials were
more interested in a “win” rather than on ensuring the collaboration was organized and
operated in the best interest of the public.
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Table 7.2:
The Importance of Area Networks
E-4

E-5

E-6
E-7

In your opinion, was there any formal or informal network or group of persons, cities or agencies
that were instrumental to the start-up of this collaboration? If yes, please explain how it started and
why it matters to this collaboration effort.
Obviously you’re employed by this community and your work is designed to improve the
conditions of this community. That being said, do you think your work should have any broader
implications or benefits for the larger metropolitan community?
Whether or not you belong to them, are there any professional organizations or local networking
groups that have been important to this effort?
Do you think that an officials participation in the Michigan Municipal League, the International
County-City Management Association, the National League of Cities and other similar
organizations or having professional training or a college degree in administration (i.e. MPA of
MBA) influences how or even if an official might approach the issue of interlocal collaboration? If
yes, how?

Effects of Local Area Networks on Collaboration
Previous research emphasized the importance of area networks of local government
officials. Research by LeRoux (2007) showed that community conferences in the
Metropolitan Detroit area played an important role in encouraging the formation of
networks among the local government officials of nineteen separate governments.
Thurmaier and Wood (2002) concluded that regional organizations like the Kansas City
Metropolitan Area’s Mid-America Regional Council (MARC) may foster collaboration
among jurisdictions in their area. The respondents were asked several questions to
illustrate the role of professional networks in this collaboration.
The communities involved in this DFA collaboration have cooperated through a
system of mutual aid to deliver public safety services for many years. The respondents’
answers indicate that these communities, and most especially the staff at the five fire
departments, have come to trust one another and depend on one another to a considerable
extent. “Interlocal agreements are more likely the products of positively connected
exchange relationships facilitated by a regional norm of reciprocity and a brokering role
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that synergistically augments local resources into the provision of effective government
services in a metropolitan area” (Thurmaier and Wood 2002, p. 590).
When asked about the presence of formal or informal networks or groups of people
instrumental to the start-up of this collaboration, the respondents repeatedly mentioned the
importance of organizations facilitating the development of local networks. Over half of
the respondents mentioned the DCC as being important to their efforts, especially early on.
The Acme city council president said that “the Downriver Community Conference was one
agency that contributed strongly.” The mayor of Eliseville stated “the Downriver
Community Conference has been instrumental.” Other groups important to the
development of this collaboration were the Downriver Fire Chiefs Association, the
network of local fire fighters unions and the long-standing informal relationships that had
developed among the mayors of these communities.
This research also examined the views of these elected and administrative officials
about how important their work is to neighboring cities. Asked if their work should have
significance beyond the community in which they are employed, the vast majority of the
respondents indicated that they believe their work should have benefits for communities
beyond their employing jurisdiction.
The Acme fire union president stated “yes, I think more fire fighters working . . .
you have better safety in numbers . . . you can provide a better service . . . I think my work
definitely benefits the surrounding communities.” The mayor of Detour said “our quality
of service depends a lot on the whole area . . . if we can improve our lot by helping
Eliseville, then we are better off . . . you never lose your next door neighbor without
hurting yourself . . . we are still neighbors.” The mayor of Coletown said, “I’m a great
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believer that what happens in the city next door is important to my city . . . our people live
in one city, work in another, play ball somewhere else . . . we intermingle to a great extent .
. . we are all concerned about one another’s city.”
The city manager of Detour said “my major efforts are in Detour, but I also think
my efforts should benefit the entire Downriver area . . . Times are telling economically . . .
wherever I go I try to promote the region . . . we all have the same issues, just in different
degrees.” The city manager of Eliseville said “yes, I think state planning laws now say
you have to notify your neighbors on issues . . . none of us is
an island anymore, we all affect each other . . . we have to consider how this is going to
work in the region.” The mayor of Eliseville stated “Yes, absolutely. You would have to be
a fool to believe that you can contain your actions within your borders . . . again, these
artificial borders, these lines drawn on a map mean nothing to developers or people
looking for a new home.” The mayor went on to speculate about area development, “a new
plant is going to potentially involve pollution coming into my city . . . I think you always
have to be thinking in a broader context.”
Overall, the administrative officials interviewed appeared consistent in the opinion
that their work had impact beyond their own city. However, one exception to this view was
expressed by the newly elected mayor of Detour. He stated “I serve the citizens of this city
. . . higher levels of government can worry about the larger area . . . the County Executive
looks out for the County, the Governor watches out for the state.”
With very few exceptions, the respondents indicated that their work, while
primarily benefiting their own community, should and does have significance for the
surrounding area. Responses to this question reinforce the idea that the tightly-packed
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communities making up this regional area are interdependent and that what each
community does has an impact on it’s neighbors. This data shows once again that
metropolitan area elected and administrative officials express a belief that the artificial
boundaries drawn on a city map do not accurately capture the essence of how these regions
are actually organized and how they operate on a daily basis.
When asked if there are any professional organizations or local networks important
to this collaboration effort, the respondents were almost unanimous in their response. The
city council president of Acme said the “Michigan Municipal League has been an
important tool for our city and others to discuss collaboration.” The DCC, the Michigan
City Manager Association, the Michigan Association of Mayors, the Southeast Michigan
Council of Governments, the Michigan Municipal Finance Officer Association, the
Michigan Fire Fighter Association, the Michigan Suburbs Alliance, the International Fire
Fighter Association along with the Downriver Fire Chief Association were all mentioned
as organizations that promoted collaboration generally or facilitated networks critical to the
collaboration.
Figure 7.1: Networks Mentioned as Valuable in Facilitating this Collaboration.
Networks

Percentage of Respondents
Mentioning this Network

Downriver Community Conference
Downriver City Managers Association
Downriver Fire Chiefs Association
Michigan Suburbs Alliance
Michigan Municipal League
Southeast Michigan Council of Governments
International Association of Fire Fighters Locals

55%
35%
30%
20%
15%
15%
5%
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Several respondents indicated that one or more of these organizations provided
white papers, model formats and model agreements that were useful in getting their
collaboration started. Many of the respondents also indicated that the issues surrounding
collaboration had been a topic of conversation within these networks for some time and
that those conversations had helped prepare them for this activity.
It is clear from this data that these participants have a strong perception that
networks of professional organizations do have a positive influence on this potential
collaboration by fostering conversation and debate about the topic and by developing
model agreements used to organize collaborative activity.
When asked whether they thought that certain kinds of professional education or
participation in certain professional organizations might influence how they approach this
issue (question E-7), the consensus was that education, particularly a Bachelors or Masters
degree in Public Administration (MPA) or a Bachelors/Masters degree in Business
Administration (MBA), changed the way they did their job and how they viewed issues
like collaboration. A sergeant at the Coletown Fire Department indicated that “yes,
education plays a significant role . . . I have a B.A. in Business Administration and it
clearly influences how I approach these issues. I think it makes you more realistic, you’re
exposed to more.” The city manager in Eliseville stated “it’s that common platform they
are working from on similar programs and topics . . . I have an MPA and it changes how
you look at issues.”
Most of the respondents also said that participation in professional organizations
such as the Michigan Municipal League, the International City-County Management
Association and other similar organizations influenced how collaboration was discussed
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and undertaken. The fire chief in Coletown said “absolutely, in professional organizations
we meet and discuss these issues all the time . . . we have a common education/training/life
experiences that definitely impact our approach to how we do these things.” The mayor of
Eliseville stated “I think that this kind of progressive idea of collaboration is advanced by
these kinds of professional organizations.” The Bedford Falls city manager concluded that
“participation in the Michigan Municipal League helps . . . you get a broader perspective
by talking to people from other cities . . . you develop a broader network . . . you tend to be
less parochial in your views.” The city council president of Eliseville said that “through
those connections and the experience they offer . . . you have the ability to look at things
from different viewpoints.”
The responses to this question indicate that having an education in specific areas
and participation in professional organizations which promote the concept of collaboration
can have a significant affect on how these issues are perceived and acted upon.
Professional organizations provide a forum or platform where these issues can be
developed and refined before they are put into practice.

The Importance of Political Constituency in Supporting Collaboration
The next set of questions focuses on the importance of political constituencies in
favor of collaboration and how such a supportive constituency can be created. These
questions also examine the respondents’ perception of who works hardest, elected or
administrative officials, to facilitate collaboration.
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Table 7.3:
Political Constituencies & the Activities of Elected & Administrative Officials
E-8
E-9
E-10
E-11

Is it important to have a political constituency for cooperation? Do you think administrators play
a role in creating one?
Thinking in terms of the overall effort to establish this collaboration, what percentage has been
driven by administrative officials and what percentage has been driven by elected officials?
What kind of activities can elected officials engage in to accomplish this kind of collaboration?
What kinds of activities can administrative officials engage in to accomplish this kind of
collaboration?

When asked if it is important to have a political constituency support a
collaborative activity (question E-8), the fire chief of Acme said “yes it was important to
have the people on board, to have them understand.” The mayor of Detour said that “it’s
important, but even without it I would still pursue it . . . if they’re against it maybe I
haven’t explained it well enough . . . they can always vote me out of office, but I’m not
going to change my standards for political reasons.” The city manager in Eliseville, who
others describe as a driving force in the DFA collaborative, said “I don’t think there is one
. . . individual officials may be for or against it but I don’t think it’s critical to have one
before you proceed.”
The fire chief of Detour stated that “if the citizens were strongly against it, were
negative about it, we would not be involved in this collaboration.” The mayor of Eliseville
said that “yes, a political constituency is helpful.” The Bedford Falls city manager said
“yes I do, I think you have to have it.” He went on to explain that since this happens
through a political process it was most important from his perspective to have a “city
council that will approve it.” The mayor of Coletown said “yes, to a certain extent I think
it’s important.” An Eliseville city council member said “yes, it is overall eventually, but it
is not a critical issue before starting something like this.” The Eliseville city council
president concluded “no I don’t…we could do it without that support if we had to.”
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Although most respondents agree that it is good to have public support, there is not
a clear consensus on this. Many respondents indicated that they would go forward without
such constituency support if they believed it was in the best interest of the community.
When asked what percentage of the initial work to establish the collaboration was
conducted by administrative personnel and what percentage by elected officials (question
E-9), the responses appear to depend on the role of that respondent in the organization.
Although there were exceptions, administrative personnel generally responded that 50 to
80 percent of the overall effort was accomplished by the administrative personnel working
on the collaboration and that less than 50 percent generally was contributed by the elected
officials. Elected officials generally reported that they thought that 50 to 80 percent of the
initial effort was attributable to the elected officials involved in the collaboration and 50
percent or less was attributable to the administrative personnel. The exception to this
pattern is seen in the responses of the fire chiefs who universally indicated that 60 to 100
percent is attributable to the activities of the elected officials.
When asked what kinds of activities elected officials could engage in to better
facilitate this collaboration (question E-10), a dominant theme mentioned was educating
the public about the benefits of collaboration. The Acme city council president stated that
they could “educate the people.” The mayor of Detour said that they could “help in the
education of administrative personnel and citizens.” The city manager of Detour mentioned
that “they need to guide the overall policy effort.” The Eliseville city manager said that
they could help “by maintaining a positive role in the effort . . . they can give
encouragement to the administrators and let them know that it’s important and a part of
their regular duties.” The fire chiefs of Detour and Eliseville both said they “should
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educate the public about the benefits of this collaboration.” The mayor of Eliseville noted
that elected officials should “stay informed, stay focused on the end, the goals . . . put
away our personal gains and think about the greater good.”
When asked what administrative officials could do to better facilitate this
collaboration (question E-11), the fire chief of Acme said that he could “free-up his union
representatives to be actively engaged in the effort.” The Detour city manager said that
“the biggest thing we cannot do is to get frustrated by the process…stay positive about it.”
The city manager in Eliseville stated that they could help “by conducting good analysis of
what you’re doing . . . know for sure whether or not it’s a good thing for your city . . . stay
up to date on what’s going on in your region, your state.” The fire chief of Bedford Falls
said that it was “maintaining a positive perspective.” The Coletown fire chief said that his
most important contribution was “keeping an open line of communication with our fire
employees.” The mayor of Eliseville said that the administrative officials should “stay
educated, articulate and up to date on the collaboration.” The Coletown mayor said that
they should “provide information to us that is fair and accurate.”
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Figure 7.2: How Elected & Administrative Officials Facilitate Collaboration
Percentage of
Respondents
Mentioning

Elected Officials
Educate Public on the
Benefits
Stay informed and Stay
Focused
Maintain a Positive Role
Encourage Administrators
Educate Administrators on
Benefits
Focus on the Greater Good
Guide the Overall Policy
Effort
Forget about Personal Gains

55%
35%
25%
20%
15%
15%
10%

Administrative Officials
Provide Fair and Accurate
Information
Keep Lines of Communication
Open
Maintain a Positive Perspective
Stay Current on Developments
Not get Frustrated by the
Process
Conduct Good Analysis
Free up Subordinates Time to
Participate

Percentage of
Respondents
Mentioning

55%
40%
30%
20%
20%
20%
5%

10%

The responses to these questions indicate that both elected and administrative
officials play important roles in the collaborative process. Also, the consensus is that while
they play different roles, both have roles to play with a significant impact on the outcome
of the collaboration. The respondents said that it is important for administrative officials
working on collaborative activities to maintain a positive attitude, stay up to date on the
activity and keep lines of communication open, while providing accurate and pertinent
information to elected officials. Elected officials need to encourage their administrative
officials, let them know that collaboration is an important part of their “regular” work and
help educate the public about benefits that can be gained.

Table 7.4:
Can Problems be Addressed Internally
E-12
E-13

Is there any way that these issues could have been resolved solely within your jurisdiction? If
yes, how?
Have you or has your jurisdiction ever engaged in cross-functional coordination within your
community such as public safety officers or similar activities? If so, how did that come about
and what were the results?
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Other Avenues for Addressing these Problems
When asked if the problems faced by the city could be resolved internally without
collaboration (question E-12), the Acme fire chief said that they could not handle these
problems alone “because of the issues . . . the cities are doing things totally different, it’s
like night and day . . . it’s too hard to act jointly right now and accomplish everything we
want to.” The Detour city manager said, “no, this collaboration is a must knowing what is
coming up for us . . . increasing cost of equipment.” The fire chief of Bedford Falls noted
“I don’t think we could . . . we can’t control our costs or our revenues so it’s getting out of
our control.” The Coletown fire chief said “no, finances would be just too much of a
problem . . . we have been hit hard over the past three years . . . we can only restructure so
much.” An Eliseville city council member said “no, we can’t do this on our own . . . we
can’t even maintain the level of services we have now . . . the quality of service cannot be
maintained unless we figure out some way of working with other groups.” The Eliseville
city council president said “you can only cut so much and then service levels become
unacceptable . . . we need a bigger organization.”
A few respondents identified internal solutions to these problems. A lieutenant in
the Detour Fire Department responded that he thought they could possibly address these
issues successfully on their own, “people have a lot of pride in this town. If we had to
increase taxes to keep good fire services here, I think they would go for it.” The fire chief
in Bedford Falls stated “sure, add money to the mix and we can solve a lot of this . . . [we
should] separate medical rescue from fire fighting.” The newly elected mayor of Detour
stated “yes we could, legacy costs are a big issue . . . we need to go to a defined
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contribution pension system . . . change some of the union contracts . . . we need to change
the systems for new hires.”
When asked this question, all but three of the respondents indicated there was no
way that the problems they were encountering could be resolved by each community alone.
Given the increasing costs of labor and equipment necessary to provide a modern fire
service, coupled with the decline in state revenue sharing and anticipated decline in local
tax base as a result of declining home values, the respondents do not believe solving the
problems alone is a realistic alternative. Most of the respondents also said that they believe
they have accomplished as much as they can through the DCC Mutual Aid System and that
better collaboration is necessary to maintain an adequate level of public services. Those
indicating these issues could be addressed by individual communities stated that doing so
will require significant increases in funding, an alternative that looks increasing unlikely
given the current economic outlook in this area and statewide.
When asked whether their city had ever considered or engaged in cross-functional
internal collaboration such as combining police and fire fighting services (question E-13),
the Acme fire chief said “we have talked about it, eight or nine years ago but not lately. It
never happened, because you know, if my guys wanted to carry a gun they would have
checked that box . . . they are different kinds of people.” The Detour city manager said “no,
I think we should, but I have not been able to convince folks here of the wisdom of doing
that . . . I think this city would be perfect for a public safety kind of coordination but when
I bring it up, I get the cold shoulder.” The fire chief in Bedford Falls stated “it’s been
brought up as a threat before.” The fire chief in Detour said “we have discussed public
safety officers before, but it never went very far . . . a mayor previously tried to actually
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appoint a public safety chief over both police and fire . . . it didn’t go far.” The mayor of
Eliseville said “it was discussed here previously, but never came about. I don’t think it
could ever happen here.” The newly elected mayor of Detour said “it was discussed
previously, but shot down quickly . . . the unions have strongly objected to this.”
The strategy most often mentioned by the respondents in answer to this question
was an attempt to combine or coordinate fire and police services. All of the cities had at
least seriously discussed the possibility, but none actually attempted to combine such
service provision. Many of the respondents mentioned the strong union presence in their
region as a major reason such coordination was never serious undertaken. Not believing
such coordination to be a true alternative, these communities began to discuss the
possibility of forming an inter-jurisdictional fire authority some time ago.

Looking Back and Looking Forward
The following represents a final set of questions asked of the interview subjects as
a way of concluding the research interview and asking them to pause for a moment and
look ahead at the potential implementation of the DFA collaboration.

Table 7.5:
Looking Back and Looking Forward
F-1

In your view, what is the most difficult aspect of pursuing this effort?

F-2
F-3

As you look forward, what are your three biggest concerns about the future of this effort?
If you made decisions on this project again with the information you have now, would you still
support working with another jurisdiction?

All of the respondents had been involved in the planning of the DFA collaboration
for over eighteen months at the time of these interviews and many participated in the
planning of the same type of collaboration back in the early 1990s. When asked what the
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most difficult aspect of pursuing this collaboration was (question F-1), the Acme city
council president indicated that it was achieving a win-win solution for all five
communities because of their differing constituencies. Echoing the work of John Kingdon
(2003) on policy streams and policy windows, the council president went on to point out
“this is complicated by the fact that each community has elected officials that will change,
newly elected officials may not be supportive . . . there is a time window during which we
may achieve success.” The fire chief in Acme thought “putting the labor agreement
together” was the most difficult aspect. The mayor of Detour said that “getting the
implementation plan in written form so as to address the concerns of all five communities”
was a big issue.
The city manager in Eliseville stated that it was “keeping the energy level up . . . it
takes a lot . . . it isn’t part of your daily work . . . we’re currently negotiating a new labor
agreement with our fire department while at the same time working to establish this fire
authority . . . it’s a challenge in many ways.” The fire chief of Bedford Falls said “I liken it
to taking five established families and putting them into one house . . . and most of those
people are going to have new parents . . . new rules to live by . . . try making that work.”
The Coletown fire chief thought that “trying to establish a stable funding source” for the
fire authority was the most difficult problem. The mayor of Eliseville said,
these local principalities that are deeply rooted politically
are difficult and you cannot discount them . . . there is a lot
of influence coming from the labor organizations . . . they have
a long history of sending retired firemen and policemen to
serve on the city council to ensure the continued flow of
benefits to their groups.
The mayor of Coletown said it was “the union issues . . . an unwillingness to start new.”
The city manager of Bedford Falls thought it was “the attitude of some of our fire fighters
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. . . their mistrust . . . some of our fire fighters think we’re doing this just to screw them
over somehow, that’s not true.” The fire chief in Eliseville indicated that the most difficult
part for him was “finding the time to be really active in the process.”
Figure 7.3: Biggest Concerns about the Future of this Collaboration.
Future Concerns Most often Mentioned
Putting Together a Labor Agreement
Establishing a Stable Funding Source
Putting Implementation Plan Together
Achieving a "Win-Win" for Everyone
Lack of Trust between Labor and Management
Keeping our Energy Level up
Losing Control over Services
Changes in Elected Participants

Percentage of Respondents
Mentioning this Issue

60%
35%
35%
35%
15%
10%
5%
5%

The responses to this question indicate that getting an operational plan and labor
agreement in place was the most difficult aspect of collaboration. Several respondents
stated that it was very difficult maintaining day-to-day operations while simultaneously
working to develop and implement such a big change in those very same day-to-day
operations.
There is significant agreement among the respondents about their three biggest
challenges in the future (question F-2). Three-quarters of the respondents indicated that
getting a labor agreement that covered the new authority in all five cities would be a big
challenge. Yet, even with such consensus about how important writing the labor agreement
was, not even a rough draft of a labor agreement had been produced to date and there was
considerable disagreement as to which side would make the first move in drafting one. The
responses indicate that the two sides are far apart on their understanding of how the labor
issues will be addressed.
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A second issue raised by nearly half of the respondents is how the new fire
authority will be funded. Agreeing on a stable source of funding for this collaboration is
clearly critical to this effort, yet this issue did not seem to be very far along toward
resolution at the time of these interviews. When asked specifically about the funding
source, the respondents had different ideas about how the authority would be funded. Some
thought a separate millage would be introduced to fund the operations. Others that each of
the five communities would merely contribute what they were already spending for their
fire services and from those resources provide the funding for the new authority. Some of
the respondents speculated that a combination of tax base and fire runs would be used to
assess the costs to each city. Finally, some of the respondents simply said they did not
know how the new authority would be funded.
Several of the respondents also mentioned the operating agreement of the fire
authority itself as a major concern going forward. Among the important issues mentioned
was making sure that the relationship is a stable one and that there are guarantees
providing each city the option of leaving the authority. Another issue is how the
differences in operating costs of the five cities would be resolved by the agreement. All
five fire departments currently have different pay rates, pension benefits, health care
options, vacation and leave time policies and operating rules.
Another issue raised was whether state statutes governing fire departments
somehow guaranteed that no bargaining unit would suffer a loss as a result of
consolidating operations in this way. Most respondents were not exactly sure what that
meant in a practical sense. Some respondents feared this might mean that all personnel of
the new fire authority would have to be brought up to the highest existing pay and benefit
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level of any of the five cities. If so, many wondered how the cities could possibly achieve
any kind of cost savings. The two statutes raising the most concern are the Michigan
Public Act 312 of 1969, mandating binding arbitration for fire union contract disputes with
communities, and the Michigan Urban Cooperation Act of 1967. If the Michigan Urban
Cooperation Act is used to form this new organization, the law may require that all
members of the new organization be paid the highest wages and benefits existing in the
previous constituent communities.
Another major concern reported by the respondents is the need to convince the
public of the benefits of collaboration once all agreements and plans are in place. The fire
union president in Eliseville said that his major concern going forward was “that people
will grow tired of this effort . . . that they’ll settle for less than what is needed . . . if this
collaboration doesn’t move forward then we have some serious safety issues.”
At the time this research was conducted, the respondents had been actively engaged
in the planning of the DFA collaboration for eighteen months. Many of them were active
in the failed attempt to collaborate in the 1990s. Looking back on their experiences over
this time frame, the respondents were asked if knowing what they know now, would they
still support working with another jurisdiction on such collaboration again in the future
(question F-3). Without exception, every one of the respondents said yes, they would
support such collaborative activity again in the future, even if this current effort ultimately
fails. The Acme fire chief said that “even if some of these cities drop out, I would go
forward and I would do this again.” The mayor of Detour said “definitely, without
hesitation.” The Detour city manager went even further and said “hell, yeah, I’ll do any

234
collaboration I can . . . this is a good idea in general . . . we have to start thinking in these
terms . . . if it works well for us, lets do it.”
The city manager in Eliseville said
yes . . . if the principles are good, the operating plan is good,
improvements in service are good. It should not be an idea
that anyone should give up on . . . there are significant challenges
because this is the first time such a highly represented group in
the public sector is trying this . . . it’s done in the private sector
all the time but this is somewhat new for us in the public
sector . . . the labor and management relationship issues in
the public sector are daunting.
The Coletown fire chief said “yes, if the benefits are there…as a stand alone department
we are struggling . . . if this fails we have to do something . . . it’s not safe the way we are
operating now.” The mayor of Eliseville said “yes, the public benefit far outweighs the
pain you have to go through to get there . . . I would do it again, in a heartbeat, absolutely.”
A captain of the Coletown Fire Department stated “what we’re doing now, service wise,
it’s a disservice to our citizens.” The city manager in Bedford Falls said “yes, absolutely,
collaboration is not always the answer but it is certainly worth considering.” The city
council president in Eliseville responded,
definitely, I think the rewards are great and not being willing
to look at alternatives is stupidity in this day and age . . . If I
could talk to other elected officials about this issue, I would
say, go for it . . . there isn’t any reason to not at least consider
collaborating like this. When costs are spiraling and services
are declining why not look at doing this?
Summary Analysis of Open-Ended Questions
These responses illustrate that the administrative respondents in this study believe
they have much more regular and substantive contact with their counterparts and that such
regular contact is an important factor in this collaboration. The responses also show that
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administrative and elected officials predominantly believe that the communities in this
study area do not cooperate on public policy issues to any significant extent.
When asked if elected and administrative officials think alike or differently about
the issue of collaboration, the overwhelming response was that they think differently.
Administrative officials have to be concerned with making the system operate well,
regardless of the circumstances, while elected officials are more concerned with the
politics involved, the budgetary issues and how residents perceive collaboration efforts.
The respondents indicated that networks are an important part of collaboration and
several are important to this specific effort. The Downriver Community Conference, the
Downriver City Manager Association, the Downriver Fire Chief Association, the Michigan
Suburbs Alliance, the Michigan Municipal League and the Southeast Michigan Council of
Governments were mentioned frequently by these respondents.
Examining the respondent’s views about collaboration, it is clear that many of them
believe that their work, while predominantly benefitting their employing community,
should also have a beneficial impact outside that city. Many of the respondents also
expressed the belief that having an MPA or other college degree affects how they view
their work in general and collaboration specifically. The responses reveal the belief that
membership in organizations such as the International City/County Management
Association and the American Society for Public Administration also influences how these
administrators view collaboration.
When asked if a political constituency is a necessary factor for collaboration, no
clear consensus emerged. When examining what kinds of activities elected officials could
undertake to facilitate collaboration, several were mentioned. Those activities mentioned
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most often included: educating the public about the benefits of collaboration, staying
informed, maintaining a positive role and encouraging administrative officials. Activities
mentioned most often for administrative officials included providing fair and accurate
information, keeping the lines of communication open, remaining current and positive and
conducting good analysis of the issues.
When asked if these problems could be solved internally without collaboration,
nearly all of these respondents said they could not. The few that said they could be solved
internally all indicated that doing so would involve the infusion of large sums of additional
money.
Finally, when asked what were the most difficult problems faced and the biggest
concerns for the future of this collaboration, respondents mentioned putting together a
labor agreement, coming up with an acceptable funding source for the new authority,
putting together an acceptable operating agreement and achieving a win-win result for all
parties.
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CHAPTER 8
THE REST OF THE STORY: THE COLLAPSE OF THE DOWNRIVER FIRE
AUTHORITY COLLABORATION EFFORT

While the information and data of this study was being tabulated and analyzed in
early 2009, the five communities that spent almost two years attempting to form a fire
authority to replace their five separate fire departments, decided to suspend their efforts.
Given this unexpected development, I decided to re-interview as many of the participants
as possible. Those epilogue interviews took place between April 6 and August 21, 2009.
All of the original interview subjects were contacted and asked if they would participate in
the epilogue interviews. A total of sixteen of the original twenty interview subjects (80
percent) agreed to be interviewed again. All five of the cities are represented in these
interviews and the following elected and administrative roles were represented. Most of the
interviews were again conducted face-to-face, but a few of the respondents answered these
questions by email. The roles of the actors interviewed are detailed in Table 8.1.

Table 8.1:
Roles of Actors Interviewed and Percentage of the Whole
Mayors
25 %
City Council Members
6%
City Managers
13 %
Fire Chiefs
30 %
Fire Command Officers
13 %
Fire Union Representatives
13 %
Total
100%
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Summary and Analysis of Second Interview
Following are the questions asked in an effort to explore specifically what
happened to cause these actors, after nearly two years of effort, to suddenly stop all efforts
to form a joint fire authority to serve these five communities. What are the main factors
present that caused this collapse? Is there anything that can be done to re-start this
collaborative effort? Did the intervening political election have any impact on the collapse?
If fiscal stress was such a major factor as most of these actors previously indicated, what
has changed to alleviate that stress? Of what importance was the actors inability to draft a
labor agreement, and develop the method for funding the fire authority?

What is the Current State of this Effort?
The city manager of Eliseville indicated that discussions between several of the
participants continue to surface relative to current plans for a police and fire central
dispatch. The city manager of Bedford Falls indicated that the effort is merely stalled and
the subject continues to come up from time to time. With the exception of two city
managers, all of the others interviewed responded that this is a dead issue, no longer under
active consideration.

Did the Last Election Impact the Decision to Stop Collaborating?
Why did the DFA effort collapse? There does not appear to be any single cause for
the collaboration failure, but there is a consensus that the end came abruptly. However,
electoral change seems to have been a major factor. All five communities held elections in
November of 2008 and at the next meeting of the DFA, held post-election, it was obvious
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that this collaboration effort was not going to move forward. The mayor of Eliseville
attended the first meeting after the elections and stated that “within a matter of twenty
minutes, eighteen months of work went right out the door.” That mayor went on to explain
that “the unions got very active in that election; they had a lot of influence in the process.”
Four of the five communities elected new mayors at that time and the mayor of Eliseville
concluded that three of them were not up to speed on the effort to form the authority or
were actually hostile to the idea. He went on to state “I can think of no other reason for this
than the change in political leadership.” The city manager of Eliseville echoed that
conclusion stating “we believe it failed for political reasons in Bedford Falls and Detour as
the change in position of these two cities followed the last general election.” The city
manager of Bedford Falls said “policy makers as a whole chose not to support it.” The fire
union president of Acme said that “two of the supportive mayors involved did not get a
second term.” The former mayor of Detour lost his bid for reelection and stated “the fire
union . . . worked to defeat two of the mayors and were successful. They had two of the
remaining mayors questioning the high cost.”
The majority of the respondents answered that the intervening elections did have an
influence in the decision to cease the attempt to collaborate. Nearly half of the respondents
stated that the results of the elections were a factor in the decision not to form a fire
authority. The city manager of Eliseville stated, “from public statements, it appears that
was the case in Detour and Acme as those new mayors stated they did not wish to
continue.” The city manager of Bedford Falls responded that yes, “two or three of the new
mayors did not support the idea.” A fire command officer in Coletown stated that “the loss
of the mayor of Detour and the mayor of Acme who had been strong supporters of
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collaboration hurt the effort.” The fire chief of Eliseville said that “absolutely the election
had a very strong impact in Detour and Bedford Falls. In my opinion, there was a real
serious change in the wind right after that election.” The fire chief in Detour responded that
“yes, in some sense, I think the political views changed . . . the new politicians expressed
very pro-union sentiments during their election campaigns. This is a hard working union
town and I think that influence is going to be felt.”
Twenty-five percent of the respondents answered that the intervening elections may
have or probably had some influence in the decision to cease collaboration efforts. The fire
chief in Bedford Falls said “that occurrence does appear to have been a turning point.” The
fire union representative in Eliseville said that two of the mayors who were strong
motivators for the collaboration were not there after the election. He explained “I don’t
think it was an organized deliberate thing as much as just the natural change that occurs
over time.” Only a quarter of the respondents did not think the election influenced the
decision.

Did Other Factors Contributed to the Collapse of this Collaboration?
The mayor of Coletown stated it was merely the lack of progress that provided the
primary reason his city stopped participating. A difference in the expected results of
collaboration appears to have been another reason the effort ceased. The fire chief of
Bedford Falls said there were a “multitude of reasons but the initial, very quietly spoken
catalyst or motivator of saving money for the taxpayers did not jump out as a by-product.”
A fire command officer in Coletown indicated that he thought the effort failed because the
mayor “started to posture saying he wanted changes in the pension system . . . started to
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discuss the issue of Public Act 312 protections being applicable in the new authority.” The
fire chief in Eliseville agreed responding “there were individuals who wanted to
renegotiate contractually before they would move forward with discussing the forming of
the authority . . . sort of damaged the trust levels between the groups.” The fire chief of
Detour stated that he “saw a lot of posturing by some of the elected officials of other cities.
They wanted short-term savings, they wanted concessions up-front and that just wasn’t
going to work.” A fire command officer in Coletown agreed, stating “elected officials have
short-term goals. The DFA would cost money up-front and probably not show a benefit for
several years.”

Is the Lack of a Labor or Funding Agreement Significant?
The importance of having a labor agreement in place is one of the most significant
findings of this research. While one or two respondents thought having a labor agreement
and a funding agreement was not the biggest issue they faced, the overwhelming majority
thought this issue of critical importance. The strongest and most elaborate responses were
in reaction to this question. Nearly nine out of ten responded that not having those
agreements in place made a difference, was very important, hurt immensely or was critical.
The fire chief of Coletown responded that “the lack of a proposed labor agreement hurt
immensely.” The city council president of Eliseville said “the labor agreement is critical.”
The newly elected mayor of Detour stated “both of those issues were critical and never
resolved.”
The fire union representative of Eliseville said “we should have had a master
agreement to start with. We (the unions) were given the authority to draft it ourselves and
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not doing that was a mistake I think.” He went on to say that “as it was, we didn’t narrow
down the fears of people on the speculative nature of what we were doing. It’s hard when
you’re used to traditional bargaining methods, it’s tough to show all of your cards and put
everything on the table.” A fire captain in Coletown responded that “even the union
couldn’t agree on the labor agreement . . . that was a mistake, the union not being able to
agree on a draft of how we would handle all of these issues.” In regards to the funding
agreement, the captain stated that “nobody had a good handle on how this would be
funded, it never got that far.” Elaborating on why negotiations on these agreements did not
progress, he noted that “elected officials have a shorter term focus . . . the benefits might
be farther down the track, not on their watch. Nobody wants to do something that the next
elected official gets to take all of the credit for. They need to think more long-term.”
Both the fire chief of Detour and fire chief of Eliseville made interesting comments
relative to how these agreements could be developed. The fire chief of Eliseville stated “it
would help if we had a model agreement to use for something like this. It could be
developed by the state, unions, a third party, some outside source. It would have been
helpful because the trust issue wouldn’t have been as difficult as between the cities and
their employees.” The fire chief of Detour stated,
the labor agreement, not having it caused distrust to
emerge in the process . . . it would have been helpful
if a third party, outside party drafted a labor agreement
and a funding agreement that the authority could
then use . . . a standard agreement that we could use,
capable of tweaking a little but a basic draft . . . at
least some basic outlines, best practices, something
that is working in another location.
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The fire chief of Acme responded “the unions were afraid because they thought that
if they drafted the labor agreement, that would cap them and they couldn’t ask for more,
they wanted the city to write it.” In regards to the funding agreement, the chief went on to
say “we got stuck on who was going to pay for the retirements, different rates of pay,
legacy costs were a serious issue that we never overcame.” Agreeing with his colleagues in
Eliseville and Detour, the fire chief of Acme went on to state “it would have been helpful
to have a model labor and funding agreement ahead of time, but only if it was being used
someplace else already and working successfully . . . best practices information would be
helpful the next time we try to start something like this.”

Can the Collaboration Effort be Re-Started?
Nearly all the respondents said that possible collaboration on fire services will
come up again, and may happen at some future date. They also agreed that it will take a
higher level of government forcing, or at least encouraging, the parties to collaborate.
Several of the respondents argued that it will take a serious problem such as the fiscal
collapse of these cities or the death of somebody to bring everyone back to the table to
make this collaboration happen. The city manager of Eliseville stated “this will happen, the
crisis of the economy is very real and this is the end of the present way of funding
municipal services as we know them.” The mayor of Eliseville said that it might take “one
of these local cities going into receivership, which will get them serious about this kind of
collaboration.” A fire captain in Coletown stated that it might take “the fiscal gun to
everybody’s head.” The fire chief in Eliseville contends that it might take “total economic
crisis . . . I think things will have to get worse.”
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Taking a different approach to what might get the parties to collaborate in the
future, the city council president in Eliseville said “I believe we need to get labor to agree
to a middle ground pay and benefits package . . . perhaps look at a two-tiered arrangement
for wages . . . it has worked elsewhere.” The fire union representative in Eliseville
responded that it might take “somebody that is bold enough to do it, an outside party
perhaps.” He also thought that the state fire fighters union “could take a position to make
this happen if they wanted to. There is no official position on collaboration or
consolidation . . . it makes a lot of sense for us to share, how can people not see that?”
Offering one final comment to this question, the fire chief of Detour stated “the
cities and the unions need to be partners in the true sense of the word.”

Has the Problem of Fiscal Stress been Alleviated?
The issue of fiscal stress in these communities is frequently quoted as being a
primary motivator in this effort. Because the collaboration failed, the interview subjects
were asked if those fiscal stressors had somehow been removed. Every single respondent
indicated that no, the fiscal stress was still present and most of them agreed it was growing
worse. The city manager of Eliseville commented,
It has become the primary driving factor and will soon reduce
municipal services so significantly that the successful ones will
be those using cash balances at a slower rate. We are based on
building fees, income tax, sales tax and real property values,
all of which are crashing at double-digit rates. A regional
fire service may not even be affordable now.
The city manager of Bedford Falls responded “in my opinion the fiscal stress remains, and
is, if anything, worse than before. In my view cities will combine departments when they
are so stressed that they have no alternative.” The former mayor of Detour said that his city
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“has an estimated $ 70 million unfunded liability for post-employment benefits . . . Ford
Motor Company has reduced their personal property taxes to the city . . . most cities are in
fiscal stress.”

What Obstacles or Mistakes Limited Collaboration?
There is a considerable amount of agreement about the biggest obstacles to this
kind of collaboration and about the mistakes made in this effort. Table 8.2 indicates the
obstacles the participants discovered in this effort to collaborate. The respondents were not
prompted or led in any way when answering this question. The respondents were not given
a list of obstacles or mistakes to choose from. Their responses are their own which makes
the frequency with which the top obstacles and mistakes are mentioned, all the more
impressive and significant.

Table 8.2:
Obstacles to Collaboration
Obstacle
Absence of Agreement on Goals
Lack of a Comprehensive Labor Agreement
Lack of Elected Leadership
Current Attitudes of Fire Fighters
A Comprehensive Funding Agreement
Sufficient Trust between the Parties
Current Employee Compensation Structure

Percentage of Respondents Mentioning Obstacle

63 %
63 %
56 %
50 %
31 %
31 %
25 %

The respondents were also quite frank in assessing what mistakes they think were
made in this attempted collaboration. Table 8.3 indicates some of these mistakes. Many of
these mirror judgments as to obstacles to collaboration.
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Table 8.3:
Mistakes Made During Collaboration Attempt
Percentage of Respondents Mentioning Mistake
Mistakes Made
Failure to Agree on Goals of Collaboration
Failure to Develop a Labor Agreement
Too many Different Union Positions
Failure to Develop a Funding Agreement
Failure to Adequately Communicate
Involving Labor Representatives too soon
Involving Elected Leaders too soon
Failure to Develop an Operating Agreement

56 %
50 %
44 %
38 %
31 %
25 %
25 %
19 %

The city manager of Bedford Falls said that if he could do it all over again he
would “go to extreme lengths to explain to all what their participation would mean . . . we
cannot find out if the project will save money and provide better service without a labor
agreement and an agreement about sharing resources.” The fire chief of Bedford Falls
commented that elected officials should not “try to sell the idea as a safety improvement
for fire fighters when in reality it is a cost cutting project.” The fire chief of Eliseville
stated in regard to mistakes that were made that the “labor agreement is the most glaring
example, a lot of lateral dancing but no forward movement.” The fire union president in
Eliseville agreed stating “not getting an agreement up front of what our goals are was a
mistake.” Noting that these same communities attempted this same kind of collaboration in
the mid 1990s, he went on to say “we’ve tried it in good economic times and now we’ve
tried it in bad economic times and we couldn’t get it done. Not writing a draft labor
agreement was a big mistake. It would be helpful to have the state legislature come in and
write a model agreement.”
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Concluding Comments
This research is based upon a single case study, so it is prudent to refrain from
generalizing these findings too broadly. Still, some of the clearer findings of this study
deserve to be tested in future research. Based on extant theories common to the applicable
literature, these five cities should have been able to successfully collaborate in providing
fire services. The follow-up interviews highlighted why this attempt at collaboration failed.
One of the initial problems this collaboration effort encountered was a significant
difference in the expectations for short-term cost savings. The elected officials anticipated
significant short-term cost savings. Overwhelmingly, the administrative officials of these
five communities did not anticipate any significant short-term cost savings. The majority
of these respondents indicated that it is very important that participants all seek the same
benefits from collaboration, yet these officials clearly did not anticipate achieving the same
benefits.
Roughly three-quarters of these respondents indicated that the political changes that
occurred as a result of an intervening election in all five cities had a very strong influence
on the decision to cease this effort. Of the three mayors who were the strongest proponents
of this collaboration, two lost their bid for reelection and the third did not run. While there
are differences of opinion as to how active the labor unions were in these changes in
elected officials, it is clear that the changes had a significant and negative impact on this
collaboration.
The vast majority (88%) of the respondents stated that it is critically important to
achieve a labor and a funding agreement and that it was a huge mistake to not do so in this
case. Many respondents indicated that it would be very helpful to have model agreements
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in place before such collaboration was attempted again. It was proffered that such a model
agreement should be drafted by the state legislature, the state municipal league, the state
fire fighters organization or some combination of these groups working together. Not
having a labor and a funding agreement in place allowed the inherent mistrust among the
parties to emerge and seriously impair this effort.
In the future, a model labor agreement and perhaps even a model funding
agreement will be required to ensure the smooth development of these types of authorities.
Significant changes may need to be made in the enabling statutes that deal with this kind of
public sector collaboration. Because public safety personnel in Michigan are heavily
unionized, a method of capturing economies of scale, while still providing an acceptable
level of protection for employees, will need to be developed. It is unrealistic to think that
such developments can be accomplished on a city-by-city basis. Just as Public Act 312,
non-residency for public safety personnel and other factors important to collaboration have
been imposed by a higher level of government; these suggested changes too may have to
come from the state legislature. Voluntary collaboration is quite possible but some of these
basic preliminary issues may be best handled by the state government in order to ensure
uniformity.
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CHAPTER 9
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH

The study of interlocal collaboration undertaken here is important to scholars of
local government, the administration of urban areas and especially to those charged with
making policy decisions in times of increasing fiscal stress. The basic research questions
this study was designed to help answer are (1) what specifically motivates interlocal
collaboration? (2) what benefits are the collaborators hoping to gain from the terms of
collaboration? (3) what attributes are important in a partner and what are partners seeking
from one another? and (4) what are the roles played by elected and administrative officials
in collaboration. This research helps advance our knowledge of these issues and provides a
better understanding of collaboration in the provision of fire services among local
governments.

What Motivates Interlocal Collaboration?
This research was undertaken in order to examine the reasons why the interview
subjects attempted to collaborate. Of equal interest is the question of what mechanisms
they developed for dealing with the transaction costs involved in horizontal collaboration?
What incentives are present that encourage local public officials to collaborate? This study
makes a valuable contribution to a better understanding of the factors that are important to
collaboration efforts. Clearly the actors interviewed for this study have a positive attitude
toward intergovernmental collaboration. The respondents in this study believe that the
organizations they work in are generally open to new ideas, acting proactively and looking
for new ways to collaborate with other local governments. This research illustrates that the

250
perceptions of local government actors regarding collaboration may be an important
predisposition to voluntary collaboration.

The Role of Trust in Collaboration
This research reveals that a certain level of trust among cities attempting to
collaborate is important in order to deal with the transaction costs that are often
encountered. The costs associated with developing a labor agreement, funding agreement
and operating agreement are just such transaction costs. If insufficient trust exists among
the participants, excessive drafting and re-drafting of documents and monitoring of
partners performance is required which makes collaboration more difficult.
Respondents in this study perceived their residents as somewhat distrustful of the
elected officials from surrounding cities and were also somewhat distrustful of the elected
officials in their own city. Respondents frequently mentioned the lack of trust between
labor and management representatives as being an obstacle to this collaboration. As a
result of insufficient trust, a great deal of time was expended by respondents in attempts to
pre-negotiate issues before even a draft labor agreement was completed. Respondents
noted that the initial lack trust became, over time, a downward spiraling vortex that
continuously lowered the level of trust. Given the long history of successful collaboration
among these respondents, their inability to deal with this transaction cost, is somewhat
surprising.
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Option of County Provided Services
One particularly interesting finding of this study was the overwhelming responses
of the interviewees who believe that their residents strongly disagree with having the
county provide services to them. There are counties in Michigan and across the nation
providing an array of public services to local residents, but these respondents indicate a
strong preference for not allowing the county to provide those services. This response was
consistent across cities and across the different roles of the respondents. Elling and Carr
(2009), found much the same in a survey of Michigan citizens. The response to this
question, indicating disagreement with the concept of the county providing services, was
by far the strongest negative reaction to any question asked.

Loss of Local Control over Service Provision
Loss of control over fire services has long been thought to be an obstacle to
collaboration. Previous research has argued that the fear of losing control over service
production is strong and therefore the net gains of turning to external sources must be
substantial (Ferris 1986). Bickers (2005), indicates that local public officials fear losing
control over service delivery and that fear can be an obstacle to collaboration. Morgan and
Hirlinger (1991), argue that when local officials fear the loss of local control, less
intergovernmental contracting tends to occur. The desire to retain independence of action
induces local officials to avoid agreements with other political entities. This research found
only limited support for those conclusions.
Respondents perceive their residents to be only somewhat in agreement with the
idea that maintaining control is more important than lowering costs or improving service
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effectiveness overall. This response is fairly consistent across all five cities and across all
five roles of respondents. When asked to indicate their own views rather than their
perceptions of community residents, respondents said the potential loss of control was
unimportant. Control over such services is seen by many respondents as illusory. For those
respondents indicating that it was real; most argued that the benefits of collaboration
outweighed any potential loss of control. When considering the issue of an escape clause in
the authority agreement, which can be seen as reserving some control over these services,
the respondents argued for the necessity of having one. However, they went on to explain
that actually withdrawing from the authority and establishing a new city fire department
would be very difficult and cost prohibitive.

Interdependence of Cities as a Motivating Factor
Cooperation on public services is generally thought to be driven, in part, by
recognition of interdependence among local jurisdictions (Frederickson 1999, Parks and
Oakerson 2000). This study illustrates, however, that it was the perception of these elected
and administrative officials that their residents do not see themselves as particularly
interdependent with the residents of surrounding communities. This study also indicated
that the respondents, in general, do not believe there is a significant political constituency
in their city for this collaboration, but they worked to bring about collaboration regardless.
When asked if they thought it was appropriate to work collaboratively if it benefitted the
whole collaboration area even against the desires of some jurisdictions, these respondents
agreed they should collaborate even against the objections of other cities.
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General Conditions and Specific Events that Motivated Collaboration
Asked what was motivating the effort to collaborate, the most frequent response
given was declining revenues and increasing costs. Many respondents mentioned that
continuing cuts in revenue sharing from the state and declining property values are making
it nearly impossible to provide the level of services that they have in the past. Respondents
also frequently mentioned that their history of cooperation through the Mutual Aid Pact
motivated them to attempt greater collaboration. This finding is consistent with the
argument of Park and Feiock (2003), that cooperation is more likely the longer the actors
have cooperated with one another.
Respondents also mentioned specific events that motivated them to collaborate. A
multi-state power outage in 2003 led to a high level of cooperation among these cities
which led to discussions of greater cooperation. The initial success of a computer server
sharing arrangement for police information also led to discussions of greater collaboration
among these cities.

The Role of Policy Entrepreneurs and Area Networks
The findings of this study also provide strong support for the theory of John
Kingdon (2003), that policy entrepreneurs can provide strong support for collaboration.
This research revealed that a few policy entrepreneurs were active in this effort. Both
elected and administrative actors were frequently mentioned as making significant
contributions to the collaboration effort. In particular, one city manager was mentioned by
nearly every respondent as being a primary actor driving this collaboration. In addition,
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two elected officials were frequently mentioned by many respondents as being
significantly engaged in moving the collaboration forward.
This research also provides support for previous research as to the importance of
networks in helping to facilitate collaboration. Lackey, Freshwater and Rupasingha (2002),
argue that a good and long-established relationship among cooperating jurisdictions
increases the chances for continuing success. Processes run smoothly because of
accumulated levels of trust among the participants. Putnam (1993) has demonstrated that
networks of civic engagement can help promote cooperation. The Downriver Community
Conference, a nonprofit network of twenty local governments in the study area, was
consistently mentioned as a strong motivating force helping to facilitate this collaboration.
The DCC provided initial support for collaboration, assisted in obtaining a state grant to
study the feasibility of this collaboration and provided ongoing support to participants.

The Difficulty of Collaboration on Fire Services
This research found mixed perceptions as to whether it is easier to collaborate on
fire services than on other kinds of public services. On one hand, fire services are seen as
moving toward greater uniformity and a national (NFPA) standard of service
characteristics. Yet, many of the respondents mentioned that it could be more difficult
because of the strong unionization levels and the desire of local residents to maintain a
separate fire department.
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Overview of Findings
This research reveals a number of factors that are important to collaboration and
catalogs a few problems that local actors considering collaboration need to be on guard
against. Although the respondents were generally positive about and open to collaboration,
insufficient trust was a problem they could not overcome. This failure is surprising given
that these cities have collaborated through a Mutual Aid Pact for many years and generally
consider their cities to be highly interdependent.
This research also discovered that the potential loss of control over service
delivery, generally considered to be an important obstacle to collaboration, was relatively
unimportant to these respondents. Respondents believe that much of their control was
already eliminated by the state government. Given the fact that these cities appear strongly
opposed to the county providing services, this kind of horizontal collaboration is the most
logical alternative open to them.
This research found that both elected and administrative policy entrepreneurs were
present and played an active role in this effort. A nonprofit community conference (DCC)
also played a significant role in facilitating this activity as did the network of local
associations of city managers and fire chiefs. These networks laid the necessary
groundwork for collaboration.

What Benefits are Expected from the Terms of Collaboration?
Important insights have been obtained into what benefits participants expect to gain
from the terms of collaboration. Seeking an answer to that question is important, because
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collaborating cities are creating a contractual relationship and central to any contractual
relationship is what the law refers to as a meeting of the minds.

Cost Savings from Collaboration
Respondents expressed a strong and consistent expectation that none of the current
fire department personnel would lose their job as a result of this collaboration. When asked
if they expected short or long-term gains from this collaboration, the respondents all
clearly expected cost savings in the long-term, described as over five years. However, there
is a significant difference of opinion in the expectations of the respondents relative to
short-term gains, described as the first three to five years. Elected officials in this study had
much greater expectations of short-term cost savings than did the administrative officials
and fire fighters. There was not a common understanding between elected and
administrative officials as to what savings could reasonably be expected in the short-term.
Such differences in expected benefits is a serious obstacle to the crafting of labor
and funding agreements which require an accurate assessment of net operating costs.
Responses indicate that it is very important that collaborating partners achieve a meeting of
the minds as to their expectations. But a clear agreement on goals requires an operating
agreement among the cities and a labor agreement with fire personnel so that costs can be
accurately assessed.
A key finding of this study was that unfortunately, after eighteen months of
meeting regularly, and working diligently on the planning of this fire authority, the issues
of a detailed operating agreement, a detailed labor agreement and an agreement on how the
authority would be funded, remained unresolved.
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Improved Service Quality and Financial Equity
This research revealed that nearly all of the respondents expected to achieve
improvements in service quality through this authority and expected that cost savings
would be equally distributed among the participating cities. This research also illustrates
that the respondents anticipated achieving financial equity among the cities. Respondents
expected to achieve a better allocation of state and federal resources than is now the case.
They expected a more equitable commitment of resources by all participating cities. The
respondents expected to gain better access to resources outside their own city and greater
overall resources to purchase facilities and equipment. These are some of the primary
factors motivating this collaboration and the benefits respondents anticipated would result.

Overview of Findings
This research illustrates a variety of benefits that those participating in
collaboration expect to gain. Interestingly, nearly all of these respondents went into this
effort with the conviction that none of the current fire service personnel would lose their
job as a result of collaboration. Given that personnel costs account for such a large
proportion of the budget, it is a significant commitment to enter into collaboration planning
with that understanding.
One of the most interesting findings of this research was the significant difference
in the expectations of elected and administrative officials relative to short-term cost
savings. Nearly all of the administrative officials expressed the belief that the cost savings
of collaboration would be long-term. Although the Plante-Moran feasibility study
anticipated a twenty percent cost saving long-term, and was partially contingent on
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attracting new members into the collaboration, nearly ever one of the elected officials
expected short-term cost savings as a result of this effort. That significant difference in
expectations was one factor that foreshadowed the collapse of the collaboration.
Nearly every one of the respondents listed improved service quality as one of the
benefits they anticipated from collaboration. Several of the respondents expressed a belief
that some of the Downriver cities were not contributing sufficiently to the provision of fire
services currently. Several respondents indicated that they did not have sufficient personnel
to send to other cities under the current Mutual Aid Pact. Virtually all of the respondents
indicated that another benefit of collaboration was that all of the cities would contribute
equitably to the provision of fire services. Respondents also anticipated a better allocation
of federal and state resources as a result of collaboration.

Important Characteristics of Collaboration Partners
The economic, social and political characteristics of a community’s population can
help shape their preferences for public goods and also help determine the potential gains
from collaboration and the transaction costs associated with it (Feiock 2007). These five
cities are relatively homogenous in terms of racial composition but, there are differences in
terms of wealth and the revenues available to each. The respondents in this study stated
that such differences are relatively unimportant to them in terms of what they are looking
for in a collaboration partner. Respondents said that it was relatively unimportant or that
they were ambivalent on the issue of having partners with similar forms of governmental
structure. But, all five of the cities that decided to collaborate in the DFA effort share a
mayor-city council form, employ a city manager and are home rule cities. Several of the
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respondents indicated that it would be difficult to collaborate in this way with townships. It
may be that this is a more important issue than these respondents indicated.
This study also provides insight into how important it is that partners are able to
provide similar levels of resources and are seeking the same benefits from collaboration.
Nearly forty percent of the respondents indicated that it is critically important to them that
their partners seek the same benefits from collaboration.
These five cities share common borders and their officials have repeated contacts
with one another and have collaborated over a long period of time on fire and other
services. A history of positive cooperation between local government actors leads to the
development of norms of behavior that build social capital and thereby reduce transaction
costs (Park and Feiock 2003). This research provides strong support for the work of Feiock
and reveals that it is important to these respondents that their partners have successfully
collaborated with them in the past. It is also important that their elected and senior
administrative officials have regular contact. Feiock (2008) argues that shared borders
expose neighboring cities to externalities, require repeat play and provide officials
opportunities for mutual assurances. Efforts at collaboration among players not as familiar
with one another can be much more costly, as key players take time to get to know one
another and develop the trust necessary for successful collaboration (Feiock 2007).
Overall, these respondents indicated that it is important to very important that they had a
previously successful collaboration with their partners. Respondents also indicated that it is
very important that their elected officials are in frequent contact and even more important
that their senior administrative officials are in frequent contact.
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Land Uses and Service Requirements
The respondents in this study indicated that it is important to very important that
their partner cities have similar land uses, similar service requirements and similar
equipment and training needs. Many of the respondents further elaborated that this was not
a critically important issue because under the terms of their Mutual Aid Pact, these five
cities are required to assist one another regardless. The response to the question of how
important it is that their partner cities have similar service requirements to theirs, indicated
it is a very important issue to these respondents, more important than similar land uses.
The most important factor of the three was the response to the question regarding partners
having similar equipment and training.

Trust of Collaboration Partners
Responses to several open-ended questions provided valuable insights relative to
trust, how partnering cities are selected and the important characteristics collaborators are
seeking in their partners. Post (2002) found that repeated contacts among local government
actors led to greater levels of trust and performance experience which often led to
increased levels of cooperation among governments in a metropolitan area. Providing
support for that research, these respondents overwhelmingly indicated that trust in their
partners is a very important factor. Many respondents stated it would be impossible to
collaborate with officials that you do not trust and indicated that there was insufficient trust
present in this effort.
Park and Feiock (2003), argue that cooperation is more likely the longer the actors
have cooperated with one another. Supporting that finding, this research revealed some

261
interesting definitions of trust in the context of interlocal service collaboration. Trust was
defined in terms of working together over time, and the ability to trust that their partners
would pull their own weight and share goals and objectives. Trust was often defined in
terms of having a proven track record in previous collaboration.
When asked how trust is developed, the respondents indicated that it often requires
taking a leap-of-faith and simply beginning. Respondents stated that changes in personnel,
elected and administrative, often made developing trust difficult. It is also clear that trust
can be undermined and damaged. Lack of communication, not following through on
promises and inappropriate political influence can damage trust levels.

How Collaboration Partners are Selected?
This research illustrates some interesting issues in terms of how collaboration
partners select one another and what characteristics are important. This research provides
support for Post (2002), that the geographic concentration of local governments can lead
them to cooperate and that the geographic density of metropolitan area governments is a
significant predictor of the occurrence of intergovernmental agreements. All twenty of the
DCC area communities initially discussed this DFA collaboration but the five cities that
moved forward share contiguous borders and are tightly packed geographically. The
respondents indicated it is important that these five are close enough to share resources
effectively. These five are very similar demographically and all employ full-time,
unionized fire personnel. Several of these respondents stated that these five cities could
contribute financially to the effort and are financially more stable than some other cities
nearby.
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It is clear from this study that how partners are selected involves strong logistical
considerations. The similarities or dissimilarities of partnering communities and financial
issues are very important. There was an interesting difference in the opinion of elected and
some of the administrative officials on this issue. Most of the fire chiefs and fire fighters
expressed the opinion that having more than these five cities currently participating would
be a good idea. Most of the elected officials thought that expanding beyond these initial
five cities was not a good idea at this time.
This research also confirms that having satisfactory past experiences with their
partners made this collaboration easier to undertake. Many of the respondents indicated
that they would be reluctant to consider collaborating with cities they had bad experiences
with.

Overview of Findings
Clearly, there exist several important factors local government actors consider
when seeking a collaboration partner. This research illustrates that it is important that
partners seek the same benefits and have similar equipment and training. There are strong
logistical considerations to the process of selecting partners. There were mixed findings in
this research as to what might be too large or too small a number of cities to successfully
collaborate.
Although past collaboration experience is thought to encourage further efforts, the
current collaboration of these five cities through the Mutual Aid Pact, may have been an
obstacle in this case. Several of the respondents expressed the belief that simply enhancing
Mutual Aid would be preferable to functionally consolidating these five departments.
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Several respondents indicated that the cities had already accomplished as much as possible
through Mutual Aid and that it was now necessary to develop an authority. Being able to
capture some of the economies of scale such as joint purchasing, joint dispatching and joint
training through the Mutual Aid Pact may have made the need for functional consolidation
through an authority, seem less urgent to some of the participants.

The Roles Played by Elected and Administrative Officials
The findings of this research provide support for the work of Zeemering (2007), as
respondents predominantly indicated that elected officials do have a significant role to play
in facilitating interlocal collaboration. Zeemering has shifted attention back to the role of
elected officials in this kind of activity. Of the policy entrepreneurs most often mentioned
as actively promoting this collaboration, one is a mayor and the other is a city manager.
However, elected and administrative officials in this study tend to view the issues
in collaboration differently. A large majority of respondents indicated that regular contact
among the officials of the cities engaging in collaboration is important. Yet, the kind of
contact is different in type and frequency. The responses of elected officials reveal that
contact with their counterparts in other cities was less regular and more often of a social
nature. The responses of the administrative officials reveal that contacts with their
counterparts are much more frequent, much more substantive and work-related in nature.

Cooperation on Policy and Service
This research illustrates important differences between elected and administrative
officials relative to their cities cooperating on public policy and service. Elected officials
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for the most part indicate that they do not think they discuss or cooperate on these issues,
with their counterparts in other cities, to any real extent. The administrative officials were
more likely to respond that they discuss these issues and cooperate regarding them, with
their counterparts in other cities, to a significant extent. These responses also illustrate the
fact that elected and administrative officials think differently about the issues involved in
collaboration. The majority of responses indicated that elected officials are more concerned
with today, balancing budgets and not offending the electorate. Administrative officials on
the other hand, are generally more concerned with making the collaboration work on a
daily basis. They have to think long-term in planning, whereas elected officials tend to
have a much shorter time horizon.

Networks, Professional Associations and Training
This research supports the findings of LeRoux (2008) on the importance of area
networks of local government officials. The nonprofit Downriver Community Conference
is repeatedly mentioned as playing a significant part in facilitating this collaboration. The
Downriver Fire Chief Association, the fire fighter union locals and the Downriver City
Manager Association were also frequently mentioned as important networks involved in
this effort.
This research also found that the professional education of officials and
membership in professional organizations influences how collaboration is approached. A
few respondents mentioned that having an MPA or a BBA changed the way they viewed
collaboration. Many of the respondents also indicated that participation in organizations
such as the Michigan Municipal League, the International City-County Management
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Association and the American Society for Public Administration influenced how
collaboration was discussed and facilitated.

Need for a Political Constituency
Another difference between elected and administrative officials that was revealed
in this research is the need for a political constituency in favor of collaboration. The
majority of administrative officials, particularly fire chiefs and command officers
responded that if city residents were opposed to collaboration they would not be attempting
it. The majority of elected officials responded that a political constituency is nice, but that
they would proceed without one. Such responses seem counter-intuitive because elected
officials are generally expected to be more concerned with the desires of their electorate.
The city managers responded with mixed opinions and therefore this research did not
discover a clear consensus on this issue.

Collaborative Activities of Elected and Administrative Officials
This research also reveals different roles played by these officials in terms of the
most important things they can do to facilitate collaboration. Asked what elected officials
can do to facilitate collaboration, the three most frequently mentioned activities were to
educate the public on the benefits, stay informed and focused and maintain a positive role.
When the same question is asked relative to what administrative officials can do to
facilitate collaboration, the three things most frequently mentioned are to provide fair and
accurate information, keep lines of communication open, and maintain a positive
perspective.
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Another key finding of this research was a significant consensus between elected
and administrative officials regarding the need for this collaboration. Asked if there was
any way that the problems facing these cities could be handled internally without
collaboration, the overwhelming majority of the respondents replied that they do not see a
real alternative to collaborating in this way. Most of the respondents indicated that they
had already cut back as much as possible and that everything that could be accomplished
by individual cities had already been done. Respondents, who indicated that these
problems could be solved internally, stated that it would take a significant infusion of new
money to accomplish anything worthwhile.

Obstacles Encountered and Future Concerns
As for major obstacles to success, responses foreshadowed the subsequent collapse
of the collaboration effort. Many respondents said one significant problem they had was
convincing elected officials that collaboration was a part of their “regular work”. Echoing
the work of John Kingdon (2003), many of the respondents expressed a concern that the
window of opportunity to accomplish this authority might be closing. The five cities
involved in this collaboration were all facing elections soon after these interviews were
conducted. The results of those elections significantly influenced the collapse of the DFA
collaboration.
The biggest concerns these respondents expressed about the future of this
collaboration were drafting a labor agreement, establishing a stable funding source for the
authority, drafting an implementation plan and achieving a win-win for everyone involved.
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Respondents were for the most part satisfied with the benefits and costs of this
collaboration but city council members were the least satisfied with the costs and the least
satisfied with the level of input they had in the process. Fire chiefs were also less satisfied
with their input than were other groups.
Finally, this research reveals that the use of an authority is seen by these
respondents as the best alternative for achieving the goals of this collaboration. Most
respondents concluded that they have achieved all they can as independent fire
departments and that this collaboration was necessary in order to maintain current service
levels and ensure the future delivery of quality services.

Overview of Findings
Supporting the work of Zeemering (2007), this research revealed that elected
officials do have important, although different, roles to play. Another finding of this
research is that elected and administrative officials view collaboration differently and
engage in different activities to help facilitate it. It is also clear that elected and
administrative officials have different time horizons in terms of how collaboration will
occur and when benefits can reasonably be expected.
This research illustrates that while regular contact among elected officials is
important, regular contact among administrative officials is considered to be more
important. That contact is also more substantive and work-related than contacts among
elected officials. This research also reveals that respondents think professional education,
such as an MPA degree, and participation in professional organizations, such as the ICMA
or ASPA, influences whether and how collaboration develops.
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Lastly, although nearly every respondent indicated that their city can not solve their
service provision problems internally without a huge infusion of new resources, this
collaboration failed. This study clearly shows how interdependent these cities are thought
to be by the respondents. This interdependency is also shown to be perceived by the
respondents as a major factor causing these cities to collaborate. All of these cities are
suffering fiscal stress and it is growing worse. Many of the respondents mentioned that
they share seamless borders, have repeat contact with one another, have fought fires in one
another’s cities over a long period of time and that the political boundaries drawn on the
map are, in many ways, meaningless to them in terms of providing fire services. Yet, this
collaboration failed. This failure appears to be largely a result of the participant’s inability
to deal with the transaction costs associated with collaboration.

Conclusion and Directions for Future Research
As the discussion above has made clear, voluntary collaboration in the provision of
fire services faces several obstacles. What local government actors can do to overcome
such obstacles is an important area for future research.

What role precisely does fiscal stress play in motivating interlocal collaboration?
This study examined cities that attempted collaboration in relatively good
economic times and in times of severe fiscal stress. The attempted collaboration was not
successful in either case. Future research would benefit from examining whether fiscal
stress is really the primary motive that these respondents thought it was. Can fiscal stress
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that is too severe be an obstacle to collaboration? If fiscal stress is not the primary
motivation for collaboration on fire services, what factors do provide such motivation?

What Benefits Can Realistically be Expected from Interlocal Collaboration?
This study clearly revealed that the elected and administrative officials involved in
this two year effort at collaboration had significantly different expectations as to what
benefits could realistically be expected from their joint effort. Future research would
benefit from a better understanding of what the costs and the benefits of collaboration on
fire services are.

Is Local Control over Fire Services a Serious Impediment to Collaboration?
The extant literature largely concludes that the potential loss of local control over
services is an impediment to collaboration. However, this study indicates that many local
elected and administrative actors consider such control illusory, at least in terms of control
over fire services. It would be beneficial for future research to further examine this factor
and whether or not it does inhibit collaboration.

How Important is a Level of Trust Among Collaboration Actors?
This research revealed quite clearly that a significant level of trust among interlocal
actors is required for collaboration to succeed. Fire services are generally considered to be
a system maintenance function and collaboration on such services should be easier to
achieve than collaboration on other services. Future research would benefit from a better
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understanding of precisely what the term “trust” means in relation to collaboration, and
how such trust is developed, damaged and destroyed.

The Role of Policy Entrepreneurs in Collaboration.
A few policy entrepreneurs were active in this attempted collaboration, some
elected and some administrative. Future research would benefit from a clearer
understanding of the roles played by such entrepreneurs and what motivates, assists and
inhibits their activities.

The Role of Area Networks in Collaboration.
The Downriver Community Conference played a significant role in facilitating the
attempted DFA collaboration. It is unclear from this research what continuing role, if any,
they maintained throughout this nearly two year attempt. Future research would benefit
from gaining a fuller understanding of the roles played by such nonprofit community
conferences and what they can do to facilitate this kind of collaboration.

What Role is Played by the Informal and Formal Networks of Interlocal Actors?
This research indicates that it is very important that senior administrative officials
be in frequent contact in order to better facilitate collaboration. Although it is less
important for elected officials to be in frequent contact, it is still considered important.
Future research would benefit from a closer examination of how these local actors interact
and what significance that has for potential collaboration efforts.
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What Role might the State Legislature or State Municipal League Play?
Future research would benefit from examining the role that can be played by a
state-wide municipal league and/or the state legislature in developing model frameworks
relative to labor agreements, funding agreements and operating agreements among
interlocal collaborators.

What Role does Strong Unionization of Public Workforces Play?
Future research would benefit from examining the role played by the level or
intensity of unionization of the public personnel attempting collaboration on public safety
services. Is there a significant role that can be played by the state-wide fire fighters’ union
in facilitating this kind of collaboration?

The Differing Roles of Elected and Administrative Officials.
This research reveals that elected officials play a far greater role in interlocal
collaboration than was previously believed. Future research would benefit from a better
understanding of the differing roles that elected and administrative officials play and how
the interaction between these two groups influences the ultimate decision to collaborate.

I started this study in 2007 wanting to perform research that would provide
practical and valuable information for practitioners at the local level, the level of
government to which I devoted such a large portion of my adult life serving. I think that I
have accomplished that goal. I chose a descriptive study because I think that it is currently
missing from the literature. This study is a very detailed, descriptive analysis that delves
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deeper into the complexities of local intergovernmental collaboration than other studies
have. To my knowledge, no other study has examined so closely, and in such detail, the
issues of collaboration dealt with in this research. I hope to do more of this research in the
future.
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Appendix A
Wayne State University
Department of Political Science

Downriver Fire Authority Project
Survey Instrument

Today’s date: ____________________
Place interview took place: ________________________________________
Time of the interview: _____________________
Interviewer’s name: ____________________________________
Interviewee’s name: _____________________________________________
Organization’s name: ____________________________________________

A. Respondent Professional Experience
A-1. I want to begin with some questions about your professional experience.
a) How long have you been with the city? Do you also reside in the city?
b) What is your current position? How long have you been in it?
c). Have you had other positions in this organization?
d) Have you ever worked for any of the other cities participating in the DFA?
e) Do you have any previous experience as an elected official (or as an administrator) in
this or another local government?

B. Factors Stimulating Interlocal Cooperation
Next, I want to ask you a few questions about the factors that led to this current effort to
cooperate on fire services across these several cities. Initially, I would like to focus on the
stimulus for cooperating on fire services, not on cooperating in terms of a fire authority.
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The fire authority is a specific approach to collaboration and I will ask you about the
authority in the next section. At this point, I am interested in understanding the factors that
simulated your city’s interest in cooperating across jurisdictional lines on fire services.

B-1. Please turn to Scale A on the back of the instructions I provided you. Use them to
indicate the extent to which you agree with the following set of statements about how the
organizational and political culture in your city affects the likelihood of these types of
cross-border efforts emerging.
On a scale of 1-10, how much do you agree these statements generally describe your
organization and/or community?
a) My organization is usually receptive to doing things in new ways.
b) My organization usually approaches problems proactively.
c) My organization is usually open to possibilities for collaborating on services with other
local governments. (Here, we refer to governments other than the county.)
d) Our residents demand that direct provision be the default option for most basic public
services.
e) Our residents demand that we consider what’s good for Downriver when we make
decisions about providing important public services.
f) Our residents tend to be suspicious of the motivations of elected officials from the
neighboring jurisdictions.
g) Our residents do not care about how services are delivered because they focus only on
the quality and cost of these services.
h) Our residents would rather we contract with other local governments than with private
or non-profit organizations for most services.
i) Our residents want us to let the county provide services whenever possible.
j) Our residents place more value on protecting our city’s control over public services than
on lowering costs.
k) Our residents place more value on protecting our city’s control over public services than
on improving service effectiveness across the Downriver communities.
l) Our residents see themselves as highly interdependent with the local governments that
surround this community.
m) There is a significant constituency in my community for seeking regional solutions to
our problems.

B-2. In your view, what are the factors that led to this effort? (Depending on the answer,
follow up with the following prompts):
a) Were there any specific events that directly encouraged your city’s participation in this
effort? If yes, explain.
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b) Is there a person in your city that has stood out as an entrepreneur/leader in this effort?
If yes, who? What are some examples of the activities this person undertook? Why do you
think this person took on this role? What motivated his or her efforts in this regard?
c) In your view, has a person from another city been instrumental to this effort going
forward? If yes, who? What are some examples of the activities this person undertook?
What do you see as his or her motivations for this leadership role?
d) Are there any third parties whose involvement was instrumental to this collaboration
moving forward? If yes, who? How so? Can you offer some examples of how they helped?
Do you have any thoughts about their motivations for involvement in this effort?
B-3. This effort involves collaboration on fire services. Does the fact that it involves fire
services make it more or less easy to do this? Explain.

C. Perceptions of the Terms of Collaboration

Now, I have a few questions about your view of the costs and benefits of cooperating on
fire services. These include an identification of the benefits anticipated to flow from this
collaboration and your expectations about how these benefits will be distributed among the
cities participating in this collaboration. We are also interested in the expected costs, if
any, of this collaboration and how the fire authority is expected to affect the costs and
benefits of participating in this project.

C-1. Turning to Scale B on the back of the instructions I provided you, please indicate your
agreement with the following statement about the importance of these specific factors to
your support of this effort to cooperate on fire services.
a) Our city will save money in the short run (3-5 years).
b) Our city will save money in the long run (over 5 years).
c) Our residents see improvements in the quality of the service over what we have
provided previously.
d) Cost savings are distributed equally among the participating communities.
e) None of our fire department staff will lose their jobs due to this collaboration.
f) Participation in the authority gives our community access to existing facilities and
equipment currently unavailable to us because of their location in another jurisdiction.
h) Participation in the authority gives our community access to the financial resources
needed to construct facilities or purchase equipment that we cannot afford by ourselves.
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i) The authority will distribute future nonlocal (state and federal) resources among the
Downriver communities in a more rationale way than is now the case.
j) Creation of this authority results in equal spending on fire protection among the
participating jurisdictions.
C-2. Are there benefits I have NOT mentioned that you hope will result from this
collaboration?
C-3. Previously, we discussed the perceptions of your city’s residents about the existence
of interdependencies among the Downriver communities. I would like you to elaborate
further on this question of interdependence.
a) Do you agree these interdependencies exist among the Downriver communities?
b) If so, what is the nature of this interdependence?
C-4.Turning to the specific issue of the fire authority as the mechanism for this
collaborative effort, I have several questions about your views of and expectations for the
authority.
a) Is the use of a fire authority important to your support for this effort? Why or why not?
How confident are you that your city will be better off by participating in this authority?
b) Are you confident that your community will retain sufficient control over the quality of
services provided to your residents? If so, why?
c) In your mind, how do the potential gains of the fire authority outweigh the loss of
complete control over this service?
d) How confident are you that the elected officials of your community will be able to exert
meaningful influence over the managers of the fire authority?
e) If your residents become dissatisfied with this arrangement, can it be easily altered? Can
your community easily withdraw from the authority?
f) How will the costs of the fire authority be allocated among the participating
communities?

D. Perceptions of Partners (and Potential Partners) in the Collaboration

Next, we are interested in your perceptions of the partners in this collaboration. We are
especially interested in understanding the levels of trust that existed among the
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participating communities prior to this collaboration and how confident you are that these
other communities will meet their obligations to the others.

D-1. Turning again to Scale B, how important are the following characteristics in a
potential local government partner for ANY significant effort to collaborate on public
services, and not just fire services? These can be thought of as general principles of
collaboration. They should be…..
a) …communities we do not directly compete with for residents and development.
b) …similar to our community in terms of wealth and racial composition.
c) …similar to our community in terms of governmental structure (i.e., either both
council-manager or both mayor-council systems).
d) …similar to our community in terms of powers (i.e., both cities or both townships).
e) …able to provide similar levels of resources to the effort.
f) …seeking the same benefits from this collaboration as we are.
g) …communities that have successfully collaborated with us in the past.
D-2. A general concern about intergovernmental collaborations on public services
involves the level of trust among the participating governments. We are interested in
understanding how trust is developed, maintained, and lost. First, using Scale B, please
answer the following questions about trust in your collaboration partners.
a) I must be able to trust the political leadership in the other communities.
b) In your opinion, how important to your community is the reputation of your
collaboration partners for trustworthiness and cooperation?
c) Do you think your community has a generally trusting orientation toward other
communities?
d) In your opinion, has the level of trust between the participants gone up, down or stayed
about the same since this collaboration effort began?
e) Do you trust your partners in this effort? All of them?
f) how do you define trust?
g) how can the required trust be built?
h) how can this trust be undermined?
D-3. I am interested in understanding how were the participants in this effort decided on.
a) How were the participants decided on? Is this the final group or do you envision others
will be added in the future?
b) Are there any nonparticipating communities you wish were involved? If yes, why do
you think they are not participating at this time?
c) What makes the current participants good partners for your community on this service?
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d) Can you think of some local jurisdictions that would NOT be good partners for your
community? If so, why?
e) How are your perceptions about these actual and potential partners affected by past
interactions? Please explain with an example or two.
D-4. Does your city already cooperate on any of the services that will be provided through
the fire authority? If yes, could you talk about the specific services, which of the
Downriver cities are involved, and the nature of the cooperative arrangement with the city.
(Some examples are an interlocal services contract, mutual aid, etc.)
D-5. What has been the public reaction in your community to this effort?

E. Differences in Roles Played by Elected Officials and Public Managers

Next, we are interested in understanding the roles played by the elected officials and public
managers in this effort. A common perception by researchers is that elected officials play a
secondary role in interlocal arrangements. Elected officials are often described as having
jurisdictional-based interests, whereas managers are said to be more likely to embrace
solutions that involve intergovernmental cooperation.

E-1. I would like to ask you a few questions about any institution(s) or network(s) either
formal or informal that helped bring about this collaboration effort. (Interviewer: note
whether interviewee is an appointed administrative person or an elected official)
a) Do you talk with officials from other local governments on a regular basis? If so, how
often in a typical year?
b) What form do these contacts take? (Choose all that apply.)
political meetings
SEMCOG
MML functions
DRCC
MSA
Regular meetings of city managers
Other
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a) Was any particular institution (hierarchy?) used in bringing about the start-up of this
collaboration? If yes, what was that institution?
b) How necessary was any institution to the emergence of this collaboration?
c) How much time would you estimate you spend monthly on this collaboration effort?
d) How much time would you estimate you spend monthly meeting with your counterparts
in surrounding communities?
e) In regards to working on this collaborative effort, how important do you think your
knowledge, expertise and shared beliefs with your counter-parts is? Why?
f) How difficult will it be/has it been to sell this collaboration to the political leaders of
your community? How did you/will you do that?
g) Is there any way these issues could have been dealt with solely within your
jurisdiction? If yes, how?
E-2. Do you belong to any professional organizations or local networking group that have
been important to this effort?
E-3. Have you relied on your professional network within the participating communities in
the development of this proposed fire authority? If yes, how? (Have we answered this with
the above questions or do we still need something more?)
E-4. Is it important to have a political constituency for cooperation? Do administrators
play a role in creating one?

F. Final Questions
In your view, what is the most difficult aspect of pursuing this effort?
As you look forward, what are your three biggest concerns about the future of this effort?
Are there any topics I have not covered that you would like to talk about?
If I have additional questions in the future, would it be okay for me to contact you again?
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Appendix B

Wayne State University
Department of Political Science

Downriver Fire Authority Project Research
2009 Supplemental Survey Instrument

Today’s date: ____________________
Interviewer’s name: Bill Hatley
Interviewee’s name: _____________________________________________
Organization’s name: ____________________________________________
Hello, my name is Bill Hatley and I’m a doctoral candidate from Wayne State University
and I’m working on a project examining the proposed Downriver Fire Authority (DFA). I
am working with Professor Jered Carr in the Department of Political Science. You will
recall that I interviewed you previously and we discussed various factors and issues
surrounding the effort to establish the DFA. Your participation in that phase of our
investigation helped us to better understand interlocal cooperation in general and the DFA
effort in particular.
We are currently examining the attitudes and insights of public managers and local elected
officials as to the current state of the DFA collaborative effort. We are particularly
interested in your thoughts as to why the DFA effort appears to be suspended and what
may have happened that caused that.
We are interviewing several officials from each of the jurisdictions that previously
participated in our study. Thank you for your willingness to participate again in this
research project. Your participation is very much appreciated. Before you start to answer
the following questions, I would like to highlight a few things:
•
•
•
•
•

Your participation in this research is entirely voluntary.
You may refuse to answer any question or part of a question.
You are free to withdraw from the research at any time.
The transcript of your answers will be available only to members of the research
team.
Excerpts from these answers may be made part of the final research report.
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We welcome any questions you might have about this research, now or in the future.
Professor Jered Carr is my dissertation advisor and working with me on this project. He
may be contacted through the WSU Department of Political Science (313-577-2630) or on
his cell phone (313-310-3632) should you have any questions. I can be reached at 313-3886210 or via email at hatleylaw@wowway.com.
Question #1: What do you believe is the current state of the effort to implement the
Downriver Fire Authority? Is the planning group still meeting? When was the last meeting
held? Is the concept still being discussed formally or informally, If yes, how?

Question # 2: If the DFA effort has been discontinued, what do you believe are the main
reasons as to why the DFA effort has been discontinued? Were there any specific events
that directly caused your city to stop participating in this effort?

Question # 3: Did the local elections of 2008 have any impact on your city’s decision to
continue or discontinue the DFA effort? For example, did the election of a new Mayor in
three out of the five cities make any difference to your participation?

Question #4: When we conducted the last interviews for this research, the planning group
had not yet drafted a proposed labor agreement nor had it drafted a proposed method for
funding the DFA. What importance, if any, do you attach to those two factors?

Question #5: Do you believe that anything can be done to re-start the DFA collaboration?
If so, what specifically?

Question #6: Our previous research indicated that all of the participating cities were
experiencing considerable fiscal stress and had hoped to alleviate some of that stress
through the DFA effort. Has that fiscal stress been eliminated in some other way? If yes,
please explain how?

Question #7: Looking back on your effort to establish the DFA, what were the three
biggest obstacles to your achieving your goals? What in your opinion are the biggest
mistakes that were made in this effort to form the DFA?
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Metropolitan regions have emerged in the United States as important economic
units with numerous small local governments each providing various public services. The
movement toward city-county consolidation has frequently been defeated at the polls.
Frederickson (1999) argues that metropolitan areas have become so fragmented in their
approach to service delivery that they constitute what he describes as a “disarticulated
state”, characterized by the declining salience of jurisdiction, the fuzziness of borders and
an erosion of the capacity of the local jurisdiction to contain and, thereby, manage complex
social, economic and political issues. Feiock (2009) contends that much of the urban
politics and public administration literatures tend to focus on regional governments and
authorities as a way of solving collective action problems in metropolitan regions. Feiock
(2008) also argues that little is currently known about the dynamics of how governance
mechanisms emerge and operate in fragmented metropolitan areas.
This study sought to examine how such governance mechanisms develop in a
metropolitan area and more specifically how fire services might be provided through
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interlocal collaboration. Using the case study method, this research uses Feiock’s (2004)
Institutional Collective Action framework to examine the following issues and their
relation to interlocal cooperation: (1) state level rules, (2) transaction and production cost
characteristics of public services, (3) characteristics of regions and communities and, (4)
political structures. This research also uses the three-part framework of Zeemering (2007)
which measures (1) the conjunction of policy stimuli, (2) perceptions of intergovernmental
partners and social capital and, (3) the terms of the proposed collaboration. This study also
uses Zeemering’s framework for examining the differing roles played by elected and
administrative actors in collaboration.
Findings of this study indicate that a certain level of trust among, and prior
experience with, partners is important in overcoming the obstacles to collaboration.
Contrary to much of the literature, this study found that losing control over fire service
delivery was not perceived as an important obstacle to collaboration. This study provides
support for prior research that fiscal stress can be a significant motivation leading cities to
collaborate. Supporting the work of Kingdon (2003), this study found the activities of
policy entrepreneurs, both elected and administrative officials, to be important to this effort
at collaboration. This study also provides support for the theory that social and
professional networks may help facilitate interlocal collaboration (LeRoux 2006).
This study concludes that voluntary interlocal collaboration on fire services is
difficult and a lack of trust among the cities participating, and between the labor and
management within each city, is a significant obstacle to collaboration. This study also
found that it is very important that participants in collaboration have a clear understanding
of the goals they are seeking and have similar expectations of the likely benefits of
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collaboration. Collaborating partners generally seek out cities that are adjacent to their
own, have similar demographics to their own, fire service needs similar to their own and
that have sufficient fiscal resources to facilitate the joint effort.
This study found strong support for the need to have an outside third party, perhaps
a higher level of government, provide standard labor, funding and operating agreements for
collaborative efforts to local governments rather than allowing them to attempt drafting
individual agreements.
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